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Abstract  
This dissertation seeks to advance the political understanding of xenophobia in South Africa by 
examining the relationship between the South African state and its African migrant population. It 
investigates the practices of frontline officials of three state institutions when dealing with African 
migrants and relates such practices to the prevalence of xenophobia. These institutions are the 
Department of Home Affairs, the South African Police Service and the City of Cape Town.  
The state of exception, propounded by Giorgio Agamben, provides a conceptual lens through which to 
examine the practices of state officials towards African migrants and the place of migrants in South 
African society. This concept is concerned with the law and the conditions of its application or 
suspension. It is characterised by the relationship between sovereign power and ‘bare life’– the form 
of deprived subjectivity produced by and captured in the exercise of sovereign power.  
The research is guided by a central question: Do the practices of state officials (from the three 
institutions), as experienced by African migrants, reinforce xenophobia in South Africa? This question 
is addressed by way of four secondary questions: a) How are the practices of state officials 
experienced by migrants?; b) To what extent are migrants treated differently by state officials in terms 
of their legal status or nationality?; c) Is the approach of state officials towards migrants evidence of a 
state of exception?; and, d) If so, to what extent has a state of exception in dealing with migrants 
shaped xenophobia in South Africa? 
In order to answer the research questions, an ethnographic field study was undertaken in Cape Town. 
The data-collection instruments were semi-structured interviews and observation at selected Home 
Affairs offices. A total of 40 African migrants, seven key informants from organisations that work on 
migration issues and two state officials were interviewed. The migrant sample represented 13 African 
countries and comprised five legal migrant categories.  
The key findings are that, firstly, migrants’ experiences with state officials were predominantly 
negative. Secondly, the primary basis for differential treatment of migrants was their foreignness, 
regardless of their nationality. With regard to the police and municipal officials, migrants’ experiences 
were further differentiated by other variables such as residential area, socio-economic status, and 
knowledge of the law or access to human rights organisations. There were also apparent differences in 
how migrants experienced Home Affairs officials based on their legal status with asylum seekers and 
refugees experiencing worse treatment than temporary and permanent residents. Thirdly, evidence of 
the state of exception varied within the three institutions. The main agents of the state of exception 
were mainly Home Affairs officials followed by the police. In the case of Home Affairs officials, the 
targets were predominantly illegal foreigners, asylum seekers and refugees, and in the case of the 
police migrants who are informal traders were targeted. The most evident site for the practice of the 
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exception was the Refugee Reception Office. Fourthly, both the state of exception and xenophobia 
have an exclusionary power, which makes them mutually reinforcing.  
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Opsomming 
Hierdie verhandeling is daarop toegespits om groter politieke begrip van xenofobie 
(vreemdelingehaat) in Suid-Afrika te bewerkstellig deur die verhouding tussen die Suid-Afrikaanse 
staat en sy migrantebevolking uit Afrika te verken. Dit ondersoek die praktyke van frontlinie-
amptenare by drie staatsinstellings in hul omgang met Afrika-migrante, en lê ’n verband tussen hierdie 
praktyke en die voorkoms van xenofobie. Hierdie instellings is die Departement van Binnelandse 
Sake, die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiediens en die Stad Kaapstad.  
Die staat van uitsondering, ’n konsep wat deur Giorgio Agamben geskep is, bied ’n konseptuele lens 
waardeur staatsamptenare se praktyke teenoor Afrika-migrante sowel as migrante se plek in die Suid-
Afrikaanse samelewing ondersoek kan word. Hierdie konsep handel oor die reg, en die omstandighede 
vir die toepassing of opskorting daarvan. Dit word gekenmerk deur die verhouding tussen soewereine 
mag en ‘blote lewe’ – die vorm van ontblote subjektiwiteit wat geskep word deur én vasgelê word in 
die uitoefening van soewereine mag.  
Die navorsing word deur ’n kernvraag gerig: Versterk staatsamptenare (by die drie instellings) se 
praktyke, soos Afrika-migrante dit ervaar, xenofobie in Suid-Afrika? Hierdie vraag word met behulp 
van vier sekondêre vrae ondersoek: a) Hoe beleef migrante staatsamptenare se praktyke? b) In watter 
mate behandel die staatsamptenare migrante verskillend op grond van hul regstatus of nasionaliteit? c) 
Getuig die staatsamptenare se benadering tot migrante van ’n staat van uitsondering? d) Indien wel, in 
watter mate dra die staat van uitsondering met betrekking tot migrante tot xenofobie in Suid-Afrika 
by? 
Om die navorsingsvrae te beantwoord, is ’n etnografiese veldstudie in Kaapstad onderneem. Die data 
is met behulp van semigestruktureerde onderhoude en waarneming by gekose kantore van die 
Departement van Binnelandse Sake ingesamel. Onderhoude is met altesaam 40 Afrika-migrante, sewe 
sleutelinformante van organisasies wat met migrasiekwessies werk, en twee staatsamptenare gevoer. 
Die migrante-steekproef het 13 Afrikalande verteenwoordig en uit vyf wettige kategorieë van migrante 
bestaan.  
Die belangrikste bevindinge is soos volg: Eerstens ervaar migrante staatsamptenare hoofsaaklik 
negatief. Tweedens is die vernaamste rede waarom migrante verskillend behandel word, hul 
vreemdheid, ongeag hul nasionaliteit. Wat die polisie en munisipale amptenare betref, word migrante 
voorts verskillend hanteer op grond van ander veranderlikes, soos woongebied, sosio-ekonomiese 
status, en kennis van die reg of toegang tot menseregte-organisasies. Daarbenewens is daar duidelike 
verskille in migrante se ervaring van amptenare van Binnelandse Sake op grond van die migrante se 
regstatus, met asielsoekers en vlugtelinge wat swakker behandeling ontvang as diegene met tydelike 
en permanente verblyfreg. Derdens bestaan daar wisselende bewyse van die staat van uitsondering 
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binne die drie instellings. Die hoofagente van die staat van uitsondering blyk die amptenare van 
Binnelandse Sake te wees, gevolg deur die polisie. In die geval van Binnelandse Sake is die teikens 
hoofsaaklik onwettige migrante, asielsoekers en vlugtelinge, terwyl die polisie weer meestal informele 
handelaars in die visier het. Die plek waar die uitsondering die duidelikste in die praktyk beoefen 
word, is die Vlugtelinge-ontvangskantoor. Vierdens beskik die staat van uitsondering en xenofobie 
albei oor ’n uitsluitingsmag, wat die een die ander laat versterk.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the study 
 
1.1 Background and rationale 
Contemporary, democratic South Africa is a recipient state of people from all corners of the world 
who reside temporarily or permanently in the country. Increasingly, these international migrants are of 
African origin. In 2008 the United Nations estimated that 72% of international migrants to South 
Africa came from African countries (United Nations, 2008). In 2009 the total number of migrants was 
estimated to range between 1.2 million and 1.7 million, or less than 4% of South Africa’s population 
by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) (Landau, Polzer & Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 
2010:220). These migrants enter and remain in the country through both legal and illegal means. 
Perhaps because of their relatively low numbers compared to the national population, migrants are 
insignificant political actors in South Africa and do not constitute a primary political constituency. 
However, their presence in South Africa is an issue that draws much attention. International migration 
to South Africa is broadly viewed in negative terms. Landau (2008b:105) states that foreigners in 
South Africa have been regarded as “groups to be feared, disdained, occasionally pitied and often 
exploited”. Foreign migrants, regardless of their legal status in South Africa, are generally conflated 
into the one category of ‘illegal aliens’ and viewed as potential contaminators of the physical and 
metaphysical metaphorical body of the nation (Peberdy, 2009:158). The state has also blamed 
foreigners for its shortcomings in providing public services to its citizens by presenting them as a 
strain on resources that are meant for citizens and a threat to the country’s security (Landau, 
2006:228). 
The arrival of international migrants in South Africa, particularly those of black African origin, has 
been met with intense intolerance. Xenophobia remains one of the negative and widespread features of 
post-apartheid South Africa. It is not only racialised, but it is also Africanised, with black African 
foreigners being disproportionally the targets of xenophobia (Nyamnjoh, 2006:49). It is within this 
context that some authors such as Matsinhe (2011:298), Everatt (2011:7) and Mngxitama (2008:195) 
use the terms ‘negrophobia’ or ‘Afrophobia’ to refer to the racialised xenophobia directed towards 
black African migrants, which they view as a more accurate term to describe xenophobia in South 
Africa. Bekker (2010:136) alludes to a hierarchy of belonging of the different races based on a ranking 
of races and stereotypes of the different racial groups.  
Black African foreigners in South Africa are often referred to by the derogatory term amakwerekwere. 
The term, coined by black South Africans, is loaded with negative connotations and symbolises the 
sound of the unintelligible languages other Africans speak (Nyamnjoh, 2006:39). The amakwerekwere 
are regarded as a deep threat to personal and community security (Vale, 2002:10), and a danger to the 
South African nation (Nyamnjoh, 2006:39). Thus the African migrant is constructed as the ‘other’. 
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According to Vale (2002:13),  this ‘othering’ was “derived ironically from a sense of superiority and 
inflated by the celebration of the success of South Africa’s transition, but it simultaneously 
constructed another underclass around the same conceptual primitives upon which apartheid once 
rested”. Nyamnjoh (2006:51) underscores how ironic it is that black Africans should be the victims of 
racial profiling in a new democratic dispensation. 
In practice, xenophobia in South Africa is manifested in the prejudice, discrimination, hostility and 
violence directed towards foreigners. Incidents of physical xenophobic attacks have been reported in 
the media since the mid-1990s. In 2008 South Africa was in the international spotlight following a 
wave of xenophobic violence, the worst violence witnessed in the country since the end of apartheid. 
Over a period of two weeks, violence spread across townships in Cape Town, Durban and 
Johannesburg and left 62 dead, hundreds injured, tens of thousands displaced and a lot of property 
destroyed (Worby, Hassim & Kupe, 2008:1-2). Although the attacks were targeted at black African 
migrants, some South Africans from smaller ethnic groups were also victims.  
After an initially slow reaction to the 2008 xenophobic violence, the government attributed it to a 
‘third force’ and denied the existence of xenophobia. A year prior to the attacks the Africa Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) had noted the poor treatment of migrants by South Africans. It noted that 
African foreigners are being subjected to brutality and detention and that the rising tide of xenophobia 
should be stopped (African Union, 2007:286). However, in its response, the state denied the existence 
of xenophobic tendencies (African Union, 2007:377). Misago (2011:96) argues that, alongside the 
denial, the state has allowed a culture of impunity in relation to perpetrators of xenophobic violence to 
prevail. This is despite the existence of a legal framework guaranteeing international migrants more 
rights than ever before (Landau et al., 2010:222). In short, the South African state has not only 
downplayed the seriousness of xenophobia, but has allegedly also been guilty of fostering it.  
In March 2012 the South African government was accused of being xenophobic by the Nigerian 
government after Home Affairs deported 125 Nigerians who, upon landing at the airport in 
Johannesburg, allegedly produced fake immunisation cards (Butunyi, 2012). The Nigerian government 
retaliated by deporting 84 South Africans from Nigeria, sparking off a diplomatic spat between the 
two countries. The South African government then issued an apology to the Nigerian government, 
which resolved the issue.1  
Foreign nationals have repeatedly been the victims of human rights violations at the hands of state 
officials (Human Rights Watch, 1998; South African Human Rights Commission, 1999). In February 
2013 the gruesome death of Mozambican Emidio Macia in police custody made news headlines. An 
eye-witness released a video recording of Macia, a taxi driver in Johannesburg, being assaulted by the 
police who then dragged him for metres attached to the back of their police van to Daveyton Police 
Station, where he was tortured and died a few days later (Zvomuya, 2013). While Macia’s death was 
                                                     
1
 South Africa’s Deputy Foreign Minister said that the yellow fever certificates had not been checked properly 
by South African immigration officials and the Nigerians should not have been deported (BBC, 2012).  
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widely condemned as yet another case of police brutality by South Africa’s militarised police known 
for their aggressive use of force, commentators also described the brutalising and killing as “mixed 
with xenophobia” (Sosibo, 2013). More recently, in March 2014, two Cape Town policemen were 
caught on video assaulting a Nigerian man who had apparently been arrested following a robbery 
complaint. The video shows the two officers on a street in the central business district stripping the 
handcuffed man naked and then repeatedly punching and kicking him in the groin area (Phakathi, 
2014). 
International migration is a matter of state sovereignty as states have the right to determine under what 
conditions they permit or prohibit entry of non-citizens into their jurisdictions.2 Management and 
control are the key concepts in immigration policy. On the one hand, this entails the legal and 
bureaucratic aspects of passports, visas, finger-prints, deportation and so on. On the other hand, it 
reflects a concern with national security and consequently a belief that international migration levels 
should be kept as low as possible and should be limited to only that which is necessary to maintaining 
economic advantage in an increasingly competitive global system.  
South Africa’s Immigration Act of 2002 determines under what conditions the state permits or 
prohibits entry of non-citizens into its borders. The Act is seen as largely retaining a strong 
sovereignty and security-centred agenda reflecting a narrowly defined notion of national interest, 
which is not very different from the position of the former apartheid regime (Landau et al., 2010:223). 
In other words, South Africa has taken a neo-realist approach to immigration policy (Vale, 2002:10).  
While the Immigration Act largely deals with economic migrants and gives priority to migrants with 
skills that are in short supply in the country, the Refugees Act of 1998 deals with persons forced to 
flee their home countries as a result of a range of circumstances and South Africa’s obligations under 
international law to host such people. The Refugees Act guarantees migrants a broad range of human 
rights and legal protections. However, together with the Immigration Act it has been described as 
schizophrenic on paper and sloppy in practice (Landau, 2008a:8). This is because those who are 
entitled to documentation struggle to get it through legal channels in part because of bureaucratic 
inefficiencies in Home Affairs, which is responsible for implementing immigration policy. All 
migrants are guaranteed the rights in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of 1996 with the exception 
of the right to form or support a political party, vote and stand for public office. Consequently, South 
Africa is regarded as having one of the most expansive rights regimes in the world for migrants 
(Human Rights Watch, 2009:2).  
Klaaren and Ramji (2001:35) argue that the institutional and symbolic effect of South Africa’s 
immigration policy is that it tends to ‘irregularise’ people by making it almost impossible to retain 
legal status over time. As a result, the majority of foreigners reside in the country with few practical 
legal protections and residency rights (Landau, 2011:8). Becoming and remaining legalised can be a 
                                                     
2
 International refugee law is an exception to this rule (Dauvergne, 2008:62). 
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costly, stressful and time-consuming exercise and many migrants find it easier simply to avoid the 
legal framework altogether by purchasing fraudulent documents from corrupt Home Affairs officials 
or going undocumented (Hoag, 2010:208).  
International migrants challenge the triad of state-territory-citizen on which the modern state is 
founded and are thus constructed as a threat to the national order of things. The state, by definition, is 
structurally characterised by a bias towards citizens and an implicit alienation of the non-national 
(Monson, 2012:463). Yet large-scale migration, both forced and voluntary, and the reasons that drive 
it suggest that there is no turning back to the ideal state with sedentary citizens bounded by birth, 
descent or culture (Mehta & Napier-Moore, 2010:236). Thus international migration brings into 
question orthodox notions of citizenship and all the elements associated with it.   
This study is being undertaken with the understanding that migration is “a central part of processes of 
social change everywhere” (Castles, 2012:26), which has been accompanied globally by xenophobia 
and anti-immigrant sentiments. Therefore, it is pertinent to conduct research into how states regulate 
the entry of international migrants into their borders and respond to their presence in their polity. In 
spite of the great strides made by South Africa towards creating a diverse, non-racial, democratic state, 
the country is typically considered to be a “deeply divided” society because of its history of apartheid 
(Gibson & Gouws, 2003:15).This study broadly investigates how the South African state deals with 
the presence of African migrants in light of the country’s pressing challenges of poverty, inequality, 
unemployment and crime on the one hand, and citizens’ high expectations of the state, on the other. 
This raises the question of the extent to which the state is able to defend the rights of an unpopular 
minority (Gibson & Gouws, 2003:16).  
Both the inherent citizen bias of the state and the exclusionary nature of immigration laws, raise the 
question of the extent to which the state itself is central in attempting to understand widespread 
xenophobia as a response to South Africa’s mostly African international migrants. This research on 
international migration, xenophobia and the South African state seeks to explore this issue by 
examining the relationship between the state and non-citizens highlighting the role of power. It does 
this by focusing on state officials, how they behave in the various spaces in which they interact with 
African migrants, and the implications of their behaviour for the prevalence of xenophobia in South 
Africa.  
Although much of the literature on African migration has focussed on African migration to the global 
North, the reality is that most African migration is to other African countries than to other parts of the 
world (Berianne & de Haas, 2012:1). Moreover, according to Crush and Ramachandran (2010:210), 
various aspects of xenophobia in Northern countries have been studied extensively; however, 
xenophobia in the South as a result of increasing South-South migration has been neglected. By 
focusing on African migration to South Africa and xenophobia in South Africa, this study is a 
contribution towards filling the gap identified by migration scholars. It approaches the study of 
xenophobia from a different angle – theorising about state practices towards African migrants and the 
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implications of such practices for shaping xenophobia. It seeks to provide an insight into whether the 
state’s approach to migrants reinforces xenophobia in South Africa. In this way, supplements the 
existing political explanations of xenophobia in South Africa by using the state of exception theory of 
Giorgio Agamben, which focuses on the state and how it exercises power over people’s lives. 
 
1.2 Problem statement and focus 
This study seeks to investigate how state power is exercised by frontline officials of the state 
bureaucracy when dealing with African migrants and how this relates to xenophobia in South Africa. 
It appears that alongside conventional law, the paradigm according to which African migrants are 
dealt with by the South African state also includes a realm of practices that fall outside state regulation 
and within the non-application of the law. This paradigm may have implications for xenophobia in 
South Africa. 
The study examines the practices of state officials from three selected institutions towards African 
migrants. These institutions have been selected as they tend to have greater face-to-face interaction 
with African migrants compared to other state institutions. They are the Department of Home Affairs 
(DHA), the South African Police Service (SAPS) and local government – the City of Cape Town 
(CoCT). The study, which was conducted in Cape Town as an ethnographic field study, relies mainly 
on the experiences of African migrants of varying legal status, nationality and socio-economic class to 
examine how state officials exercise their authority while going about their daily routines. Based on 
the migrants’ experiences, the study further seeks to understand the state’s practices towards African 
migrants in the context of widespread xenophobia in South Africa. This is a qualitative study which 
uses ethnographic instruments and is approached from a political science perspective. The 
hypothetical ‘state of exception’ espoused by Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005) provides a useful 
theoretical framework from which the behaviour of state officials towards African migrants is 
examined. More fully defined in Chapter 3, the state of exception essentially refers to the suspension 
of the law by the state in order to protect it from threats, but the law remains in force. Captured in the 
state of exception is ‘bare life’ where people are stripped of their rights and abandoned by the law.   
The key arguments and assumptions that the researcher makes in this dissertation can be summarised 
as follows. The author asserts that the negative perceptions of migrants and the concern with state 
sovereignty in South Africa have led to a discourse that constructs African migrants as vectors of 
insecurity. She argues that in response to the assumed threat posed by migrants to the wellbeing of 
South Africans, some state officials use their authority to disregard their own laws with impunity in 
order to constrain and exclude migrants with serious consequences for their wellbeing in South Africa. 
The assumption was made that state behaviour is motivated by the threat, real or perceived, posed by 
migrants in terms of security, national identity, health and livelihoods. The researcher analyses 
bureaucratic practices within Agamben’s theoretical framework of the state of exception. The 
researcher then argues that extra-legal practices reinforce xenophobia. The dissertation seeks to 
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advance the political theorisation of xenophobia in South Africa by examining the relationship 
between the South African state and its African migrant population both theoretically and empirically.  
 
1.2.1 Research questions 
The central question that the research seeks to answer is: Do the practices of state officials (from the 
DHA, SAPS and CoCT), as experienced by African migrants, reinforce xenophobia in South Africa? 
The main question will be further broken down into four secondary questions:  
a) How are the practices of South African state officials experienced by African migrants? 
b) To what extent are African migrants treated differently by South African state officials in 
terms of their legal status or nationality? 
c) Is the approach of South African state officials towards African migrants evidence of a state of 
exception?  
d) If so, to what extent has a state of exception in dealing with African migrants shaped 
xenophobia in South Africa? 
 
1.2.2 Research objectives 
The study has the following four objectives related to each of the research questions: 
a) To understand how African migrants experience the sovereign power of the state through their 
interactions with frontline DHA, SAPS and local government (CoCT) bureaucrats; 
b) To establish if there are differences or patterns in how African migrants experience  state 
officials based on their legal status or nationality; 
c) To locate the practices of state officials towards African migrants within political theory; 
d) To investigate the relationship between African migrants’ experiences of sovereign state 
power and xenophobia in South Africa. 
 
1.3 Limitations and delimitation 
This qualitative field study has three limitations. The first limitation is that it is not representative of 
the entire South African state and the whole African migrant population.  The second limitation is that 
although it is about the state, it relies heavily on the experiences of African migrants and key 
informant non-governmental organisations (NGOs), because of the challenges of gaining direct 
information from state officials. Related to this is the fact that migrants have different levels of contact 
with state officials. So while it is guaranteed that all migrants will have had experiences with the 
DHA, they will not necessarily have had personal experiences with the other two selected institutions. 
The third limitation is that generalisability is difficult. However, Bryman (2008:391-392) points out 
that “the findings of qualitative research are to generalise to theory rather than to populations”. 
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Furthermore, Williams (in Bryman, 2008:392) argues that it is possible to make what he refers to as 
moderatum generalisations “in which aspects of the focus of enquiry can be seen to be instances of a 
broader set of recognisable features”.  
In terms of delimiting the study, firstly, it only focuses on selected state officials from three state 
organs (DHA, SAPS and CoCT), NGOs and African migrants based in Cape Town. Secondly, 
although the study is conducted in Cape Town, the experiences of migrants are broader and include 
other areas where they have encountered the selected officials. Thirdly, the period of the study is 
January 2012 to August 2014. However, the experiences of Africans migrants covered in the study 
range from the post-1994 period up to the end of the fieldwork, which is October 2013. Fourthly, the 
study only compared the experiences of migrants with state officials to the legal and normative 
framework relating to migrants. It did not compare the experiences of migrants with state officials to 
the experiences of citizens with state officials.   
 
1.4 Research design and methodology 
An ethnographic field study research design was selected as it was particularly suited to the 
exploratory and descriptive nature of the research questions. Ethnography is one of many established 
qualitative research approaches in the social sciences. Fetterman (1989:11) defines ethnography as 
“the art and science of describing a group or culture”. Ethnography has its roots in anthropology, but 
has over time spread to other disciplines. Whitehead (2005:6-7) defines ethnography as “an open-
ended emergent process of learning episodes that is facilitated through iterative processes of continual 
observations, asking questions (interviewing), making inferences, and continuing these processes until 
those questions have been answered with the greatest emic validity possible”.  
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007:2) claim in their seminal book Ethnography: Principles in Practice 
that ethnography does not have a universal definition, having been remoulded over time by various 
disciplines to deal with particular contexts. Their emphasis is on the common features of ethnographic 
work, which are that people’s actions are studied in everyday contexts rather than in situations 
specifically set up for research purposes; data are drawn from multiple sources but mainly from 
participant observation and/or informal conversations; data collection is mostly ‘unstructured’ as it 
does not develop from a fixed research design at the outset; data are collected from a few cases to 
enable in-depth study; and data analysis involves interpreting meanings, functions and consequences 
of human actions and institutional practices, as well as their implications for local and wider contexts 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007:3). Ethnography in political research is sometimes referred to as 
political ethnography (Manheim, Rich, Willnat, Brians & Babb, 2012:329). Bryman (2008:403) 
observes that conducting research for a dissertation is a form of “micro-ethnography” as opposed to 
“full-scale ethnography”, which requires the researcher to be immersed in a social setting for long 
periods of time.   
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An ethnographic field study allows the researcher to be flexible and open-minded in searching for data 
(Shaffir & Stebbins, 1991:5). The strengths of this research design are that it offers high construct 
validity, in-depth insights, and establishes rapport with research subjects (Mouton, 2001:148). In 
addition, analysis and data collection can occur simultaneously in ethnographic research, unlike with 
most research designs, where data analysis is undertaken after data collection has been completed 
(Fetterman, 1989:13). However, every research design has its limitations, so it is incumbent upon the 
researcher to be aware of them and minimise the main sources of error. The limitations associated with 
ethnographic research, according to Mouton (2001:48), are the lack of generalisability of results, non-
standardisation of measurement, and the time-consuming nature of data collection and analysis.  
Fieldwork, which is synonymous with ethnography, refers to going out into the social setting in order 
to experience the worldview from the selected cases. Fieldwork for this study took place over a period 
of four months from July to October 2013 in order to immerse the researcher in the social context 
within which South African state officials and African migrants interact. Fieldwork was conducted 
with the aim of recording as much information as possible about the actions of state officials towards 
African migrants. The researcher observed, gathered and examined the experiences of African 
migrants with state officials from the DHA, SAPS and CoCT. Throughout the fieldwork all three 
forms of note taking – mental, jotting and full field notes – were used.  
The researcher operationalised three concepts – xenophobia, the state of exception and bare life. This 
was necessary in order for the researcher to know what to look for in the field (Bryman, 2008:373). 
Chapter 3 defines these concepts and how they were measured. 
 
1.4.1 Sampling methods and sample profiles 
Purposive sampling was used to ensure relevance to the research questions (Bryman, 2008:415). The 
research sample of the study consisted of 40 African migrants, seven local and international 
organisations based in Cape Town, which work on migration issues, and two state officials from the 
institutions selected for the study. Having different cases, i.e. individual migrants, organisations and 
state officials, helped to cross-validate the findings of the study. It also helped to counter the challenge 
anticipated by the researcher of getting information from state officials, who may have perceived the 
study as sensitive because it examines their behaviour, and as a result may not have been willing to 
participate. 
The geographical site at which the study was conducted was Cape Town. As it was not possible to 
study the entire state, the focus was on officials of three state institutions that interact with African 
migrants. These institutions are the DHA, SAPS and CoCT. These institutions were selected based on 
the fact that their responsibilities lead them to interact with foreigners to a greater extent compared to 
other state institutions. The DHA has immigration-related responsibilities, the SAPS is involved in 
addressing crime, maintaining public order and providing security, and the CoCT has a public services 
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provision mandate that affects migrants. In addition,  the DHA and SAPS are key sites of institutional 
xenophobia in South Africa (Human Rights Watch, 1998; South African Human Rights Commission, 
1999; Harris, 2001) while public violent xenophobia has been linked to local politics at the 
ward/municipal level (Steinberg, 2008; Misago, 2011; Nieftagodien, 2011). Within these institutions, 
the practices of frontline officials were the subject of study, as they were experienced by African 
migrants. These were relatively junior bureaucrats who interact directly with foreigners. Given that 
junior officials would be unwilling to speak to the researcher because of the government hierarchy, the 
researcher sampled one senior official from each institution for the fieldwork, although as will be 
pointed out the DHA did not participate.   
The sample of migrants was as heterogeneous as possible in order to provide as much diversity as 
possible and allow for any patterns to emerge from their experiences. It also avoided the nationality 
bias and vulnerable migrant bias in much of the research on migration in South Africa. A total of 40 
migrants from countries within the African continent were identified through snow-ball sampling and 
with the assistance of the selected NGOs. They differed in terms of immigration status, nationality, 
age, sex and income. They had been residing in South Africa for between one and 13 years and lived 
in different parts of Cape Town. They represented 13 African countries as shown in Table 1.1 and they 
comprised five legal categories of migrants as provided for in the Immigration and Refugee Acts (see 
Table 1.2). Table 1.3 shows the gender spread of the migrant sample.  
Organisations that work on migrants’ issues were also selected as cases due to their knowledge of the 
issues related to the study. As these organisations interact with migrants on a daily basis, they were 
able to direct the researcher to “situations, events or people likely to be helpful to the progress of the 
investigation” (Bryman, 2008:409). The key informants targeted were mostly NGOs which are 
members of the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) based in Cape 
Town. A list of the seven key informant organisations is provided in Table 1.4. It is worth pointing out 
that of the seven key informants only two were South African. 
 
Table 1.1: Country of origin of sample migrant population 
 Country Number of respondents 
1 Angola 1 
2 Burundi 2 
3 Congo 2 
4 Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) 
7 
5 Ethiopia 2 
6 Kenya 2 
7 Malawi 3 
8 Mozambique 4 
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Table 1.2: Current legal status of migrant population 
Status Number of respondents % of total 
Permanent resident 1 2.5 
Temporary resident (work 
permit holder) 
4 10 
Temporary resident (study 
permit holder) 
5 12.5 
Temporary resident (visitor’s 
visa) 
1 2.5 
Refugee permit holder 15 37.5 
Asylum seeker permit holder 9 22.5 
Illegal foreigner  5 12.5 
Total 40 100 
 
Table 1.3: Gender breakdown of migrant sample 
Gender Number Per cent 
Male 25 62.5 
Female 15 37.5 
Total 40 100 
 
Table 1.4: List of key informant organisations 
 Organisation Respondent’s designation 
1 African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) Researcher 
2 Agency for Refugee Education, Skills Training and 
Advocacy (ARESTA) 
Advocacy Officer 
3 Cape Town Refugee Centre (CTRC) Director 
4 Legal Resources Centre (LRC) Attorney 
5 People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty 
(PASSOP) 
Community Liaison Officer 
6 Scalabrini Centre Advocacy Officer 
7 United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) Head of Field Office 
 
 
9 Nigeria 2 
10 Rwanda 2 
11 Somalia 3 
12 Uganda 2 
13 Zimbabwe 8 
 Total 40 
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Table 1.5: List of state institutions 
 State institution Respondent’s designation 
1 City of Cape Town City Manager 
2 South African Police Service Deputy Provincial 
Commissioner 
 
1.4.2 Research methods 
The study employed three techniques of data collection: secondary data analysis, semi-structured 
interviews and observation. Using different data-collection tools ensured cross-validation of the 
conclusions drawn from each method and case group, thereby reducing the degree of subjectivity and 
increasing the degree of validity (Manheim et al., 2012:345).  
1.4.2.1 Secondary data analysis 
The collection of secondary data began before fieldwork and continued thereafter. This data is used 
mainly in Chapters 2 to 4 of this dissertation. The analysis of this data identified the gaps in the 
literature, outlined the theoretical framework, set the context of the research and augmented the 
primary data. The researcher analysed the literature on xenophobia in South Africa and the state of 
exception. This was informed mainly by scholarly publications, speeches, media articles and other 
relevant documentary sources. The legal framework relating to international migrants and the three 
state institutions was also analysed. Key legislation that was analysed include the South African 
Constitution of 1996, the Immigration Act of 2002 and the Refugees Act of 1998. This analysis of 
legislation, which is included in Chapter 4, enabled the researcher to assess the extent to which the 
actions of state officials, as presented in other sources and in the primary data conform to the law or 
not.  
1.4.2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Interviews were deemed appropriate as they generate narratives and thick descriptions that are 
appropriate to the research questions. A total of 49 in-depth semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with African migrants, state officials and migrant organisations (see Appendix C for the list 
of the interview respondents). The interviews were guided by measuring instruments developed by the 
researcher in the form of open-ended questions and themes for discussion. A research instrument was 
developed for each of the three categories of respondents (see Appendix A). Probing and follow-up 
questions were used to solicit in-depth information and details (Genzuk, 2003:7). The interviews were 
conducted in English and face-to-face in various locations in Cape Town except for one that was done 
telephonically. All but two of the interviews were audio recorded. In the two cases the respondents 
were not comfortable with being recorded.  
The starting point with the semi-structured interviews was with organisations that work on migration 
issues. Key informant interviews were conducted initially with member organisations of CoRMSA, a 
network of NGOs that promotes and protects migrant rights. CoRMSA member organisations based in 
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the Western Cape include the Cape Town Refugee Centre, Scalabrini Centre, the Agency for Refugee 
Education, Skills Training and Advocacy (ARESTA) and People Against Suffering Oppression and 
Poverty (PASSOP). Additional interviews were later held with representatives from the Legal 
Resources Centre, United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the ACMS. 
Two semi-structured interviews were then conducted with state officials from the SAPS and CoCT 
(Table 1.5) to gain insight into their implementation of relevant legislation, how they describe their 
interaction with clients and how they exercise any discretionary powers given to them by the law. 
These interviews, which targeted senior state officials, also aimed to observe any similarities or 
differences between what they say and how migrants experienced frontline junior officials. Limited 
direct interaction with state officials was deliberate not only due to the expected difficulty of access to 
state officials, but also because additional interviews with state officials were unlikely to yield new 
information. 
Finally, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 40 African migrants residing in various parts 
of Cape Town. Sourcing information from migrants countered the foreseeable challenge of accessing 
information directly from state officials. These interviews were aimed at capturing the practices of 
state officials from the DHA, the SAPS and CoCT from the perspective of the migrants. The 
interviews also sought to draw out perceptions of xenophobia and state exceptionalism. As is 
characteristic of qualitative research, the questions were open-ended.   
The interviews with key informants and state officials were held in their respective offices. The 
location of the interviews with migrants varied. Some spot interviews with migrants were conducted at 
the offices of the key informants. Pre-arranged interviews were held in the migrants’ places of work 
and study. Others were held in public places, such as restaurants and parks and in some cases, in the 
cars of migrants. The average length of an interview was 40 minutes but depending on the experiences 
that the respondent had to share and how well they were able to express themselves in English, it 
varied considerably from approximately 15 minutes to 100 minutes.  
1.4.2.3 Observation 
Prior to commencing fieldwork, the researcher had planned to gather data using direct or participant 
observation in the form of covert or passive observation, where the research would be unknown to the 
subjects of the study (Brians, Willnat, Manheim & Rich, 2011:327). This meant that the researcher 
would be present but detached from the scene of action only taking on the role of ‘by-stander’ or 
‘spectator’ (Spradley, 1980:59). Passive observation is undertaken in a natural setting and as the 
subjects are unaware that they are being observed, they tend to behave as they would ordinarily 
(Johnson & Reynolds, 2005:191). According to Hammersley and Atkinson (2007:4), studying 
people’s actions in everyday contexts rather than in situations created by the researcher gives 
ethnography a distinctive character. 
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Direct observation was limited to DHA officials in two DHA offices and the Refugee Reception 
Office (RRO) in Cape Town. This is because, unlike other state institutions, the DHA has separate 
sections for citizens and foreigners making it easy to identify the non-citizens. The RRO caters only to 
foreigners, so it was also a suitable site for observation. Observation of state officials has been used 
before as a means to explain their behaviour. For example, the study conducted by Sutton and 
Vigneswaran (2011:630) on detention and deportation in South Africa included observation of police 
interactions with civilians and observing everyday practices in government offices over a period of 
months. 
The main advantage of this form of observation is that it yields highly valid information, as the 
subjects do not alter their behaviour because they are being studied. The disadvantage is that covert 
observation can be difficult to organise and implement. Taking notes on the spot can be difficult as the 
researcher is always anxious about being detected and ethical tenets are transgressed (Bryman, 
2008:406).  
However, during fieldwork limited observation than initially envisaged was done by the researcher at 
DHA offices, which amounted to four hours in total. In the case of the two DHA offices in Bellville 
and Cape Town, it proved difficult to passively observe the behaviour of DHA officials as they went 
about their day-to-day activities in terms of xenophobia and the state of exception without an element 
of intrusion with regard to the either the clients or the staff, which the researcher wanted to avoid. In 
the case of the RRO, the challenge of access hampered observation as will be explained later. 
Nevertheless, the limited observations during those visits were quite insightful. Fortunately for the 
researcher, the participation of some migrants who had previously worked at the RRO in the research 
provided a useful insider perspective. In addition, two of the NGOs interviewed had also previously 
conducted monitoring research at the RRO, before the RRO started restricting access, and were able to 
share the findings of their research.  
Studying the practices of state officials through a mix of direct and indirect methods as described 
above is a strategy that has been used by other researchers (see Human Rights Watch, 1998; Harris, 
2001; Landau, 2005a; Sutton & Vigneswaran, 2011). 
 
1.4.3 Data analysis 
Data analysis refers to the “process of bringing order to the data, organising what there is into patterns, 
categories and basic descriptive units” (Genzuk, 2003:9). Primary data were analysed using computer-
assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) which “searches, organises and annotates 
textual and visual data” (Smit, 2005:107). A CAQDAS does not actually analyse the data but it is 
useful for data management. The main advantage of using it is that is allows “for more rapid, rigorous 
and scientific qualitative data analysis” (Rambaree, 2008:3).  
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All 49 interview transcripts and field notes were stored in Atlas.ti. Thereafter, they were 
systematically analysed using the NCT (notice, collect, think) model of qualitative data analysis which 
is well detailed in Susanne Friese’s book Qualitative data analysis with Atlas.ti (2012). The book 
served as a step-by-step guide for the researcher. NCT is derived from the process of noticing things, 
collecting things and thinking about things (Friese, 2012: 92). It is not a linear process but an iterative 
one.  
The first step followed in the context of the NCT model was to look through the data, noticing things 
in the data and then labelling what was noticed in the form of codes. Coding is essentially the same as 
collecting things. Coding is the basis for summarising or reducing the data (Saldana, 2009:2). The 
researcher went through a few cycles of coding, starting with coding a few words, a sentence or 
paragraphs. Unprescribed labels, which were derived from the data were assigned. The researcher then 
went back to the data to review the codes, adding and removing some in the process. In another cycle 
of coding she coded for patterns and categories during which three concepts of the study – 
xenophobia, state of exception and bare life were operationalised. These concepts are further defined 
and operationalised for measurement in Chapter 3. This coding phase ended when the researcher could 
no longer notice anything new in the data. The final code list had over 200 codes and is attached in 
Appendix D. Friese (2012) recommends coding all the data as it provides a holistic picture of the data. 
In instances where a pre-developed code list derived from theoretical concepts is being used there is a 
risk of ignoring what does not appear to fit into the coding system. Coding all the data prevents this 
and also allows for new insights to be revealed. Up to this point, the tasks undertaken were part of a 
descriptive level of analysis. 
The next step in applying the NCT model was to conduct conceptual-level analysis by noticing things 
in the already coded data and the relations between them. In this step the data were analysed from the 
perspective of the research questions. The analysis tools in Atlas.ti such as the query tool as well as the 
memo function, were useful in this regard. Analytic memos were created for each research question to 
systematically develop and document the researcher’s interpretation of the data. At this stage of 
analysis it was also possible to explore and link the data visually through network views, a feature in 
Atlas.ti used to create concept maps. The researcher also used the memo writing feature to transfer 
hand written field notes, document the entire data analysis process and jot down thoughts in a research 
diary memo. Storing and organising all the data in Atlas.ti as well as documenting the analysis process 
created an audit trail that contributed to the transparency of the data analysis process.  
After data analysis, data interpretation was done. According to Genzuk (2003:9), it involves “attaching 
meaning and significance to the analysis, explaining descriptive patterns, and looking for relationships 
and linkages among descriptive dimensions”. The interpretation of the data is presented as part of the 
research findings in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of the dissertation. 
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1.4.4 Reflection on methodology 
It is worth reflecting on the research design and methodology of the study as it unfolded in practice in 
order to capture the variable and evolving nature of fieldwork (Schutt, 2012:332) and to highlight any 
shortcomings, limitations and gaps in the data (Mouton, 2001:124).  
All in all, the interviews went smoothly as the respondents demonstrated their interest in the study. 
They were all willing to share information and the researcher was able to establish a good rapport with 
them. Some key informants and migrants were particularly helpful in pointing the researcher to other 
respondents and to secondary sources of information. There are a number of possible reasons for the 
responsiveness of the research respondents. In the case of the migrants, perhaps there was already a 
measure of trust in the research because the researcher had either been referred to them or had 
approached them in the offices of the key informants, which offer a safe space for migrants. It was 
also perhaps because it was conducted by an African migrant, which made it easier for them to open 
up. Another possible reason for their willingness to participate is that the research was framed in a 
non-threatening manner as a process of gathering the experiences of African migrants in South Africa 
for academic purposes. The responsiveness of the key informants and state officials, with the 
exception of the DHA, was possibly due to being accustomed to receiving requests for interviews and 
the public orientation of their work.  
It is necessary to point out that no interview was conducted with the DHA, which was one of the state 
institutions selected for the study. The researcher’s efforts to get a DHA official to interview were 
unsuccessful. Several attempts in the form of emails and telephone calls were made to secure an 
interview with the Deputy Director-General: Immigration Services based in Pretoria but no response 
was received. The researcher then wrote to the Provincial Manager of the Western Cape asking for an 
interview. A written response was never received but upon calling the Provincial Manager’s office to 
follow-up, his personal assistant acknowledged having received the interview request. She then said 
that he needed authorisation from the head office. After several follow-ups she said that she was still 
waiting for a response from Pretoria but that it was not forthcoming. The researcher then asked her for 
details of the official in Pretoria she had contacted in order to approach him. However, just like with 
the Deputy Director General, his phone went unanswered and he never responded to the researcher’s 
emails. In addition, the researcher’s written request for statistics on migrants made in terms of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act was ignored.  
The challenges the researcher experienced with the DHA could be an indicator of the perceived 
sensitivity of the study and hence the possible challenges of relying on state officials for information 
on a topic of this nature. However, it was starkly different from the responses of the two other state 
institutions, so it could also say something about the DHA. In this regard, it also worth noting that 
with the other two state institutions, as well as the key informants, they all responded in writing to the 
researcher’s request for an interview, which was also put in writing, whereas no written response was 
ever received from the DHA. Even efforts to get the DHA in Cape Town to put in writing what they 
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communicated to the researcher over the telephone or to reply to the researcher in writing, were 
ignored. This suggests that the non-responsiveness of the DHA could also be due to basic ineptitude. 
Some of the key informants had also experienced similar challenges in contacting officials from the 
Department so the researcher was not surprised.  
The data collection method of observation of DHA officials did not go as anticipated because of the 
barriers to entering one of the DHA offices which was of particular interest to the researcher – the 
RRO. During the first visit to the RRO, the researcher discovered that access to the main service area 
is only granted upon presentation of an asylum seeker or refugee permit and the researcher was 
advised by the security guards to seek permission from the Centre Manager to gain entry as a 
researcher. In the process of trying to get this permission, the researcher had to visit the office and 
walk through some service areas in order to get to the manager’s office. This provided a small window 
for observation. The Centre Manager was not in the office but the researcher was able to get his 
contact details to request the permission. He was very evasive when the researcher later telephoned 
and emailed him. The researcher then made a second visit in the hope of meeting him in person but he 
was out of the office. Fortunately, on the way to the Centre Manager’s office, the researcher had to 
pass through a different and smaller service area without being asked for identification and was able to 
get a glimpse of the officials going about their activities. In hindsight and from experience, it was 
important for the researcher to see the physical spaces within which the DHA provides services to 
migrants but she would not recommend conducting observation of these spaces as a research 
methodology in future as it is unlikely to yield much beyond an appreciation of the context. 
Overall, the research design and methods were deemed appropriate and reliable for answering the 
research questions. The data set was enriched by the variety of migrants’ experiences, which 
transcended Cape Town although the study was conducted in Cape Town. In terms of DHA 
encounters of the migrants, not all of these had occurred in Cape Town. Some took place in other 
provinces or even outside the country, specifically in South African embassies in Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe, where migrants had applied for their permits. The embassy staff who provide consular 
services abroad are employees of the DHA, so these experiences were taken into account in the study. 
Encounters with the SAPS were also not limited to Cape Town as some migrants had come into 
contact with the police while residing in other parts of the country before moving to Cape Town. It is 
only in the case of the CoCT that migrants’ experiences were specific to Cape Town. 
In addition, some migrants who had been approached in their individual capacities turned out to be 
particularly resourceful. This was because of their involvement in migrant associations and networks. 
Their interaction with other migrants in these groupings exposed them to issues facing migrants at 
different levels and they shared these with the researcher. On top of that, three migrants had previously 
worked at the Cape Town RRO as interpreters between DHA officials and asylum seekers.3 They were 
                                                     
3
 These interpreters were not on the DHA payroll, however. They were employed by an NGO (Refugee 
Ministries Centre) and placed at the RRO. 
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therefore able to shed light on how things work behind the scenes at the RRO, a perspective the 
researcher would never have had exposure to otherwise. 
However, some limitations of the data set exist. Firstly, the experiences of African migrants were 
primarily impacted upon by the DHA, which every migrant had encountered simply by virtue of being 
foreigners, compared to the other two selected state institutions. The researcher was unable to control 
this, as it was difficult to know beforehand which of the other two state institutions migrants had 
encountered beyond the DHA. Figure 1.1 below shows the migrant sample in relation to their 
experiences with officials from the three selected institutions. While all forty migrants had 
encountered DHA officials, not all of them had had any experience with SAPS and City officials. Only 
28 reported having had an encounter with the police and 11 with CoCT officials.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Number of migrants with experiences with officials from the DHA, SAPS and CoCT 
 
Secondly, the data do not reveal the frequency of certain practices of state officials that were of 
interest to the study. The inability to get an accurate measurement of the frequency of attitudes and 
behaviours measured in the study, even when they are recurring, is a limitation of qualitative methods 
(Castles, 2012:25). Thirdly, the overreliance on migrants as a data source meant that it was not 
possible to empirically ascertain the motivations, intentions and constraints that drive bureaucratic 
behaviour from the officials themselves and to compare how distinct migrants’ experiences were from 
South Africans who also encounter the same state officials. As already pointed out, the decision to rely 
on migrants was justified by the foreseeable challenge of accessing state officials and getting 
information from them. In addition, the researcher would most likely have found it difficult as a 
foreign researcher to interview ordinary South Africans given the topic of the study. Nevertheless, the 
researcher was able to make certain valid assumptions on the motivations of officials’ actions and 
comparative experiences of citizens and non-citizens from the scholarly literature.  
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A final point of reflection is on the positioning of the researcher as an African migrant. The researcher 
is from Kenya and has lived in South Africa for 12 years. This background and her experiences of 
living in South Africa influenced the choice of the research topic. To minimise any biases that may be 
inherent as a result, the researcher strove to be objective in the formulation and sequencing of 
interview questions. She also sought to minimise her influence on the responses of the respondents by 
emphasising her interest in their unique and personal experiences. As already alluded to, the 
positioning of the researcher as a migrant probably made the migrant respondents more willing to talk 
to her.   
1.4.5 Ethical considerations 
The study was conducted in line with professional ethical codes for social science research and the 
‘Framework policy for the assurance and promotion of ethically accountable research at Stellenbosch 
University’. Since the study involved gathering data from human subjects, the researcher was guided 
by key ethical principles for responsible research highlighted by Spradley (1980) in his book 
Participant Observation. These principles are: consider informants first; safeguard informants’ rights, 
interests and sensitivities; communicate research objectives; protect the privacy of informants; do not 
exploit informants; and make reports available to informants (Spradley, 1980:20-25). To this end, the 
research goals were made clear to all those who were interviewed. This included the NGO 
representatives, African migrants and the representatives of state agencies. The researcher sought their 
written or oral consent to participate in the study without any financial compensation. The researcher 
ensured the anonymity of the migrant respondents by using codes when presenting the findings. The 
researcher also ensured privacy and confidentiality of the data by storing it in a password-protected 
computer that could be accessed only by the researcher. In an effort not to harm the informants or the 
researcher, interviews were conducted in secure spaces. All sources of information are duly 
acknowledged and properly referenced in the dissertation. 
Observation DHA officials, albeit limited, was done without their informed consent as they were not 
made aware of the study. According to Manheim et al. (2012:345), using unobtrusive observation 
“involves some degree of deception”. However, the researcher does not view going into the public 
areas of a public institution as an onlooker as an ethical transgression. The researcher was not going to 
interfere with the activities of the officials or to expose the names or identities of officials if these were 
to become known to the researcher during observation. However, it is apparent from the restricted 
access to the RRO that state officials are wary of this data collection method. The researcher came to 
learn from key informants that the DHA had started to restrict access in the recent past only after 
NGOs apparently took advantage of the public access to monitor the RRO and report their findings to 
the media, which the DHA felt portrayed them in a negative light.   
If state officials know that they are being observed, they are likely to act differently, thus creating an 
artificial setting, bar access altogether or sabotage the research.  Indeed, the researcher’s efforts to get 
official permission from the DHA to conduct research at the RRO were unsuccessful. The experiences 
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of the ACMS while conducting research on barriers to asylum in South Africa are quite instructive in 
regard to studies related to the DHA. Despite a deliberate decision by the ACMS to administer surveys 
to asylum seekers outside DHA offices, the DHA approached the researchers to seek DHA permission 
because the research could portray the department in a negative light. The DHA sought to “manage the 
results and control the sharing of information held by private individuals”, yet the research was being 
conducted in public spaces where direct permission was not required (Amit, 2012:21-22). Continued 
harassment and threats of arrest by the DHA led the ACMS to file a complaint with the Public 
Protector and substantially reduce its sample size. Although the researcher relied less on observation 
and more on interviews, there was a case for undisclosed observation. The argument is that the greater 
good of the research outweighs any harm that could be caused to the subjects not knowing that they 
are being studied (Manheim et al., 2012:346). Taking on the role of spectator presented the only real 
chance to “discern the real from the ideal, the tacit from the explicit and the back from the front” 
(Whitehead, 2005:15) and the only way to minimise the researcher’s effect on the state officials being 
studied. 
 
1.5 Chapter overview 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters, including this introductory chapter. Subsequent chapters 
are as follows:   
Chapter 2: Context: International migration in South Africa  
Chapter 2 provides a background to international migration in South Africa and lays the foundation for 
an exploration of the relationship between the state and non-citizens residing within its borders. It 
begins with a general overview of international migration as a function of state sovereignty. It then 
reviews international migration in the South African context by focusing on African migration, the 
role of state policies in shaping international migration, the different categories of migrants and the 
perceptions of international migration in South Africa.  
Chapter 3: Literature review: Xenophobia and the state of exception 
This chapter reviews the literature on xenophobia in South Africa and contains the theoretical 
framework that informs the study. After defining the key concepts of the study, the first part of this 
chapter examines xenophobia and the various explanations that have been put forward to explain it in 
xenophobia. The second part of the chapter presents the theoretical framework of the dissertation that 
will be used to analyse xenophobia in South Africa – Giorgio Agamben’s theory of the state of 
exception. Thereafter, it examines the relevance of Agamben’s theory in establishing the grounds for 
inclusion and exclusion in South Africa by the state. Finally, it operationalises the key concept of the 
state of exception as an analytical tool. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the study will 
contribute to the body of literature after pointing out gaps in the existing literature.    
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Chapter 4: Legal foundations and institutional context: Migrants and the Department of Home Affairs, 
the South African Police Service and Local Government 
This chapter examines the constitutional and statutory underpinnings of South Africa’s immigration 
policy and practice, including migrants’ rights. The chapter analyses the Constitution of 1996, the 
Immigration Act of 2002 and the Refugees Act of 1998 in terms of the rights and obligations of the 
different categories of migrants. It also provides an overview of the functions and operations of the 
three state institutions.  
Chapter 5: African migrants’ experiences with state officials 
This chapter presents and analyses the findings of the empirical qualitative research with regard to the 
first two research questions of the study. These questions relate to the experiences of African migrants 
with state officials broadly and in terms of their legal status and nationality.  
Chapter 6: African migrants, the state of exception and xenophobia 
This chapter presents more findings and analysis of the empirical qualitative research in relation to the 
other two research questions of the study, which relate to the state of exception and xenophobia.  
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Chapter 7 summarises the entire dissertation and key research findings. It also draws the overall 
conclusions of the study. Finally, it articulates the theoretical and practical significance of the study 
and identifies possible areas for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Context: International migration in South Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Xenophobia in South Africa occurs against the backdrop of international migration – the movement of 
populations across national borders. It is therefore important to begin by examining state responses to 
international migration and the consequences thereof. Furthermore, one cannot discuss xenophobia 
without an understanding of the extent of international migration in South Africa given that 
xenophobia is mostly targeted at migrants from outside the boundaries of South Africa who live in the 
country. Therefore, this chapter contextualises international migration in South Africa. 
The chapter begins with a broad context on immigration as a function of the state. It then provides a 
historical overview of migratory patterns in South Africa highlighting the role of state policies in 
shaping mobility. It then moves to international migration in post-apartheid South Africa. Here the 
focus is on the trends with regard to African migration, the immigration policy, the different categories 
of migrants and finally, the perceptions of migration in South Africa.  
 
2.2 International migration as a function of state sovereignty 
Sovereign states have the right to determine under what conditions they permit or prohibit entry of 
non-citizens into their jurisdictions.4 Put differently, international migration is a matter of state 
sovereignty. Torpey (1998:239) argues that modern states have deprived people from moving freely 
across international boundaries and subjected them to being dependent on states for the permission to 
do so, unlike in the medieval era when this authority was mostly held in individuals and private 
entities. Thus, over time states have expropriated the legitimate “means of movement” (Torpey, 
1998:239). Herbst (2000:228) observes that in Africa this process began in the 1960s as newly 
independent states closed their borders in order to assert their sovereignty. 
States have sought to “monopolize the capacity to authorize movements of persons – and 
unambiguously to establish their identities in order to enforce this authority – for a great variety of 
reasons that reflect the ambiguous nature of modern states, which are at once sheltering and 
dominating” (Torpey, 1998:241). Some of these reasons mentioned by Torpey (1998:241) include the 
extraction of taxes and labour; the facilitation of law enforcement; the exclusion, surveillance, and 
containment of “undesirable elements”; and the supervision of the growth and spatial distribution of 
populations within their territories, among others.  
States have, over hundreds of years, created elaborate bureaucracies and technologies in order to 
identify people and regulate their movements. According to Torpey (1998:256), passports and 
                                                     
4
 International refugee law is an exception to this rule (Dauvergne, 2008:62).  
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identification documents produced by these bureaucracies heralded a new era in human affairs. He 
describes the social transformation as “akin to those identified by Marx when he analysed the 
monopolisation of the means of production by capitalists, and by Weber when he discussed the 
modern state’s expropriation of the legitimate use of violence” (Torpey, 1998:256).  
A fundamental moral contradiction in international human rights law is that it provides for a universal 
right to emigrate without any reciprocal right of admission elsewhere (Richmond, 1994:57). The right 
to migrate is regarded as a matter of human rights, asserted in the United Nations (UN) Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, while the right of admission is regarded as a matter of national 
sovereignty (Weiner, 1996:171). States pursue immigration policies that advance their own collective 
self-interest and include draconian enforcement measures against those perceived as illegal migrants 
(Richmond, 1994:64). Richmond (1994:210 & 216) has argued that with increasing migration from 
poorer to richer countries there is a trend in most economically developed and affluent countries to 
stem international migration in order to protect their privileged positions using legislation and 
regulative institutions similar to those used during apartheid South Africa to control the movement of 
people from outside and within its borders.  
State immigration policies control the membership of the nation-state thus performing the gate-
keeping function of enforcing territorial sovereignty (Dauvergne, 2004:86). In so doing, immigration 
law is coupled with national identity to the extent that it distinguishes between members and non-
members. Management and control are the key concepts in immigration policy. On the one hand, this 
entails the legal and bureaucratic aspects of passports, visas, finger prints and deportation and so on. 
On the other hand, it reflects a concern with national security and consequently in a belief that 
international migration should be kept as low as possible and should be limited to only that which is 
necessary to maintaining economic advantage in an increasingly competitive global system. To this 
end, immigration policies prescribe degrees of membership through a ‘migration hierarchy’ consisting 
of different legal statuses or permits with varying rights (Dauvergne, 2004:85). Torpey (1998:276) 
states that this codification of migrants is what ultimately determines their identity. Labour migration 
and free movement for investors, entrepreneurs and certain categories of skilled workers is generally 
welcomed as long as it is controlled. Tourism, even when it conflicts with the need to control borders, 
must be facilitated since it is a major contributor to the economy. Selection of migrants is therefore 
largely based on economic criteria.5  
Additionally, immigration policies serve to mark the individual as external to the nation-state in order 
to facilitate identification and control (Tuitt, 2004:48). In this way they possess “an enhanced power of 
exclusion” demonstrated by the label of ‘illegal’ migrants (Dauvergne, 2004:92). As Dauvergne 
(2004:92-93) argues, the term ‘illegal’ lacks content as it circumscribes identity to its bearers purely in 
relation to the law. She contends that the label operates by masking the identities of those to whom it 
                                                     
5
 Asylum seekers and refugees are considered as a separate category from economic migrants. International law 
places obligations on states to host asylum seekers and refugees on humanitarian grounds. States have 
domesticated these obligations into national laws, for example, the Refugees Act in South Africa. 
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is attached and obscuring the differences among the illegal individuals. She adds that its emergence as 
a global identity serves to create a common understanding of insiders and outsiders. Furthermore, it 
reflects a global view of what are proper and improper reasons to migrate (Dauvergne, 2004:94). On 
one level, Dauvergne (2004:94) argues that in the present age, migration is for the privileged. She 
claims that being poor and willing to start one’s life over again, for instance, following wars and 
economic crises, were not reasons for being excluded from migrating in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries as the bulk of migrants were largely people in search of a better life. However, the era of 
globalisation has reframed traditional ‘class’ lines by according preference to the educated, skilled and 
moneyed whose migration is seen as positive while migration of the lower class represents the 
negative side of globalisation.  
On another level, Dauvergne (2004:93) argues that the desirability of richer Western nations as 
destinations for illegal migrants from poorer countries also “functions as a measure of their status and 
standing as nations”, which they collectively use as justification for securitised immigration policies 
and the exclusion of the have-nots as it threatens the prosperity of the nation-state. Mills (quoted in 
Vale, 2002:15) has stated that the painful truth of restricting cross-border movement of people and a 
securitised immigration policy is that it only reinforces “one of the paradoxes about the contemporary 
practice of sovereignty: even as states are increasing their efforts to control their borders, they [lose] 
ground”. In this regard, while states have monopolised the authority to restrict movement, they have 
not been able to effectively control all movement of people (Torpey, 1998:240). 
 
2.3 International migration in South Africa: past and present 
 
2.3.1 Historical context of international migration in South Africa 
Transnational human mobility into South Africa has a long history dating back to the pre-colonial era. 
In fact, it is international migration that has given rise to the diversity of people that make up the 
‘rainbow nation’ of South Africa. South Africa’s population, which is estimated at 52.98 million 
people, is broken down as follows: Black Africans – 79.8%, Coloureds – 9%, Whites – 8.7% and 
Asians – 2.5% (Statistics South Africa, 2013b:3-4). 
It is believed that the Khoikhoi and the San were the first inhabitants of what is presently South Africa 
from approximately 1,000 BC (Butler, 2009:6). The descendants of the African Bantu population 
migrated southwards from Central Africa thousands of years ago and began to settle in South Africa 
by 300 AD (Butler, 2009:10). At the time, Africa was a borderless continent and migration was caused 
by ecological problems, conflicts and the search for better land and water (Butler, 2009:8; Lekogo, 
2008:12). The Caucasian or European population arrived in South Africa between the 16th and 20th 
centuries. It was during this period that exploration, colonisation and partitioning of Africa into 
national boundaries took place. South Africa was colonised by the British and later by Dutch 
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descendants. In the 1800s the British colonialists also imported indentured labour from India, China 
and Malaysia giving rise to the Asian population in South Africa. Intermarriages between the different 
racial groups led to the emergence of South Africans of mixed race, commonly known as Coloureds. 
Previous patterns of African migration were destroyed by colonialism and later patterns of African 
migration after decolonisation and independence have been largely determined by the legacy of 
colonialism (Lekogo, 2008:15). The formation of sovereign African states has given states the 
exclusive authority to decide on rules of entry and exit as well as citizenship. 
The modern South African state, formed in 1910, emerged from the two British colonies and two 
Afrikaner republics that had formed in southern Africa by the end of the nineteenth century (du Toit & 
Kotzé, 2011:36). It is worth highlighting that the early policies and practices of the Union of South 
Africa under white minority rule, firstly, through segregation and later apartheid, have not only had a 
particularly profound impact on South Africa’s socio-economic and political development but also 
shaped migration patterns and policies. These policies together with the migrant labour system and the 
immigration policy are discussed briefly below in terms of their ramifications on the movement of 
people. 
The Union government and its predecessor were directly involved in the regulation of labour in order 
to secure and control a steady supply of labour for the industrialisation of South Africa (Stadler, 
1987:87; Wolpe, 1995:65). An unprecedented demand for labour had been created by the discovery of 
diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886 at the height of British imperialism (Butler, 2009:12; Thompson, 
2001:110).6 In order to effectively and profitably exploit these resources, the British colonial power 
realised the need for a combination of massive cheap manual labour and skilled labour – many say that 
this was done at the will of British mining capital (Southall, 2013:18).  
The establishment of reserves in rural areas for the black population provided a source of cheap labour 
not only in the mines but also in agricultural and manufacturing industries, which were located outside 
of these reserves and in the hands of white capital (Stadler, 1987:13-14). The demand for these 
labourers extended beyond the reserves to what were then the British protectorates and colonies, and 
Portuguese colonies in southern Africa. This led to the establishment of a migrant labour system based 
on exploitation of the unskilled, rural, African. In the case of those mine workers from outside South 
Africa, fixed contracts were signed for several months at a time between sending states and the host 
state. The sending states did not want to permanently lose the migrants while the South African 
government did not want them to settle in South Africa permanently, so both parties agreed that the 
migrants would not be accompanied by their families and they would return home after their contracts 
ended (Crush, 2000a:14).  
                                                     
6
 Migrant labour began before the discovery of minerals in the sugar plantations in Natal, which depended on 
labourers from Mozambique (Butler, 2009:13) but rose dramatically from the 1890s to the 1930s (Neocosmos, 
2010:56). 
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Stadler (1987:47) notes that the state also encouraged white migrant labour, especially on the mines, 
by opening the country up to British citizens and other immigrant workers with experience of the 
Californian and Australian goldfields, and the Cornish tin mines. These migrants were not only 
employed in supervisory and skilled positions, but they were also given permanent residency rights in 
the cities as well as voting rights. White immigration in general was encouraged not only to provide 
skilled labour but also to boost the numbers of white people in South Africa. Welsh (2009:25), for 
example, illustrates how British immigration in particular was encouraged as a political strategy ahead 
of the 1948 elections and was seen as a threat to Afrikaner supremacy and identity.  
Immigration policy was a sphere relegated to whites-only politics (Klotz, 2012:195). International 
migrants had to be able to assimilate into the white population and this was ensured through the use of 
racist selection criteria in the immigration policy (Crush, 2000b:108; Hopstock & de Jager, 2011:122). 
The Immigration Act and Regulations of 1913 disallowed black immigration to South Africa except as 
temporary guest workers who fell under the influx control legislation once in the country. The state 
therefore pursued a ‘two gates’ policy which differentiated between black and white immigrants and 
privileged white migration over black migration (Peberdy, 2009:13). South Africa’s two gates 
immigration policy fell into Castles and Davidson’s (2000:60-61) categories of assimilation and 
differential exclusion.7 The common principle in these categories is that migration “should not bring 
about significant social and cultural change in the receiving society” (Castles & Davidson, 2000:61). 
Vale (2002:21) reveals how violations of sovereignty in pursuit of economic growth, though not 
unique to South Africa, operated in the context of South Africa’s two-gate apartheid immigration 
policy – the one gate for cheap migrant labour and the other gate for other forms of migration. He 
describes how the bilateral arrangement between South Africa’s mining industry and other states in the 
region “enjoyed a special place in the affairs of southern Africa, beyond the trappings of sovereignty” 
– the legal fictitious notion that nation-states have a right to rule themselves in their own territory 
(Vale, 2002:20) and that all states are equal (Keohane, 2003:277). By ensuring that migrant labour 
remained an easily managed, contained and always temporary commodity, South Africa’s economy 
grew and helped the apartheid government maintain its racial exclusion policy. Ironically then, “while 
the migrant labour system seemed to violate orthodox interpretations of South Africa’s sovereignty, in 
practice it was an important component of it” (Vale, 2002:20).  
After the formation of the Union, government policy continued to focus on the supply of labour. It did 
so through a set of laws known as segregation policies, which also regulated movement of people and 
the relationship between races (Beinart & Dubow, 1995:1). Some examples of the state’s laws on land 
and the movement of people included the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936; the Urban Areas Acts of 1923 
and 1945; the Bantu Amendment Act and Bantu Labour Act (influx control measures); and the Group 
                                                     
7
 Assimilation, which was essentially defined by race and religion applied to whites of Christian faith from 
Europe while differential exclusion was used to control blacks. Differential exclusion meant accepting migrants 
within strict confines “as workers, not as settlers; as individuals, but not as families or communities; as 
temporary sojourners, but not as long-term residents” (Castles & Davidson, 2000:61).  
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Areas Act of 1950 (Matlapeng, 2000:187-188). Collectively these laws ensured: forced resettlement of 
the African population leaving them with 13% of the land while the remaining 87% was allocated to 
whites, which served to separate the races; confinement of Africans in rural reserves and exceptional 
limited residence and movement in urban areas, thus creating impermanence of Africans in urban 
areas; and denial of land-tenure rights to Africans.  
Black workers were housed in hostels in the mine compounds in order to prevent them from filtering 
into black townships and so remaining in the country (Vale, 2002:20). Deegan (2001:6-7) states that 
they were accommodated as single workers and paid as such, which allowed employers to keep costs 
low and minimised the responsibility of the state on their welfare (Vale, 2002:20). Black labourers 
were denied political and permanent residence rights in urban ‘white’ areas and were regarded as 
migrants with no citizenship rights (Hopstock & de Jager, 2011:124; Klotz, 2012:198).8 According to 
Butler (2009:13), the migrant labour system based on the exploitation of black workers “became the 
backbone of the industrial and commercial systems of apartheid as a whole”. Overall, the history of 
state responses to migration was selective on the basis of race and ethnicity and excluded blacks from 
citizenship. In addition, they left South Africa with “a socially and spatially fragmented population, 
suspicious of movements within and across its borders” (Landau et al., 2010:220). 
 
2.3.2 International migration in post-apartheid South Africa 
This section shows the changing patterns of migration and the diversity and composition of migrants 
in democratic South Africa. Johnson (2010:7) notes that as other southern African states gained 
independence the number of migrant workers they sent to South Africa shrunk drastically. According 
to Crush (2000a:18), the apartheid government had also begun to see these migrants as a political 
threat as their countries became politically independent and in the 1960s established the first border 
posts between South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. By the time of the transition from 
apartheid to democracy, the number of African migrants working in the mines had dropped drastically 
as a result of the implementation of a policy of internalisation, which favoured black South Africans 
over other Africans, mechanisation of labour and the poor economic performance of minerals in world 
markets (Simelane, 1999:13).  
The creation of a new, democratic, non-racial South Africa in 1994 opened up the country to new 
migration patterns while retaining some aspects of South Africa’s long history of cross-border 
movement. When the restrictions on movement internally were lifted, the country’s previously 
forbidden cities became major nodes of migration for black South Africans.9 As Polzer (2010:2) notes, 
                                                     
8
 The designation of ‘South African’ was for whites born in South Africa, as distinguished from white settlers or 
colonials born in Europe (Prah, 1996:120). Blacks were regarded as citizens of the so-called self-governing 
homelands or of the neighbouring colonial states for those who came from outside South Africa.  
9
 It must be noted that segregation and apartheid policies did not succeed in preventing the emergence of a 
permanent urban black population (Stadler, 1987:89; Welsh, 2009:18-19). The abolition of pass laws only 
allowed an increase in that population and eliminated the control mechanisms previously applied by the state on 
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the scale of internal migration between provinces and municipalities is by far the most numerically 
significant form of movement in South Africa, which poses challenges for government planning and 
social cohesion. The elimination of the ban on non-white immigration also meant that Africans from 
around the continent could migrate to South Africa. As a result, contemporary democratic South 
Africa is now a host country to people from other countries who reside temporarily or permanently in 
the country.  
South Africa is an economically prosperous country on the continent and is therefore a major 
migration destination in Africa. The inflow of people from other African countries into South Africa 
has been driven by several factors. These include an overlapping cluster of economic, political and 
socio-cultural factors (Sabela, 2000:104; Tsheola, 2000:85; Solomon, 2003:55). The term ‘mixed 
migration’ has been used to describe the heterogeneous migration streams from the rest of the 
continent and the complex migration dynamics. According to Van Hear (2011:2) the notion of mixed 
migration has gained recognition over the last two decades as “people may move to escape life or 
death circumstances, they may move to escape intolerable living conditions, they may move to better 
themselves, or they move for these and other reasons”.  
South Africa’s liberal legislation on asylum seekers and refugees makes it an attractive destination for 
those seeking protection. This is because asylum seekers and refugees enjoy freedom of movement 
and are not confined to refugee camps as is the case in many African countries. They also enjoy wide 
protections under the Constitution and Refugees Act which, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, include 
the right to work, study, primary healthcare and basic education.  
The productive activities that migrants are engaged in while in South Africa are not known precisely 
and they vary. Given the country’s history of migrant labour, the majority of low-skilled migrants 
from the region today still work in the mining, agricultural and construction sectors, which are the 
backbone of South Africa’s economy. Migrants are also concentrated in the hospitality industry, cross-
border trade, domestic work and informal trading. Several highly-skilled migrants are also found in 
professions in which South Africa faces a shortage of skills such as the health and education sectors 
while a substantial number of migrants are pursuing higher education in the country’s tertiary 
institutions.  
As in the past, most African migrants are still from southern Africa – Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Crush & Williams, 2003:2). Zimbabweans 
arguably make up the largest group of African migrants having overtaken Mozambicans in the last 
decade (Human Rights Watch, 2007:16-17). In addition to migrants from the region, South Africa has 
also attracted population flows from Central, East, North and West Africa. While most African 
migrants in South Africa originate from neighbouring countries, it is worth pointing out that this is not 
as a result of relaxed entry rules for citizens of these countries, which are all members of the Southern 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the movement of people in urban areas. Welsh (2009:21-22) states that the realities of racial interdependence 
meant that total separation remained a utopian vision.  
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Africa Development Community (SADC) regional bloc, but rather due to the history of migrant 
labour, geographic proximity and cultural affinities.  
Post-apartheid South Africa, together with Botswana and Namibia, has in the past opposed measures 
to allow the free movement of persons within southern Africa as part of regional integration (Oucho, 
2007:1; Mawadza, 2008:2). These three countries with the highest gross domestic products in the 
region are considered the most desirable destinations on the continent for African migrants (Oucho, 
2007:1; Mawadza, 2008:2). Rejecting the draft protocol on the free movement of people developed in 
1995 by the SADC, South Africa feared that the protocol would lead to an influx of jobseekers to 
South Africa and a rise in xenophobia (Mawadza, 2008:2). Subsequently the protocol was revised and 
diluted in 1997 and again in 2005 before it was acceptable to member states. South Africa signed the 
Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the SADC in 2005. The protocol proposes a 
‘progressive minimisation’ of controls as opposed to a complete removal of all controls on the free 
movement of people (Oucho, 2007:157).  To this end, South Africa has signed visa waiver agreements 
with several SADC countries which allow their citizens entry into each other’s countries for up to 30 
days without a visa. 
It is not known precisely how many foreign migrants reside in South Africa as no official statistics 
exist. International migration is difficult to measure because of its transient nature, the existence of 
undocumented migrants and the fact that it is associated with “highly politicised issues surrounding 
nation building, citizenship and belonging” (Landau et al., 2010:218). It “changes the very 
composition of one’s population and therefore potentially one’s domestic policies; it brings the outside 
in, as it were, and it involves sending a piece of one’s nation into another society” (Weiner, 1985:453). 
In 2009 the total number of migrants was estimated to range between 1.2 million and 1.7 million or 
less than 4% of the total population by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) (Landau 
et al., 2010:220). The majority of international migrants originate from within the African continent 
and reside predominantly in metropolitan areas. The UN estimates that 72% of international migrants 
to South Africa in 2008 came from African countries (United Nations, 2008). In 2013 Statistics South 
Africa (Stats SA) estimated that the African migrant population between 2006 and 2010 stood at 
974,000 and projected a rise to 998,000 between 2010 and 2015 (Statistics South Africa, 2013b:6).  
In the absence of any accurate figures on the number of migrants in South Africa, the number of 
permits issued by Home Affairs gives an indication of the numbers of legal migrants, their purpose in 
the country and their countries of origin. According to Stats SA, a total of 141, 500 temporary resident 
permits and 1,283 permanent residents were issued by the DHA in 2012 (Statistics South Africa, 
2013a).10 Of these, 54.4% temporary resident permits and 53.2% permanent residents were issued to 
African migrants. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the top eight recipient African countries of these permits.  
                                                     
10
 However, these figures do not indicate how many of these permit holders are still in the country and how 
many of them are changes from one permit to another by migrants who were already in the country, as opposed 
to first time applicants. 
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They show that while most temporary and permanent resident permits were issued to Zimbabweans, 
which borders South Africa, the other top permit recipients were from countries that do not border 
South Africa and that fall outside the southern African region such as Nigeria, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Cameroon and Kenya.    
  
 
Figure 2.1: Number of recipients of temporary residence permits from the eight leading African 
countries, 2012 
Source: Statistics South Africa (2013a:17). 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Number of recipients of permanent residence permits from the top eight African 
countries, 2012 
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Source: Statistics South Africa (2013a:32). 
 
According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), South Africa hosts approximately 230, 
500 asylum seekers and 65,300 refugees (UNHCR, 2013:2). They are mostly from Zimbabwe, 
Ethiopia, Somalia and the DRC. 
  
2.3.3 Post-apartheid immigration policy 
International migration in post-apartheid South Africa is regulated by the Refugees Act which came 
into effect in 200011 and the Immigration Act, which was promulgated in 2003 replacing the Aliens 
Control Act of 1991. The former deals with persons forced to flee their home countries due to a range 
of circumstances and South Africa’s obligations under international law to host such people while the 
latter deals with economic migrants. While the Immigration Act mainly gives priority to migrants with 
skills that are in short supply in South Africa, it also retains the migrant labour system by giving 
special privileges to the mining and agricultural sectors to recruit temporary labour from outside South 
Africa.  
According to Vale (2002:10), South Africa has taken a neo-realist perspective towards international 
migration to the country. By focusing on the idea that South Africa “lives up against, rather than with, 
its neighbours”, he makes two theoretical points underlying the government’s perspective. First, is the 
assumption that policy considerations must only be made based on the ‘national interest’, including 
migration, and second is that the main driving force behind policy options is power considerations 
(Vale, 2002:11). The latter allowed South Africa, as a super power in southern Africa to “stake out an 
assertive position on cross-border movement in the region” (Vale, 2002:11). Writing about events 
following the transition from apartheid, Vale (2002:12) asserts that this neo-realist perspective gained 
its power from the public discourse on the influx of foreign Africans into the new South Africa. It also 
rested on the “hegemonic authority of constructions of danger and the link between these and the 
search for national identity” (Vale, 2002:12). The security discourse of the old South Africa based on 
control and surveillance, argues Vale (2002:12), was seen as the best policy option in dealing with the 
migration ‘problem’ notwithstanding that migration has made South Africa and indeed the region.  
South Africa’s post-apartheid immigration policy has been characterised by containment, exclusion 
and deportation (Human Rights Watch, 2007:17; McKnight, 2008:21). The Immigration Act of 2002 
is seen as largely retaining a strong sovereignty and security-centred agenda reflecting a narrowly 
defined notion of national interest, which is not very different from the former apartheid regime’s 
position (Landau et al., 2010:223). Klaaren and Ramji (2001:35) contend that the post-apartheid 
immigration policy did not change substantially and if anything, the Immigration Act has entrenched 
                                                     
11
 Prior to this South Africa did not officially recognise refugees even though it hosted significant numbers of 
Mozambican refugees in the 1980s (Crush & Williams, 2003:8). 
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the lack of legal status of undocumented migrants. Further, they argue that the institutional and 
symbolic effect of the Immigration Act is that it ‘irregularises’ people by making it almost impossible 
to retain legal status over time. Some of the mechanisms of “illegality” are: 
a) South African citizenship is difficult to obtain resulting in a number of residents in the country 
without citizenship rights;  
b) avenues for the regularisation of stay are hampered by bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of 
political will; 
c) the bureaucratic inefficiency of the DHA in the delivery of immigration services contributes to 
the production of illegality; and  
d) the continuation of the ‘two gates’ system for temporary labour in South Africa (Klaaren & 
Ramji, 2001:39).  
The Act criminalises undocumented migrants and grants the police generous provisions for arrest, 
detention and deportation of any person suspected of being in South Africa illegally (Landau, 
Ramjathan-Keogh & Singh, 2005:14). 
It is almost impossible for foreigners with “temporary contracts, without contracts or with 
refugee/asylum status to regularise their stay or claim the status of inalienable, inviolable insiders” 
(Landau, 2011:8). As a result, the majority of the foreigners, reside in South Africa with few practical 
legal protections and residency rights (Landau, 2011:8). According to Vale (2008), migration to South 
Africa is only possible through the same battery of conditions which enable migration to Europe and 
the United States. These conditions include wealth and skills, which Vale argues are in short supply in 
Africa. This leads Vale to conclude that in this way, the immigration policy “includes and excludes 
along a chain determined by the chance of birth and the privilege of childhood” (Vale, 2008).  
The content of the Refugees Act and the Immigration Act and their implementation will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 4. This makes it possible to later identify from the empirical data when 
officials actively and intentionally step out of the legal and normative order thus denying migrants 
their rights. The chapter will therefore also focus on the rights and obligations of migrants and 
incorporate the Constitution of South Africa into the discussion.   
 
2.3.4 Legal categorisation of migrants in South Africa 
International migrants are broadly categorised as temporary residents, permanent residents, asylum 
seekers, refugees and illegal foreigners by South African law. Temporary residents include those with 
permits to enrol in learning institutions, those with work permits and others visiting the country on a 
short-term basis for reasons other than work or study. Work permits of different kinds are issued to 
those with scarce skills, those who have been transferred to the country because they work for an 
international company with offices in South Africa, and those who have been hired in positions where 
no suitably qualified South African could be found. Other temporary residents include those operating 
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their own businesses in South Africa and retirees of a certain net worth determined by the Minister of 
Home Affairs. Temporary residents with work, investor or retiree permits may be eligible to apply for 
permanent residence after five years in South Africa. Individuals residing outside South Africa with a 
high net worth or exceptional skills may also qualify for permanent residency without necessarily 
having lived in South Africa before. Refugees who have been in the country for five years and are 
deemed to remain refugees indefinitely also qualify for permanent residence. Another avenue for 
acquiring permanent residence status is through government amnesties. The South African 
government implemented three amnesty processes between 1995 and 2000 for eligible citizens of 
SADC countries (Steinberg, 2005:15). An asylum seeker is a non-citizen seeking refugee status in 
South Africa while a refugee is a person who has been recognised as a refugee in South Africa in 
terms of the law. Such a person has successfully gone through the process of refugee status 
determination, which is explained in Chapter 4. 
While the majority of migrants in South Africa are legal, a sizeable number are undocumented 
migrants/ illegal foreigners. The literature prefers to use the term ‘undocumented’, which is the term 
used by the UN and the International Organization for Migration. It is seen to be a more neutral term 
than ‘illegal’, which is arguably loaded with connotations of criminality. However, South Africa’s 
Immigration Act of 2002 makes use of the term ‘illegal’. These migrants might initially have entered 
the country legally but have either overstayed their visas or not lodged an asylum claim to regularise 
their stay. They could also have simply entered the country through unauthorised means. Some ways 
of entering the country illegally include being smuggled through official border posts using networks 
most of which work in cahoots with immigration officials and jumping the border using unofficial 
ports of entry, for example, swimming across the Limpopo River from Zimbabwe and walking 
through the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park from Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Table 2.1 shows the 
categories of migrants based on DHA classification which are of interest to this research.  
 
Table 2.1: Categories of migrants selected for the study based on DHA categories 
Involuntary/Forced 
migrants 
 
 
 
Asylum seekers 
Refugees 
Voluntary migrants Temporary residents Students 
Workers 
Others (investors, retirees, dependant relatives 
of temporary and permanent residents) 
Permanent residents Permanent residents 
Undocumented migrants  Illegal foreigners 
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2.3.5 Popular perceptions of international migration in South Africa 
Migration is said to be neither positive nor negative. Indeed, it is the inability of government 
institutions to respond adequately to human mobility that produces so called negative effects (Landau 
et al., 2010:219). Given the politicised nature of international migration in South Africa, foreign 
migrants are viewed as “potential contaminators of the physical and metaphysical metaphorical body 
of the nation” (Peberdy, 2009:158). Broadly speaking, migrants in South Africa are viewed in negative 
terms, which in itself is a breeding ground for xenophobia. A number of false claims are often stated 
as facts with little regard for empirical evidence to reinforce these claims. Four common perceptions 
that have long been perpetuated by state officials, policy makers, journalists and researchers on 
international migration in South Africa are discussed below and contrasted with the evidence 
available. These claims may help to explain the behaviour of the state officials examined in this study 
towards African migrants. 
The first perception is that South Africa is being flooded with foreign migrants. Sensationalist 
headlines and metaphors depict African migrants as ‘masses’ or ‘hordes’ that are ‘flooding’ or 
‘invading’ South Africa creating the impression that migration is out of control and if allowed to 
continue spells doom for the country.12 Migration is presented as a new and seemingly overwhelming 
problem for the post-apartheid state that has created a sense of fear, helplessness and desperation 
(Trimikliniotis, Gordon & Zondo, 2008:1324; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2008:8). In 
1994 the police estimated that there were 8 million undocumented migrants in the country (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998:19). In 1997 former Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in his 
contribution to the Budget Debate in the South African Parliament in 1997 proclaimed that: 
With an illegal population estimated at between 2.5 million and 5 million, it is obvious that the socio-
economic resources of the country, which are under severe strain as it is, are further being burdened by 
the presence of illegal aliens. The cost implication becomes even clearer when one makes a calculation 
suggesting that if every illegal costs our infrastructure, say 100 Rand per annum, then multiplied with 
whatever numbers you wish, it becomes obvious that the cost becomes billions of Rands per year. 
(Minister of Home Affairs, 1997)  
The problem with this perception is threefold. First, legal and illegal migrants are conflated into the 
one category of ‘illegal aliens’. Second, it assumes that migrants are a burden without considering 
their contribution to development. Third, alarmist and exaggerated figures, whose sources are unclear 
and unsubstantiated have been presented by state officials and become public discourse. While data on 
illegal migration remains elusive, the deportation statistics of the DHA have been used by the state to 
provide an indication of the number of illegals even though it is not clear how the figures arrived at 
run into the millions presented by the Minister. Moreover, Valji (2003:3) indicates that using 
deportation statistics is “a problematic methodology that is premised upon an even more problematic 
process”. The statistics show that there has been a growing increase in the number of deportations 
                                                     
12
 In this sense media reportage both reflects the reality that xenophobia exists in society as well as the media as 
a source of xenophobia (McDonalds & Jacobs, 2005:296). 
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from 50,000 deportations in 1990 to just over 300,000 in 2007 (Vigneswaran & Duponchel, 2009:8).13 
While this is a cause for concern, these numbers speak to the issue of migration management in South 
Africa, which also contributes to the production of illegality. However, this is not something that will 
be pursued at this juncture. The point being made is that the number of illegal migrants is overstated.  
More educated guesses on the number of international migrants have estimated the figures to be much 
lower. The earlier cited estimates by the ACMS of between 1.2 million and 1.7 million or less than 4% 
of the total population in 2009 include both legal and illegal migrants. It is not clear whether the 2013 
estimates of Stats SA of an African migrant population of 974,000 include illegal foreigners. 
However, as stated earlier, these estimates, which are regarded as more credible than others, are not 
consistent with those which put the Zimbabwean migrant population alone at 1.5 million. Nonetheless, 
it is difficult to fathom that the number of illegal migrants could exceed that of legal migrants at any 
given point in post-apartheid South Africa. The evidence suggests that the numbers are much lower 
than popular estimates and that certain state officials are playing the ‘numbers game’ and stigmatise 
migration as a ‘problem’ (Trimikliniotis et al., 2008:1326).  
The second perception is that foreigners present serious challenges to the country’s social services 
thereby threatening citizens’ livelihoods and socio-economic rights (Landau, 2006:228). This is the 
point that the former Minister of Home Affairs was making in the excerpt of his speech quoted above. 
It was also echoed a few years later by Johannesburg’s Executive Mayor, Amos Masondo (quoted in 
Landau et al., 2005:6), in 2004 when he argued that: 
In keeping with the international trend of growing migration, our city has become a magnet for people 
from other provinces, the African continent and indeed the four corners of the world. While migrancy 
contributes to the rich tapestry of the cosmopolitan city, it also places a severe strain on employment 
levels and public services. 
In addition, McConnell (2009:35) states there is a common perception that every job occupied by a 
foreigner is one less job for a South African. There is, however, little evidence to back the claim that 
foreigners are threatening the livelihoods and entitlements of citizens. To paraphrase Landau 
(2006:232), firstly, their numbers in South Africa’s cities pale in comparison to the number of South 
African citizens migrating from rural areas to the cities. Secondly, employers have expressed 
preference for the work habits of foreign workers who are on average better trained, more experienced 
and willing to work for lower wages than their South African counterparts (Crush and Williams, 
2001:8). This means that they are able to contribute economically. Finally, those particularly from 
countries not bordering South Africa must demonstrate to immigration officials that they have the 
resources to support their extended stay in the country, thus only the more economically endowed are 
able to migrate. Of those who can easily enter the country from bordering countries, there are bound to 
be those who would attempt to benefit from free public services, however, to single them out makes 
little sense. Research by the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) in Johannesburg showed 
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 These figures do not include repeat deportations/offenders. 
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that foreigners are twice more likely to be self-employed and self-sufficient than local residents 
(Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2008:10). Migration in this instance, therefore, becomes a 
scapegoat for the shortcomings in the delivery of public goods by the government.  
A third claim is that ‘illegal immigrants’ are responsible for the high crime in South Africa (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998:124). For example, the Executive Mayor of Johannesburg was quoted in the press 
in 2004 as having stated that there are “30 Nigerians on every street corner committing crime and 
undermining the city’s safety and security” (Landau et al., 2005:8). To quote Solomon (2003:33), who 
argues that illegal migration is a source of insecurity, “the millions of illegal immigrants living in 
South Africa overstrain the country’s social services and exacerbate South Africa’s spiralling crime 
rates”. Another of the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) surveys found that 48% of South 
Africans feel that foreigners are a criminal threat (Crush & Williams, 2003:1).  
No one can deny that foreigners have been convicted of various crimes in South Africa. For instance, 
transnational organised crime networks, ranging from human trafficking to narcotics and arms trade, 
certainly include foreigners and locals and contribute to the security challenges of states, including 
South Africa. However, the link between foreignness and crime is a tenuous one as people commit 
crime for reasons beyond the fact that they are foreigners. Moreover, in 2001 statistics from the SAPS 
showed that no more that 2% of arrests were of non-nationals (in Harris, 2001:34). So while some 
migrants have been involved in criminal acts, a generalisation has been made to the effect that 
migrants are responsible for crime. SAMP’s research has shown that migrants are disproportionally 
the victims of crime given the prevalence of xenophobia and the lack of protection by the police 
(McDonald, Mashike & Golden, 1999:2). Morris’s interviews with Congolese and Nigerian migrants 
in Johannesburg indicated that “they all felt that crime in South Africa was far more widespread and 
violent than in their country of origin” (Morris, 1998:1129). 
The fourth commonly held belief about African migrants in South Africa is that they are poverty 
stricken, desperate people who intend to settle in South Africa permanently as immigrants (Harris, 
2001:128). In fact, it seems that the term ‘refugee’ has pejorative connotations in South Africa and 
does not evoke the empathy that one would expect. It is synonymous with all poor foreigners (Landau 
et al., 2005:18). While African migrants tend to be stereotyped into this category of refugee, as it is 
commonly interpreted, section 2.3.3 has shown that there are different categories of migrants who are 
in the country for different reasons and are thus not a homogenous group. In addition, immigration 
law, through its stringent visa requirements, tends to be more selective of those who are better off 
economically than the destitute. Nonetheless, even the poor migrants who manage to make their way 
to South Africa tend to find work relatively easily because they take whatever comes their way. 
However, because of their desperation and vulnerability to exploitation, often times they earn lower 
wages than South Africans for the same job. SAMP’s extensive research also suggests that migration 
to South Africa is predominantly short-term and migrants retain links with their home countries with 
the hope of returning one day (McDonald et al., 1999:2; McDonald, 2000:8). However, it is not 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
36 
 
uncommon to find migrants who have been in South Africa longer than they had hoped due to 
prolonged unfavourable conditions in their home countries. Many migrants also come to South Africa 
unaccompanied by their entire immediate family members with the intention of going back home, or 
migrating to a third country after some time. Whether a migrant decides to settle in South Africa 
permanently or not is a personal choice based on a number of considerations, including having to 
navigate a restrictive immigration policy.  
Research conducted in Johannesburg found that “African migrants were more likely to hire someone 
to work for them in the past year than the South Africans amongst whom they lived and that more than 
two-thirds of those hired by migrants were South Africans” (Landau, 2006:231). The CDE study also 
found that 12% of the 44% of foreigners who are self-employed created jobs for South Africans 
(Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2008:8). In the last decade foreign entrepreneurs, particularly 
Somalis with refugee status, have come to dominate the spaza shop market in South Africa’s urban 
informal settlements (Charman & Piper, 2012:83). Therefore, the evidence does not seem to support 
the proposition that many of the migrants are the desperate poor, dependent on South Africa’s social 
services, and planning to settle in the country for the rest of their lives.  
It can be argued that these misconceptions have shaped state and public responses to migration in post-
apartheid South Africa. This is despite the evidence available to counter these claims. Such negative 
perceptions have led to South Africans being strongly opposed to immigration and have translated into 
negative feelings towards international migrants. While such arguments might be similar to those 
advanced by those who are anti-immigration in other countries, what is unique in South Africa is that 
these negative views are biased towards African migrants. As a result, migration is framed “as a 
phenomenon to be prevented, slowed or stopped” (Landau, 2006:222). This is in line with much of the 
literature by migration scholars which highlights the potential threats that migrants pose to national 
security. According to Ibrahim (2005), there has been a global trend towards securitisation of 
migration where migration is increasingly described in security terms and which normalises the view 
that migrants are a threat. This is in contrast to the rarely mentioned fundamental role that migrants 
can play in developing national economies. 
The increase in international migration into South Africa, particularly of Africans, has been 
accompanied by a rise in xenophobia (Guy, 2004:85). One would expect that negative perceptions of 
international migration, such as those highlighted above, would be accompanied by negative attitudes 
towards foreigners. Handmaker and Parsley (2001:48) argue that this is because the migration debate 
in South Africa has centred on blaming migrants for a host of South Africa’s socio-economic 
problems. It is worth stressing from this section that state officials have played a key role in promoting 
a negative discourse on migration and a fear of foreign domination.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined international migration in South Africa. It focused on a particular group of 
international migrants – African migrants – who form the majority of migrants into post-apartheid 
South Africa and the attention that they receive from South Africans, which are important for this 
dissertation. The chapter began by recognising that states have the sovereign authority to decide who 
can and who cannot enter and stay on its territory. By providing an overview of international 
migration trends in South Africa and the role of the state in shaping migration, it showed that South 
Africa has a long history of cross-border migration and its diversity is the result of international 
migration. It also highlighted differences between African migration in the pre-apartheid and post-
apartheid era. In the former, migration was pursued by the state through a two gates policy – black 
migration took place within the context of the migrant labour system and under the government’s 
segregation policies, whereas white migration was regulated by immigration legislation. In the latter, 
all migration is regulated by the Refugees Act and the Immigration Act (which replaced the Aliens 
Control Act from 2002). With regard to similarities between migration in the two dispensations, the 
chapter highlighted the fact that most African migrants historically and to date still come from 
neighbouring southern African countries while legal provisions exist within the Immigration Act for 
the continuation of the migrant labour system. An important takeaway from the discussion on state 
responses to the issue of immigration is that they have implications for the conditions of the migrant 
population in the host country.  
The chapter also noted that contemporary migration is more complex and African migrants, who now 
come from all sub-regions of the continent, are drawn to South Africa by a range of economic, 
political, socio-cultural and personal factors. It also pointed out that the presence of African migrants 
in South Africa is largely viewed in negative terms by the state and the public. This is reflected by a 
dominant political discourse that has centred on: overstating the scale of international migration to 
suggest an overwhelming problem for the country; presenting migrants as a threat to citizens’ 
livelihoods and security; and fears that migrants plan to settle in South Africa permanently to the 
detriment of South Africa’s scarce resources, which belong to its citizens. The resulting xenophobia, 
which continues to be a feature of South Africa’s democracy, is discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Literature review: Xenophobia and the state of exception 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter, structured in two main parts, reviews the existing literature which informs this study and 
to which this study seeks to contribute. After defining some key terminology, it proceeds to provide an 
account of the prevalence of xenophobia by looking at the various ways in which xenophobia is 
manifested. It also critically reviews various theories that have been proffered to explain the 
emergence and spread of xenophobia. These are thematically distinguished in terms of economic, 
sociological, socio-cultural and political factors. The literary sources examined here primarily relate to 
the South African context in the post-apartheid period.   
The second part of the chapter is an extension of the theoretical section on xenophobia and focuses 
specifically on the theoretical framework that will be used in this dissertation – Giorgio Agamben’s 
theory of the state of exception, which is characterised by sovereignty and bare life. The author will 
apply this theoretical framework to explain how sovereign power in the South African state operates 
through day-to-day practices of state officials that result in the drawing of distinctions between 
citizens and non-citizens and its implications for xenophobia. Reference is then made to South African 
and international literature critiquing Agamben’s theory and also showing how it has been interpreted 
and used as an analytical tool in the social sciences and humanities. This leads to the author’s 
operationalisation of the theory in the study in order to identify it in the case of South African state 
officials’ treatment of African migrants. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the gaps in the 
literature which this study hopes to address by focusing on the relationship between the state and non-
citizens rather than on the relationship between citizens and non-citizens which has received much 
attention in the literature.  
 
3.2 Definition of key concepts 
Five key terms used in the study are defined here – migrant, state, xenophobia, state of exception and 
bare life.   
3.2.1 Migrant 
The study adopts the United Nations (UN) definition of a migrant as “an individual who has resided in 
a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the 
means, regular or irregular, used to migrate” (International Organization for Migration, 2011:62). As 
stated in Chapter 2, the different categories of African migrants included in this research are asylum 
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seekers, refugees, temporary residents, permanent residents and illegal foreigners of various African 
nationalities who have been living in South Africa for a minimum of one year. 
3.2.2 The state 
The South African state, disaggregated into three state institutions, is the interpretive frame through 
which international migration and xenophobia are examined in this study. Structurally, the state is 
characterised by a bias towards its citizens and an implicit alienation of the non-national (Monson, 
2012:463). International migrants, therefore, challenge the triad of state-territory-citizen and are thus 
constructed as a threat to the national order of things. Agamben, in his writing, takes the state as a 
given and does not provide a definition of the state. However, the Western context in which he writes, 
his acknowledgement that the state is constituted by a defined territory with a population that is ruled 
by a government, and the notion of violence by the state suggest that he adopts a classical definition in 
line with Max Weber and others.  
The sovereign state is the primary unit of analysis in mainstream International Relations (IR) theories, 
which trace the emergence of the global state system to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia treaties. The 
state is accepted as a universal form of governance and is the supreme authority within its jurisdiction. 
According to Keohane (2003:276), the state still remains as “the principle unit of protection and 
collective action”. This is despite claims that suggest its diminishing importance in the face of 
globalisation and organisations that increasingly operate beyond the boundaries of states.  
Dominant traditional definitions of the state describe it in terms of functionalist and organisational 
dimensions (Heywood, 2007:90). The most dominant definition in scholarship is perhaps that of Max 
Weber who defines the state in terms of control of the means of violence. Weber defines the state as “a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a 
given territory” (Weber, 1984:33). Richmond (1994:35) suggests that the accuracy of this assertion 
depends on interpretation of the term ‘legitimate’ as states do not have a monopoly on violence or the 
use of weapons. Weber holds that “the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions and 
individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it” (Gerth & Mills, 1948:78). Giddens, on the 
other hand, recognises that it is only in some modern states that the state can “successfully lay claim to 
the monopoly of the means of violence, and only in such states does the administrative scope of the 
state correspond directly with territorial boundaries about which that claim is made” (Giddens, 
1985:18). According to Weber, the bureaucratic state order is an especially important characteristic of 
the modern state (Gerth & Mills, 1948:82). 
Giddens (1985:17) contends that in ordinary language the state can either refer to an apparatus of 
government or power, or to the entire social system subject to that government or power but he 
technically defines the state as “a political organization whose rule is territorially ordered and which is 
able to monopolize the means of violence to sustain that rule” (Giddens, 1985:20). A nation-state is “a 
power-container whose administrative purview corresponds exactly to its territorial delimitation” 
(Giddens, 1985:172). It is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative 
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monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries, its rule being sanctioned by law and direct 
control of the means of internal and external violence (Giddens, 1985:121). The idea of a nation in 
nation-state encompasses the idea of a community that shares a common language and history, and 
whose borders coincide with such a community.    
Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009:2) characterise a state as “a single, unified source of political authority for 
a territory, drawing upon the undivided loyalties of its population, operating in a well-organized and 
permanent way and directed towards the interests of the whole society”. According to Jackson 
(1990:38), a sovereign state “consists traditionally of a bordered territory occupied by a settled 
population under effective and at least to some extent civil – that is ‘civilized’– government”. It is a 
political organisation that has the following elements: “the capacity, within a delimited territory or 
territories, to make laws and effectively sanction their up-keep; exert a monopoly over the disposal of 
the means of violence; control basic policies relating to the internal political or administrative form of 
government; and dispose of the fruits of a national economy that are the basis of its revenue” 
(Giddens, 1985:282).  
While the state has continued to evolve since its early beginning into the modern state as we know it 
today, the definitions above seem to refer to the original modern European nation-state, which has 
globally emerged as the dominant political form since the early nineteenth century. The four 
definitions of the state advanced by Weber, Giddens, Dryzek and Dunleavy, and Jackson emphasise 
the territorial, institutional and central nature of the state. They can be viewed as describing an ideal 
state, with Western states believed to bear closest resemblance to these definitions. The ‘classical’ 
state, as it were, has continued to evolve and has provided a model to other states outside Western 
Europe that have since developed. It has been adopted across the world with variations. 
The state exists to provide political goods to those living within its borders and focuses on the 
concerns and demands of its citizens (Rotberg, 2003:2). The political (public) goods typically 
provided by states include security; essential political, civil and human rights; healthcare; education; 
physical infrastructure; and a monetary and banking system (Rotberg, 2003:3; Rotberg, 2004:3). 
Rotberg (2003, 2004) argues that states can be judged as strong, weak or failed according to the extent 
to which they are able to provide these goods, which according to him are hierarchical, with security 
being the most crucial. Zartman (1995:5) identifies the following three key intertwined functions of 
the state:  
the state as the sovereign authority – the accepted source of identity and the arena of politics; the state 
as an institution – and therefore a tangible organization of decisionmaking and an intangible symbol of 
identity; and the state as the security guarantor for a populated territory. 
The trajectory of state formation in Africa differs from that in Western Europe where modern states 
first emerged. As many African states vitiate from the Weberian benchmark, the scholarship on the 
African state has attached many adjectival qualifiers in defining and theorising the African state. Some 
of the qualifiers of the misnomer African state which are used in academic writings include ‘post-
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colonial’, ‘predatory’, ‘failed’, ‘weak’, ‘quasi’ and ‘fragile’. These depictions are the result of African 
states’ inability to perform the functions required for them to pass as states as outlined by Zartman 
(1995:5) and Rotberg (2003:2). Gambari (1995:222) suggests that the maintenance of law and order in 
Africa has existed tenuously because the instruments of the state have been unable to cope with the 
demands of governance. According to Khadiagala (1995:35), the African state is thus described 
because it lacks “social cohesion, an institutional core and organizational capacities”.  
The modern African state, though meeting the basic characteristics of states, is unique in a number of 
ways. As Gambari (1995:222) and Giddens (1985:272) note, it emerged from state apparatuses 
originally established during colonialism. Zartman (1995:1) alludes to the scepticism surrounding the 
viability of African states brought about by the relative newness of the African state and colonialist 
claims of African unreadiness for sovereignty at independence. The African state is largely based on 
boundaries drawn up by the colonialists, which resulted in the arbitrary splitting of nations and peoples 
across borders (Gambari, 1995:222). Consequently, they have been referred to as ‘state-nations’ to 
denote the emergence of the state prior to that of the nation in contrast to European states where the 
process occurred in the reverse (Giddens, 1985:272). This term also highlights the heterogeneous 
ethnic and cultural groups that make up the populations of African states perhaps with the partial 
exception of Lesotho, Swaziland and Somalia (Giddens, 1985:273). Giddens acknowledges that the 
sovereignty of numerous post-colonial states, such as those found in most of Africa, “may be limited 
both by a relatively low level of internal administrative control and by external economic dependence” 
(Giddens, 1985:287).  
Herbst (2000:94) argues that the territorial boundaries of Africa established following the Berlin 
Conference of 1884/5 were the most consequential part of colonialism. Herbst (2000:103) explains 
why African leaders at independence collectively agreed to retain these boundaries. Firstly, the new 
leaders realised that basing their boundaries on the actual territory administered by the state would 
result in the size of the state becoming much smaller. Secondly, they recognised that redrawing their 
boundaries would inevitably be a violent process that would threaten their own positions. Indeed, 
many of these boundaries have persisted with a few notable exceptions such as the secession of Eritrea 
from Ethiopia and South Sudan from Sudan. Herbst (2000) contends that the creation of territorial 
states in Africa, in contrast to nation-states in Europe, has had ramifications on state consolidation as 
African states have struggled to exercise authority over their entire jurisdictions. Furthermore, he notes 
that African states are not confident of their sovereignty because they do not control the full extent of 
their territories and are resistant to any measures that would purportedly diminish their authority such 
as implementing certain agreements within the context of regional integration and reducing the 
salience of citizenship by conferring a broad range of human rights to non-citizens (Herbst, 2000:234). 
This could explain why many states are against open borders and free movement of people within their 
regional economic groupings.  
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Jackson (1990:21) describes post-colonial states (not an internally undifferentiated category) as being 
similar to all other states only in terms of juridical statehood. His argument is that the main reason for 
the persistence of the African state is its recognition by all other states since statehood became a global 
norm. In terms of ‘empirical statehood’, these states are limited in their “political will, institutional 
authority and organised power to protect human rights or provide socio-economic welfare.” In the 
sense of empirical statehood, therefore, he claims that they are still far from complete and refers to 
them as ‘quasi-states’ (Jackson, 1990:21). His analysis of sovereignty is shaped around the ideas of 
negative and positive sovereignty, which are worth explaining briefly. He defines negative sovereignty 
as freedom from outside interference or non-intervention (Jackson, 1990:22). Negative sovereignty is 
a legal attribute that refers to the constitutional independence that post-colonial states acquired from 
their former colonies. Positive sovereignty as a substantive condition refers to a government which not 
only enjoys negative sovereignty but also “possesses the wherewithal to provide political goods for its 
citizens” (Jackson, 1990:29). Jackson associates empirical statehood with positive sovereignty and 
challenges the capabilities of post-colonial states, which in his view lack both empirical statehood and 
positive sovereignty. He states that most of them “are not yet beneficial to the masses of ordinary 
people who inhabit them and whose living conditions have improved little if at all as a result of 
independence” (Jackson, 1990:176).  
Mamdani (1996:16-18) argues that the structure of sovereign rule in African states is based on the 
colonial legacy of “the bifurcated state” that is based on the urban-rural divide. To quote him:  
Direct rule was the form of urban civil power. It was about the exclusion of natives from civil freedoms 
guaranteed to citizens in civil society. Indirect rule, however, signified a rural tribal authority. It was 
about incorporating natives into a state-enforced customary order. (Mamdani, 1996:18). 
This legacy points to the challenge that African states face in projecting power beyond their main 
cities into their hinterlands and, by extension, the relationship between central authorities and local 
leaders. Herbst (2000:197) points out that it is in the rural areas that the contradiction of states having 
sovereign authority but not actual control is most glaring.  
Dunn (2001:55) criticises the unproblematised acceptance of the state in IR and argues that dominant 
definitions of the state do not fit the African reality. This, he opines, is not due to the African context 
in which the state was transplanted but rather due to the limitations of state-centric approaches for 
understanding the state in Africa. Dunn (2001:56) argues that there is need to further interrogate and 
re-examine the conceptualisation of the state. In contrast, Chabal and Daloz (1999:11) maintain that 
the most prevalent interpretations of the African state have a tendency to overemphasise the impact of 
colonialism on the formation of the African state. Herbst (2000:29) seems to agree with Chabal and 
Daloz by observing that most scholars have not succeeded in “developing a view of African politics 
that takes into account the precolonial period seriously while still acknowledging the traumas created 
by white rule”. However, Mazrui (1986:67) recognises the existence of states and stateless societies in 
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Africa before colonialism. Pre-colonial African states had “centralised structures of authority and 
coercion” while in stateless societies authority was “diffuse and decentralised” (Mazrui, 1986:67).   
South Africa is regarded as a ‘strong’ state when compared to most African states. It is ranked among 
the top five best governed African states in international governance indices year after year alongside 
Mauritius, Cape Verde, Botswana and the Seychelles. However, South Africa grapples with the 
apartheid legacy, high crime (reflected in low safety rankings), corruption, poor quality of basic 
education and HIV/AIDSs (Rotberg, 2013:180).  
It is important to highlight that this study does not study the state as a unit of analysis in the traditional 
IR sense. It also recognises that conventional definitions of the state refer to ideals, which many states 
including the South African state fall short. However, it is important for purposes of the study to 
underline the role of the state as a guarantor of rights and provider of security to those living in its 
territory. Non-citizens are excluded from the state by definition but at the same time states also have 
obligations towards non-citizens residing within their borders. The fact that non-citizens also form part 
of the population within states makes research into how states regulate the entry of international 
migrants into their borders and respond to their presence in their polity pertinent. The South African 
constitution confers rights to all who live in its territory rather than to citizens only, with a few 
exceptions. Thus, a fundamental question this study explores is whether in reality the actual enjoyment 
of rights is tied to citizenship or dissociated from citizenship.  
This study presents an opportunity to test, albeit on a limited scale, some of the inherent assumptions 
on the nature of the state and sovereignty in the context of three South African state institutions. These 
include that: the state is a unitary system and coherent set of institutions and practices; that state actors 
are bound by official law, policy and principles; and that internal sovereignty is authored by the state 
or informed by unified strategies of control (Landau & Monson, 2008:333; Landau, 2011:15-16). By 
using Agamben’s theory of the state of exception, the study investigates how the state “employs law 
through the exception, helping to reveal the paradoxical and omnipotent qualities of sovereign power” 
(Brophy, 2009:199). 
 
3.2.3 Xenophobia 
Xenophobia is a global phenomenon that varies in intensity and manifestation in different contexts. 
Two things are unique about xenophobia in South Africa. The first is that it is predominantly directed 
at black African foreigners, hence the term ‘Afrophobia’. The discrimination that black migrants 
experience in South Africa is comparable to that faced by black immigrants in other continents 
(Morris, 1998). This is despite the fact that South Africa is an African country and the majority of its 
population is black. African migrants in South Africa are no less immune to xenophobia in South 
Africa than they would be in Europe, Asia or North America where xenophobia stems from rivalry 
between nationals and non-nationals over scarce resources and a clash of cultures. Secondly, is the 
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violent manifestation of xenophobia beyond xenophobic attitudes. According to Matsinhe (2011:306), 
the 2008 pogroms, which were neither the first nor the last of xenophobic violence, are a salient 
manifestation of a broadly and deeply entrenched disdain of black foreigners. 
The common definition of xenophobia is “the hatred or fear of foreigners, combining the Greek xenos 
(foreign) with phobia (fear)” (Crush, 2008:15). The South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) defines xenophobia as “the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state” 
(South African Human Rights Commission, 1998). Xenophobia includes “all forms of discriminatory 
attitudes towards non-nationals, whatever their source or rationality” (Landau et al., 2005:4). 
According to Neocosmos (2010:13) it is a discourse and practice which results in the social and 
political exclusion of its targets from the rest of the population. Xenophobia in South Africa is 
manifested in the prejudice, discrimination, hostility and violence directed towards foreigners. This 
study distinguishes between the attitudinal and behavioural aspects of xenophobia, focussing on the 
former. It defines and measures xenophobia in terms of a set of negative attitudes or dispositions 
towards non-South Africans. Xenophobia includes discriminatory attitudes, hostility and intolerance 
towards foreigners by citizens and the state. The author takes the position that xenophobia arises from 
a political discourse that constructs African migrants as a threat to the human security of South 
Africans. This discourse spreads and gains acceptance within the general population and leads to 
practices that result in the exclusion of migrants from citizenship entitlements.  
 
3.2.4 State of exception 
Agamben (1998:18) posits that the state of exception is the situation that results from the suspension 
of the law by the sovereign (in this case state officials), but the law remains in force. It is an 
increasingly common mechanism used by sovereign states to exert power over populations in order to 
protect the state from threats (Agamben, 2005:1). The state of exception is a wilful act declared by the 
sovereign power during a period of emergency when the constitutional order is at stake. It can also be 
declared when there is a threat or perceived threat to national belonging, security and well-being of the 
state. In this instance, the state of exception is not a formal proclamation, however. Instead, it refers to 
the implicit authorisation of state officials to operate outside the law in order to protect the state from 
the migrant who is perceived to be a threat. Declaring a state of exception in this context endorses 
practices in which the law itself is either suspended or regarded as an instrument that state officials 
may enact as a strategy for constraining and monitoring the African migrant population. The state of 
exception impacts negatively on the lives of migrants. The state of exception is justified by the 
imperative to defend the state from the apparent threat to the body politic presented by the migrant. It 
is understood as an attribute of the political system and the institutional character of the state, which 
allows for state officials to discriminate against migrants.   
The state of exception “is a state of suspended law but not of lawlessness” (Brophy, 2009:200). This 
can be understood by drawing upon Agamben’s understanding of politics as “an ongoing process of 
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clarification between inclusion and exclusion, between forms of life that the sovereign will protect and 
represent and those it will not” (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004:34). This process of distinguishing 
forms of life which are included and excluded enables the state to maintain sovereignty. Thus, the state 
of exception is distinguished from general lawlessness as the sovereign “is able to operate both inside 
and outside the legal system simultaneously” when a state of exception has been declared (Jones, 
2009:881). 
A more detailed engagement with Agamben is contained in section 3.5. Also, the operationalisation of 
the state of exception in this study, which focuses on the practices of state officials in their daily 
dealings with migrants, how these practices impact upon the lives of African migrants and 
consequently, how this shapes xenophobia, is explained later in this chapter (section 3.8).  
 
3.2.5 Bare life 
Bare life is the form of subjectivity produced by and captured in sovereign power. This is central to 
the state of exception. Those reduced to bare life are biologically alive but “lacking almost all the 
rights and expectations that we customarily attribute to human existence” (Agamben, 1998:159). 
Agamben claims that outside citizenship all non-citizens are potentially reduced to a state of bare life 
because the lives of non-citizens do not make sense in terms of the state-nation-territory triad. The 
state is the producer of humanity, by protecting citizens, and of bare life by denying it to non-citizens 
(Ong, 2006:22). Agamben’s definition does not lend itself well to empirical observation and 
measurement as it is formulated. Therefore, in order to operationalise bare life in this study, the author 
borrows from the interpretations of other scholars. According to Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2004:50), 
bare life includes the dependence on the whims of state officials “for full enjoyment of life, livelihood, 
and personal security and dignity”. Kearns (2007:7) interprets bare life as a condition in which some 
lives are treated as if they were either not worth living or not worth protecting. 
The attention now turns to the extensive body of literature on xenophobia, which helps to position this 
study. It first reviews the group of largely survey-based literature which focuses on establishing the 
prevalence and experience of xenophobia in South Africa and then moves on to review the literature 
concerned with explaining the causes of xenophobia. These two groups of literature are not mutually 
exclusive. However, reviewing them separately here merely helps to structure the chapter. 
3.3 The prevalence of xenophobia in South Africa 
Incidents of xenophobic attacks, inflicted predominantly by black South Africans, began to appear in 
the media in the 1990s.14 Fine and Bird (2006:59) note that incidents of xenophobia have been a 
regular feature of media coverage between 1994 and 2002, the period covered by their research on 
newspaper coverage of racial violence and xenophobia. According to the Consortium for Refugees and 
                                                     
14
 Steenkamp (2009:442) contrasts these post-apartheid attacks with the apartheid years when African migrants 
were integrated into black townships, intermarriage was common and migrants were united with black South 
Africans in workers’ struggles and the struggle against apartheid.    
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Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) (2011:9), xenophobia in South Africa is not decreasing but the 
fact that many violent incidents of xenophobia go unreported in the media creates the impression that 
xenophobia is no longer a problem. CoRMSA has recorded over 250 incidents of violence towards 
foreigners between December 1994 and December 2012. Appendix B shows the xenophobic incidents 
from 2011 to 2012 compiled by CoRMSA from civil society and media reports.  
In 1998 a partnership between the SAHRC, the National Consortium for Refugees and UNHCR 
spearheaded a nationwide public education and information campaign – the Roll Back Xenophobia 
Campaign – after it identified xenophobia as a major source of concern to human rights and 
democratic values in the country (Crush, 2001:1). An evaluation of the campaign is not known to exist 
but the success of this campaign is questionable on two accounts; continued media reports of 
xenophobic incidents and research that reveals strong anti-immigrant sentiment since the campaign.  
The first category of research reveals xenophobia through surveys among South Africans of their 
attitudes towards migrants. Some of the earliest and most extensive primary research, which revealed 
xenophobic attitudes in South Africa, has been conducted since the late 1990s by the Southern African 
Migration Project (SAMP). The SAMP, which already had a history of research on immigration issues 
and migrants’ rights, began to pay attention to xenophobia in the 1990s after a series of violent attacks 
on African foreigners perpetrated by citizens took place in various parts of the country. The series of 
SAMP national public opinion surveys reveal a high level of intolerance towards non-citizens 
regardless of their immigration status in the country. These studies show that “South Africans not only 
hold negative attitudes towards foreigners but they also have a readily accessible set of stereotypes 
with which to justify or rationalise their negative attitudes” (Mattes, Taylor, McDonald & Richmond, 
1999:19).  
According to Crush (2001:18), South Africans display distinctive negative reactions to Africans from 
elsewhere on the continent and show definite preferences for European and North American 
immigrants. This is followed by Africans from southern Africa who are regarded more favourably 
than those from the rest of the continent (Crush, 2008:4). However, even among southern Africans 
there are variations. Migrants from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are more desirable than 
Mozambicans and Zimbabweans (Crush, 2008:30). Most unpopular are Africans from elsewhere 
particularly Angolans, Congolese, Nigerians and Somalis (Crush, 2008:31). This could explain why 
Somalis, Mozambicans and Zimbabweans are mostly the victims of violent xenophobia (Crush, 
2008:30). According to Neocosmos, (2010) some nationalities have borne the brunt of xenophobia 
more than others by being singled out in the South African press. Nigerians and Mozambicans have 
long appeared in the press for drug dealing and illegal migration respectively, and in more recent times 
Zimbabweans have been the victims of opprobrium following reportage on the economic crisis in their 
country (Neocosmos, 2010:1, 96-97).  
A 2006 SAMP Survey shows South Africans as the least open to outsiders compared to citizens of 
other countries (Crush, 2008:1). Negative attitudes translate into strong support for policies that would 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
47 
 
limit or prohibit immigration altogether. These include a total ban or very strict limits on immigration 
and repatriating every foreigner. The results are based on a widely held view by the surveyed South 
Africans that too many foreigners are being allowed into the country (Crush, 2001:13). This view 
might reflect the homogenising perception that South Africa is flooded with migrants as discussed in 
section 2.3.4, in spite of a selective immigration policy. It also reflects the lack of distinction or 
recognition of the various categories of migrants. Indeed, most South Africans in the survey believe 
that most of the foreigners in South Africa are here illegally and for that reason should be denied basic 
human rights (Crush, 2008:3).  
A 2010 SAMP Survey revealed a reduction in xenophobic sentiments among South Africans 
compared to its 2006 Survey (Crush, Ramachandran & Pendleton, 2013:4). However, the proportion 
of those willing to transform their xenophobic sentiments into violence remained constant in the 
aftermath of the 2008 xenophobic eruption (Crush, Ramachandran & Pendleton, 2013:6). It also noted 
that globally South Africa is still the country most opposed to immigration (Crush, Ramachandran & 
Pendleton, 2013:4).  
Popular attitudes toward foreigners have also been surveyed by Afrobarometer.15 Data from the 2008 
national survey (Round 4) in South Africa indicate that “the majority of South Africans are extremely 
distrustful of foreigners” (Afrobarometer, 2010:2). Negative attitudes toward foreigners are 
corroborated by data from the 2006 World Values Survey on public attitudes. The results show that 
“South Africans generally do not like the presence of foreigners and support policies that make it more 
difficult for them to settle in their midst” (du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:164). However, they are prepared to 
put up with foreign workers living in the country, even though they do not like them (du Toit & Kotzé, 
2011:170). There appears to be consensus among the SAMP, Afrobarometer and World Values 
Surveys that South Africans are generally xenophobic across class, race and income lines. The 2008 
SAMP survey found that the most xenophobic are Coloureds, followed by whites, then blacks and 
finally, Asians/ Indians (Crush, 2008:5).   
This kind of research points to the potential for violence by bringing to the fore the strong and 
widespread character of xenophobia in South Africa, but as Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2011:60) 
point out, it does not allow for localised variations of the appearance of xenophobia. For example, 
when one looks at the violent expression of xenophobia, one may believe that blacks are the most 
xenophobic. However, the SAMP also finds that in terms of class, “xenophobic attitudes are stronger 
amongst the poor and working class than the wealthy and middle class” (Crush, 2008:5). Again, 
looking at xenophobic violence, the fact that the vast majority of the underclass is black and may have 
greater interaction with African migrants could explain why blacks are the main perpetrators. 
However, because xenophobia is broader than violence and encompasses attitudes as well, the SAMP 
                                                     
15
 The Afrobarometer public opinion surveys measure attitudes towards democracy, governance, civil society 
and markets in 20 African countries including South Africa.  
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findings counter the misconception that xenophobia can be pin-pointed to specific groups of South 
Africans based on income, race, gender, political affiliation and so on (Lefko-Everett, 2008:24). 
A second category of research on xenophobia focuses on the experiences of migrants and this study 
falls under this category. Some of the notable research on xenophobia informed by the perspectives of 
migrants in South Africa has been undertaken by Morris (1998), Harris (2001) and Dodson (2010). 
Morris’s study was based on Congolese and Nigerian nationals living in Johannesburg’s inner-city 
neighbourhoods. These two groups are believed to be the most numerous groups of African migrants 
from outside southern Africa. His research shows that they “have experienced significant antagonism 
and prejudice from the local population, more especially from black South Africans” (Morris, 
1998:1116). He argues that these foreigners are easily identifiable by their physiognomies, distinctive 
dress and inability to speak South African languages. A common view expressed by the interviewees 
was that South Africans, especially black South Africans, who they tended to interact more with, were 
unwelcoming and treated them harshly (Morris, 1998:1122). Each of them had encountered verbal 
abuse such as being told to go back home or being called amakwerekwere – a derogatory term for 
African foreigners. The men were also accused by South African men of taking their women. They 
also felt that being black and African did not offer them any protection from prejudice and hostility 
contrary to the Pan-African consciousness espoused by some politicians.  
Harris’s research for the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation explored the experiences 
of foreigners along the themes of violence, crime and xenophobia. The study finds that “a general 
climate of xenophobia renders foreigners vulnerable to exploitation and violence” (Harris, 2001:9). 
The general climate refers to the negative and stereotypical manner in which the media portrays 
foreigners; the xenophobic statements that have been made by politicians and public officials; public 
protests against foreigners and physical attacks targeted at foreigners. According to Harris (2001), 
foreigners are the victims of abuse, extortion and human rights violations at the hands of state 
officials. These include the police, the army and the DHA. The report distinguishes between 
victimisation of foreigners directed by economic exploitation and financial gain, and by xenophobia. 
Xenophobia is said to take the following forms: murder, violence, institutional discrimination, verbal 
abuse and public hostility (Harris, 2001:10).  
Harris (2001:98-99) highlights a subtle distinction between broad xenophobia based on foreignness 
and focussed xenophobia based on nationality. In the former, xenophobia operates in terms that are 
relative to South African identity and nationality. It is motivated by a general sense that the individual 
is not South African. Xenophobia by nationality, on the other hand, perpetuates myths and 
generalisations about specific nationalities. It comments on the national membership of the foreigners, 
for example, Nigerians as drug dealers or Somalis as shrewd traders. 
Dodson’s (2010) research was conducted with African migrants living in Cape Town. Migrants from 
13 African countries narrated their day-to-day experiences of life in South Africa. The findings 
“provided accounts of everyday xenophobia in the fear, dislike and disrespect that they encountered in 
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simply going about their lives” (Dodson, 2010:15). Examples of these included being victims of 
robbery and verbal abuse, and accusations of taking South African jobs and women.      
A third area of research focuses on institutional xenophobia at the state level, which is also a critical 
aspect of this study as it reviews officials’ behaviour. While Harris’s research also includes an element 
of this, studies have been conducted by Human Rights Watch (1998), the South African Human Rights 
Commission (1999), and Klaaren and Ramji (2001). This category of research draws attention to the 
xenophobic behaviour of state officials and the human rights violations suffered by vulnerable 
migrants classified as refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. It highlights the abuses 
that these migrants endure as part of immigration enforcement by the DHA and the SAPS. Also 
included are officials of the army and the Lindela deportation centre.16 The research investigates how 
state officials interact with migrants in the issuing of permits, search and arrest procedures, and the 
detention process. The SAHRC report finds that in many cases immigration-related officials act as a 
law unto themselves, exercising their power with total disregard for human rights (South African 
Human Rights Commission, 1999:4). Handmaker and Parsley (2001:42) observe that state officials do 
not abuse or exploit white illegal foreigners in the way that they do African migrants noting that white 
foreigners who have overstayed their visas do not end up in Lindela suggesting that state officials treat 
migrants differently based on their race.  
A fourth area of research focuses on violent xenophobia with specific reference to the 2008 eruption. 
In 2008 South Africa was in the international limelight following a wave of xenophobic violence, the 
worst sustained violence witnessed in the country since the end of apartheid. Over a period of two 
weeks, violence spread across townships in three of the country’s biggest cities and left 62 dead, 
hundreds injured, tens of thousands displaced and property destroyed (Worby et al., 2008:1-2). 
Although the attacks were targeted at black African migrants, some South Africans from smaller 
ethnic groups were also victims because they were perceived as outsiders. Following this episode, over 
20,000 foreigners were sheltered in temporary refugee camps and many were reported to have left the 
country (Bekker, 2010:126). 
Much of the research that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 attacks analyses xenophobic violence 
within a history of political violence in South Africa’s townships and locates xenophobia within the 
broader socio-economic and political issues facing the country. Because much of this literature is 
anchored in answering the question “what happened?” it is dealt with in the following section, which 
discusses some of the theories for the existence of xenophobia in South Africa. The research discussed 
in this section only confirms the existence of xenophobia in South Africa as an enduring social 
phenomenon, characterised by attitudes of intolerance, prejudice, human rights violations and 
violence, but says little about what the roots of xenophobia are. In terms of the different research 
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 The Lindela deportation centre serves as a central holding facility for illegal foreigners awaiting deportation. It 
is located in Krugersdorp just outside Johannesburg and has a holding capacity of about 4,000. The centre, which 
is owned by Dyambu Trust, a private company allegedly owned by senior members of the ANC Women’s 
League, has been leased to the DHA since 1996.  
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approaches discussed above, this research is a combination of the second and third in that it focuses on 
the experiences of migrants as the targets of xenophobia and on institutional xenophobia with state 
actors as the perpetrators.  
 
3.4 Theoretical approaches to xenophobia 
Xenophobia is a complex phenomenon that cannot be explained by a single theory. The research 
theorising the causes of xenophobia in South Africa is of a multidisciplinary nature resulting in 
competing explanations and framings of this phenomenon. This review focuses on eleven causes 
emerging from the disciplines of economics, sociology, psychology and political science. They are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive but are rather approached from different theoretical perspectives and 
offer different levels of explanation – individual versus collective and micro versus macro – exposing 
the complexity of xenophobia. Intellectually, these explanations are broadly grouped as economic or 
materialist, sociological, socio-cultural or historic, and political. Within each broad grouping is a set of 
supplementary explanations. The economic or material explanations include rational choice theory and 
relative deprivation. The sociological or psychosocial explanations include the scapegoating 
hypothesis and ethnic riots. The socio-cultural explanations consist of the isolation hypothesis, bio-
cultural hypotheses, and ‘othering’ discourse on African migrants. The political explanations comprise 
government denialism and impunity, micro-politics, state discourse on xenophobia, citizenship and 
nationalism; and the state of exception. Each of these is discussed in turn below highlighting the 
arguments and counterarguments, and stating those that are relevant for this study.  
  
3.4.1 Rational choice 
According to rational choice theory, the rivalry between foreign migrants and nationals for scarce 
resources leads to xenophobia (Wimmer, 1997:19). Xenophobia, not only in South Africa but also in 
other countries, is commonly justified on the grounds of economic necessity. According to Steinberg 
(2008:1), the economy is conceptualised as a finite lump; the assumption then is that access to 
resources is a zero-sum game and this breeds conflict. In relation to foreigners, Steinberg (2008:2) 
explains that successful foreigners are perceived to prosper by benefiting unrightfully from national 
resources that belong to South Africans. On the other hand, seeing foreigners prosper without any 
assistance from the state “upsets one’s conception of one’s own relation to the state and what one’s 
entitlements are” (Steinberg, 2008:2).  
South Africans perceive foreigners as “competing with them for jobs, housing and other resources to 
which they themselves feel entitled” (Dodson, 2010:5). This is played out against a background of 
poverty, high unemployment and high income inequality between the rich and the poor. Fears of 
perceived foreign domination in the job market create conflict and make people feel that labour 
immigration should be limited and that the government is not doing enough to reduce the number of 
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foreign migrants. The perceived competition for economic opportunities is associated with unskilled 
and casual jobs in the domestic sphere, on farms, construction sites, and in the hospitality and informal 
sectors. It is believed that migrants undercut citizens in these sectors where they are willing to work 
for less pay and for longer hours. In so doing, they also encourage employers to get away with unfair 
labour practices. 
South Africans also have a fear of foreign domination in small businesses, for example by Somali-
owned shops in townships. Yet these are entrepreneurs who have started their businesses with their 
own capital and are not eligible for support from the state or financial institutions. Many South 
Africans are blind to the difficulties that African migrants face in obtaining work that matches their 
skills and qualifications. Obtaining a work permit is difficult without evidence from the potential 
employer that no South African is suitably qualified for the job or that the applicant possesses 
exceptional skills.17 Asylum seekers and refugees, who by virtue of their immigration status have the 
right to work without the need for a work permit, also struggle to find suitable work often due to 
discrimination and resort to finding unskilled jobs, which they are seen to compete for with their 
unskilled South African counterparts (Hopstock & de Jager, 2011:123).  
Rational choice theory is widely accepted as an explanation for xenophobia in South Africa both at the 
individual and collective levels. This is supported by the results of a 2009 survey conducted by the 
Gauteng City-Region Observatory. The survey, which investigated satisfaction and quality of life 
among 6,636 Gauteng residents and those of selected areas in neighbouring provinces, uncovered 
xenophobic attitudes that cut across race, class and sex. A total of 69% of the respondents were in 
agreement that foreigners are taking benefits that are meant for South Africans (Gauteng City-Region 
Observatory, 2009). However, the relationship between xenophobia and a drop in wages or rising 
unemployment – both economic indicators of intensive competition in the job market – has not been 
scientifically tested in South Africa. Therefore, rational choice theory is not based on indicators of 
intensive competition in the economy but on perceptions of illegitimate competition, which lead to 
resentment of migrants. While this does not invalidate the theory, it does not explain the conditions 
which give rise to the negative perception of migrants given that other countries welcome migrants 
into their societies because of the positive contribution they make to the economy.  
 
3.4.2 Relative deprivation 
A second thesis on xenophobia that complements the first is the relative deprivation theory. It 
highlights socio-economic class, power and access to resources as inter-related causal factors (Pillay, 
2008:93). It also introduces a psychological level of explanation that is applied specifically to urban 
poor South Africans and township xenophobia. The poor develop a sense of relative deprivation and 
frustration based on the belief that they are getting less than what they are entitled to. Frustration 
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 The DHA defines exceptional skills in relation to those professions which the government has gazetted as 
being in short supply in the country.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
52 
 
breeds over slow service delivery, especially housing, and the corruption of government officials 
involved in the provision of these services (Human Sciences Research Council, 2008:6). Xenophobia 
in this instance is often expressed by the poor and displayed through violence. As a result, this form of 
xenophobia has received the most attention from the media and increasingly from researchers. This 
might explain why authors such as Solomon (2003:93) view xenophobia as being confined to 
individuals at the lower end of the socio-economic and educational spectrum.  
In the aftermath of the 2008 attacks against African migrants in South Africa, Pillay (2008) and Gelb 
(2008) argue that class inequality as a structural problem of uneven development lay at the root of the 
violence. Pillay (2008:100) describes the attacks as the reaction of the marginalised, the unemployed 
and the working poor to the self-enrichment of a tiny minority. The absence of a disciplined and 
organised association through which they could challenge their subdued discontent results in angry, 
desperate and barbaric expression (Pillay, 2008:101). Gelb (2008:80) points out that poverty and 
inequality are distinct issues and that while both are major issues in South Africa, the government has 
made gains in addressing poverty but not inequality which is on the rise.18 Gelb argues that it is “the 
sense of unfairness engendered by inequality, of being discriminated against, which creates 
resentments and hostility towards those perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be better off or to have 
received preferential treatment” (Gelb, 2008:79-80).  
Relative deprivation in itself falls short as it is a micro-level explanation that neither explains why 
poor foreigners were targeted nor does it explain why rich South Africans and migrants were not 
targeted by poor South Africans in 2008. It only suggests that xenophobia is a symptom of a deeper 
social malaise attributed to the country’s history of separate development, which means that it may not 
explain xenophobia in other countries which did not experience apartheid or a similar type of socially-
based engineering. By bringing in structural issues and legacies of the past, relative deprivation takes 
no notice of the shortcomings of the post-apartheid state in promoting social cohesion and embracing 
diversity. It is also not clear whether the targets are viewed by the relatively deprived perpetrators as 
being relatively gratified or whether they are easy targets due to their vulnerability as ‘outsiders’ or 
what Neocosmos (2010:4) calls the “political weakness of foreigners”. Everatt’s research (2011:27) 
suggests that African migrants in townships are seen to be better off than the locals, which ties in with 
former President Mbeki’s argument that only those with property to loot were targeted and therefore 
the attacks were merely acts of criminality.  
Pillay (2008:94) suggests that the frustration brought about by relative deprivation is conducive to 
identifying soft targets or scapegoats. Similarly, Tshitereke (in Harris, 2001:58), notes that violence is 
not an inevitable outcome of relative deprivation but rather that the pent up frustration leads people to 
release their anger through scapegoating the foreigner. Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2011:56) point 
out another weakness of this thesis, which is that there is no evidence to show how these broad 
                                                     
18
 South Africa’s Gini index is among the highest in the world indicating vast inequality between the rich and the 
poor. In 2009 South Africa had a Gini index of 63.1 according to the World Bank. 
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structural factors advanced by Pillay and Gelb can be isolated to the areas where the xenophobic 
violence occurred in 2008, and by extension, explain why the violence occurred in some socio-
economically deprived areas and not in others. Relative deprivation as a structural explanation shows 
correlation but not causality and negates agency and thus choice. However, Charman and Piper 
(2012:85) argue that while relative deprivation may not necessarily be useful in explaining macro-
level xenophobic attitudes, it is valuable to understanding the attitudes of South African shopkeepers 
towards their Somali counterparts in Delft, Cape Town, where they conducted a micro-level study. 
 
3.4.3 Scapegoating 
The two economic perspectives on xenophobia above are reductionist and do not explain xenophobia 
in irrational terms. Scapegoating, which is linked to sociology, is the first of the explanations that does 
this. It explains that “the foreigner represents a scapegoat, someone to blame for social ills and 
personal frustrations” (Harris, 2001:58). Scapegoating is also the first of three explanations of 
xenophobia offered by Harris (2001, 2002), the other two being isolation and bio-cultural hypotheses, 
which are discussed subsequently in this section.  
The scapegoating theory, which locates xenophobia within the context of social transition and change, 
suggests that South Africa’s transition to democracy has highlighted the unequal distribution of 
resources in the country (Harris, 2002:171). Citizens’ expectations of a better life in the post-apartheid 
era have been heightened but the pace of delivery and redistribution has not matched their 
expectations, resulting in discontent. According to Tshitereke (in Harris, 2001:58), this creates the 
ideal climate for xenophobia to take root and flourish. Steinberg (2008:4) notes that many argued that 
those attacked during the 2008 pogroms were victims of misplaced anger. Klotz (2012:203) states that 
the violence was seen as a sign of resurgent populism expressing frustration with the ANC 
government and in which foreign Africans were easy targets. 
While scapegoats can always be found among ‘insiders’, it is the author’s view that the reason that 
‘outsiders’ have become scapegoats is because of the entrenched xenophobic discourse which 
constructs migrants as a threat to the security, health, economy, jobs and other entitlements of South 
Africans (Crush & Williams, 2003:1; Landau et al.,  2005:6-9; Crush & Ramachandran, 2010:216; 
Dodson, 2010:5). As discussed in section 2.3.5, the foreigner in South Africa is viewed – by the state 
and the public – as a group of illegals threatening citizens’ livelihoods and socio-economic rights as 
well as being responsible for the high crime in South Africa. Such scapegoating of African migrants 
by the state, as gleaned from the speeches of the former Minister for Home Affairs and the 
Johannesburg mayor cited in section 2.3.5, for example, diverts attention from the real issues, such as 
whether the government is managing the resources it has at its disposal effectively. Furthermore, it 
tacitly justifies exclusionary and discriminatory actions by citizens and state officials towards 
migrants. Conversely, as the citizens join in scapegoating the foreigner, they blame the presence of 
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African migrants on an ineffective immigration regime and take it upon themselves to get rid of the 
foreigners in their communities, even if this calls for violence.    
  
3.4.4 Ethnic riots 
Specific to the 2008 attacks, du Toit and Kotzé (2011), and Bekker (2010) apply the Horowitz 
framework of ethnic riots to examine the events from the perspective of the perpetrators. The 
Horowitz framework, which builds on social identity theory, considers the violent outbursts as ethnic 
riots. They entail the sudden attack of strangers by crowds (Horowitz, 2001:xiii). The perpetrators are 
seen as usually being from groups that find themselves unable to compete effectively in a modernising 
economy and society, whereas the targets are from the ranks of those who prosper in such a 
modernising economy (du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:162). Du Toit and Kotzé (2011:160) explain that a 
culturally and ethnically divided society such as South Africa is “prone to conflicts about cultural 
incompatibilities and/or matters of relative group status”.  
According to Horowitz (2001:71), and similar to the 2008 violence, the ethnic riot follows a particular 
sequence, starting with rumours followed by certain preparations that then lead to violence and mass 
killings. Not only is there a degree of spontaneity and deep emotion associated with the riot, there is 
also passion and calculation (Bekker, 2010:142). Such violence, according to Bekker (2010, 143) is 
likely to emerge under the following conditions: 
a) Shared widespread antipathy against ‘outsiders’; 
b) Selection of targets based on the perception of immunity from punishment; 
c) An assessment of a reduced risk of retaliatory attacks; 
d) Justification of mobilisation in terms of the meanings residents give to local issues; 
e) The reversal of humiliation through collective action.  
To explain the diffusion of the violence, Horowitz argues that violence does not occur in isolation but 
gains momentum from events viewed as comparable elsewhere. For this contagion to occur, the 
perpetrators perceive that there is tacit acceptance of their actions by the authorities (Bekker, 
2010:145). Different authors have attempted to explain the contagion of 2008. For Misago (2011:104), 
the contagion was explained by similarities in social and political structures. Fauvelle-Aymar and 
Segatti (2011:76) attribute the contagion to a correlation between heterogeneity (in terms of language 
and socio-economic status) and violence. Their research reveals that very homogeneous wards seem 
less prone to violence while heterogeneous wards are significantly prone to violence. For Steinberg 
(2008:6), the contagion was driven by the will to loot and burn.   
While Horowitz provides a useful framework that analyses the specific events of 2008, it needs to be 
complemented by the previous scapegoating explanation. The anger of South Africans towards the 
government, for reasons such as poor service delivery, was unleashed on foreigners who were in an 
unranked relationship instead of at the government itself (du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:162). In this sense, 
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the 2008 violence is compared to the widespread service delivery protests by poor communities that 
have plagued the country. The perpetrators exhibit the same mix of passion and calculation and their 
body language seems devoid of guilt or fear of retribution as those of 2008 but with little evidence of 
xenophobic violence (Bekker, 2010:146). 
 
3.4.5 Isolation and exceptionalism 
Moving to the socio-cultural explanations, Harris (2001, 2002) rightly acknowledges that scapegoating 
does not explain why the African migrant, as opposed to any other individual or group is targeted. She 
therefore goes a step further by presenting the isolation hypothesis to explain why the foreigner 
becomes the scapegoat. The isolation hypothesis “situates foreignness at the heart of hostility towards 
foreigners” (Harris, 2002:172). Due to years of isolation of South Africans from the rest of Africa 
during the apartheid years and the inadequate education of South Africans about the continent, they 
find it difficult to incorporate foreigners into their frame of reference (Morris, 1998:1125). 
Furthermore, the isolation of groups of South Africans from other South Africans due to 
institutionalised racism and the creation of boundaries of movement has made it difficult for them to 
tolerate difference (Harris, 2002:172). In the isolation hypothesis people see difference as ominous 
(Harris, 2002:172).  
The isolation hypothesis is similar to the culture of exclusion argument which attributes xenophobia to 
historical roots of discrimination, general mistrust among citizens and a scarred national psyche 
(International Organization for Migration, 2009; Landau et al., 2010; Everatt, 2011; Hopstock & de 
Jager, 2011; Peberdy & Jara, 2011). While isolation or a culture of exclusion creates the space for 
xenophobia to develop, in the author’s view, it serves as a more accurate explanation for the slow 
integration of South Africans of all races and the challenge of eliminating racism.  
One limitation of this explanation is exposed by the fact that isolation has not resulted in uniform 
treatment towards foreigners from all parts of the world. Therefore, it is the researcher’s view that 
complementing isolation with exceptionalism (Coplan, 2009; Neocosmos, 2006 & 2010), which is still 
in the socio-cultural realm as it deals with feelings of cultural superiority, may better explain 
xenophobia towards African migrants. Exceptionalism as a ‘superiority complex’, leads to self-
isolation based on the belief that South Africans are better than other Africans. Previously 
institutionalised isolation has morphed into exceptionalism in the post-apartheid era.  
The literature suggests that South Africans have a feeling of superiority towards other Africans and a 
belief in the exclusivity of their nation when compared to the rest of continent (Neocosmos, 2010 & 
2006).  This is despite a number of African countries having hosted refugees from South Africa during 
the apartheid years. In the aftermath of the 2008 attacks, township residents complained that they had 
not fought for liberation to benefit foreigners who had made their own countries unliveable (Coplan, 
2009:78). In 2013 President Jacob Zuma, who is one of those who were exiled in other countries in 
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southern Africa, made some off-the-cuff comments which illustrate the exceptionalism with which 
South Africans view themselves in relation to other Africans and the backwardness which they 
associate the rest of Africa with. Speaking in Johannesburg in reference to the need to pay e-tolls, he 
remarked that South Africans should not “think like Africans generally” and that this was 
Johannesburg and “not some national road in Malawi” (Ephraim, 2013). His remarks were met with 
laughter by his audience but later became the subject of debate when they were reported by the media. 
The advent of democracy and consequently South Africa’s readmission into the global community has 
brought South Africans into contact with foreigners. However, Landau (2008b:113) points out that 
despite the rhetoric of pan-Africanism which emerged with democracy, particularly under the 
leadership of Thabo Mbeki, many South African state officials show disdain for what happens 
elsewhere on the continent. The pan-African rhetoric rings hollow to ordinary South Africans as little 
effort has been made to generate local interest in the affairs of the rest of the continent and to embrace 
Africans in the ‘new’ South Africa. Neocosmos (2006:5) highlights a dominant arrogant political 
discourse held by many South Africans regarding the apparent exceptionalism of their country on the 
African continent. Sub-Saharan Africa is identified with failure and black South Africans desperately 
desire northern hemisphere models of success (Coplan, 2009:71). Harris (2002:175) makes reference 
to a newspaper article in which the author argues incorrectly that even at the height of apartheid, the 
conditions of blacks were never as bad as those of blacks in the rest of the continent. Stephen Chan, a 
leading scholar on Africa, made the following remarks in a newspaper interview: 
I've always been slightly appalled that in South Africa there's so little interest in the affairs of 
your neighbours, and only lip service to Africa as a whole. South Africa wants to be seen as 
representing the continent, but its understanding of the rest of the continent is no greater than 
during the apartheid days. That's to your jeopardy in the future. Stephen Chan (in De Waal, 
2011) 
 
3.4.6 Bio-cultural hypothesis 
The second socio-cultural explanation for xenophobia – the bio-cultural hypothesis presented by 
Harris (2001, 2002) – explains the asymmetrical xenophobia towards African foreigners. For Harris, 
this is the third explanation in her three-pronged approach to theorising xenophobia which includes 
scapegoating, isolation and bio-cultural hypotheses as an interconnected set of explanations. 
According to Harris (2002:174), other explanations tend to present xenophobia as “uniform or 
monolithic” when the reality in South Africa is that it is mostly black Africans who bear the brunt of 
xenophobia. She attributes this to the use of bio-cultural characteristics or visible difference (Harris, 
2001:60). This includes physiognomies, accents, dress, hairstyles, vaccination marks and inability to 
speak South African indigenous languages.  
Morris (1998:1125) and Harris (2001:60) point out that these are the irrational standards used by state 
officials, mainly the police and immigration officials, to determine foreignness. Racial or ethnic 
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profiling is used as a more ‘effective’ means of determining a person’s nationality and immigration 
status rather than the person’s documents or government databases (Vigneswaran, 2011:165). Gordon 
(2010a:16)  points out the exceptional bio-cultural markers used to identify African non-citizens by the 
police are justified on the basis that identity documents can be forged or obtained fraudulently thus 
they cannot be relied on as definite indicators of either South African citizenship or being in South 
Africa legally. Due to the subjective nature of this profiling, a number of black South Africans have 
borne the brunt of xenophobia after having been mistaken for being foreign. Greenburg (2010:69) 
points out, from her research conducted in Johannesburg, that while racial profiling builds on 
apartheid era practices its victims are people who have been in the country following the fall of 
apartheid which demonstrates the manner in which race has become spatially re-inscribed post-
apartheid.    
This specific racialisation, according to Gqola, makes African migrants victims of everyday abuse and 
discriminatory practices by state officials (2008:213). It is also only used to sift out black people and is 
not applied to any other racial group in South Africa (Gqola, 2008:218). In other words, while other 
races may also have different accents, wear distinct cultural dress and not be able to speak an 
indigenous language, they will not be singled out as not belonging to South Africa on the basis of 
these irrational criteria, which are only applied to black people.  
Trimikliniotis et al. (2008:1331) caution against not seeing xenophobia in South Africa for what it is, 
which in their view is essentially a continuation of the apartheid regime’s treatment of blacks and the 
result of years of institutionalised racism. Nieftagodien (2011:132) believes that xenophobia should be 
understood as part of a broader politics of discrimination rooted in the country’s history. Parallels have 
been drawn between the manner in which institutionalised racism and apartheid in South Africa 
criminalised being black and foreign on the one hand, and xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa, 
on the other (Klaaren & Ramji, 2001:37; Harris, 2001; Trimikliniotis et al., 2008; Matsinhe, 2011). 
According to Matsinhe (2011:302), “the ex-oppressed in South Africa have taken on the character of 
their ex-oppressor”. Nyamnjoh (2006:51) underscores how ironic it is that black Africans should be 
the victims of racial profiling in a new democratic dispensation. It is difficult to reconcile the 
discourse, language and exclusion of African migrants in South Africa with the values of a 
constitutional democracy, diversity and a culture of human rights.  
The bio-cultural hypothesis links xenophobia directly to racism. According to Wimmer (1997:33), 
xenophobia and racism can be seen as two points on a continuum of exclusionist discourses that 
construct the relation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Xenophobia is characterised by “fears of inundation, 
phobia of interbreeding and the perception of a zero-sum game” while racism is distinguished by “the 
hierarchisation of the groups and the idea of impregnation”.19Although Wimmer captures the link 
between racism and xenophobia as concepts that support each other, he does so from a Eurocentric 
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 The idea of impregnation refers to the view that certain bio-cultural characteristics are so deep that they cannot 
be changed during the lifetime of an individual and form part of the history of the whole group (Wimmer, 
1997:33).  
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perspective. The Media Monitoring Project of South Africa provides a more nuanced account of the 
connection: 
Racism and xenophobia operate on the basis of the profiling of people and making negative 
assumptions about them. While the former profiles individuals in terms of their race, the latter profiles 
individuals in terms of their nationality. These profiles are often negative and lead to the creation and 
perpetuation of generalisations and stereotypes. (Media Monitoring Project, 2003:82-83)  
 
3.4.7 ‘Othering’ discourse on African migrants 
This socio-cultural explanation, which complements the previous two above, and is also convincing on 
its own, argues that xenophobia can be understood by looking at the manner in which other Africans 
are imagined in the minds of South Africans collectively. The cultural affinities of black Africans 
throughout the continent notwithstanding, Tadjo (2008:238) posits that in the collective imagination of 
South Africans, the rest of Africa is largely unknown and carries negative associations, allowing for 
clichés to be reproduced. According to Handmaker and Parsley (2001:44) xenophobia is “largely 
based on unfounded myths and stereotypes”. Everatt (2011:7) refers to this as the underlying social 
base that feeds xenophobia in South Africa.  
Black African foreigners in South Africa are referred to as amakwerekwere – a derogatory term coined 
by black South Africans that symbolises the sound of the unintelligible languages they speak 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006:39). According to Nyamnjoh (2006:39), the term is loaded with negative 
connotations and the amakwerekwere are interpreted as a deep threat to personal and community 
security (Vale, 2002:10). Amakwerekwere also denotes: one who is not conversant in indigenous 
South African languages; one who originates from an African country that is backward compared to 
South Africa; an uncivilized person; the darkest of the dark skinned; and a danger to the South African 
nation (Nyamnjoh, 2006:39). Thus the African migrant is constructed as the ‘other’. According to 
Vale (2002:13), this ‘othering’ is “derived ironically from a sense of superiority and inflated by the 
celebration of the success of South Africa’s transition, but it simultaneously constructed another 
underclass around the same conceptual primitives upon which apartheid once rested”. 
It is not surprising that xenophobia in South Africa has a strong racial dimension. Bekker (2010:136) 
refers to a hierarchy of belonging of the different races based on a ranking of races and stereotypes of 
the different racial groups. It is therefore wrong for the CDE to state that xenophobia has nothing to do 
with racism on the part of black or white South Africans when the evidence shows black African 
foreigners to be disproportionally the victims of xenophobia (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 
2008:10). Xenophobia is not only racialised, it is also Africanised (Nyamnjoh, 2006:49). It is within 
this context that some authors such as Matsinhe (2011:298), Everatt (2011:7) and Mngxitama 
(2008:195) use the terms ‘negrophobia’ or ‘Afrophobia’ to refer to racialised xenophobia towards 
black African migrants, which they view as more accurate terms of describing xenophobia in South 
Africa. Moreover, Mngxitama (2008:195-196) suggests that the black-led South African state 
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regularly sends out the message that black Africans are undesirables and singles them out for 
harassment. Referring to the xenophobic events of 2008, he argues that the poor were only mirroring 
the manner in which the state treats African migrants and wonders how the same government that has 
helped structure xenophobia can be called upon to quell xenophobic violence (Mngxitama, 2008:196).  
Differential treatment is extended to African migrants and migrants from elsewhere. Indeed, in South 
Africa white foreigners are generally more positively viewed as tourists, investors and representatives 
of countries that South Africa aims to impress with its status as ‘world class’ or ‘emerging nation’ 
(Gqola, 2008:221). Black foreigners, on the other hand, are viewed as freeloaders and criminals. 
Whites are not expected to speak any of the African indigenous languages nor are they judged as 
foreigners based on their looks. On the other hand, the police and communities, in turn, use the 
inability of black people to speak a local South African language and the degree of blackness as 
markers of foreignness and therefore of possibly being in the country illegally.  
Dodson (2010:6) explains that the construction of the ‘other’ was the inevitable outcome of the 
construction of a new South African national identity after the end of apartheid. Gqola (2008:211) 
contends that African migrants belong to a category of people in the South African public eye “who do 
not matter, whose humanity, once successfully misrecognised, renders them safe to violate”. Gqola 
(2008:213) argues that what makes attacks on some foreigners possible and on others unthinkable is 
the sexualised, class marked and racialised narrative about foreign migrants. She makes the point that 
whiteness is valued and considered safe while blackness is considered disposable and can be 
brutalised. Codifying African migrants as being very dark skinned makes them visible as their identity 
is marked on their bodies. Their ‘unusual’ blackness categorises them as not belonging to South 
Africa. This specific racialisation, according to Gqola, makes African migrants victims of everyday 
abuse and discriminatory practices by state officials (2008:213). It is also only used to sift out black 
people and is not applied to any other racial group in South Africa (Gqola, 2008:218). Tadjo 
(2008:234), in her contribution to what South Africa can learn from the experience of Côte d’Ivoire 
with xenophobia, attributes xenophobia to the construction of the ‘other’. Defining belonging in terms 
of autochthony serves to alienate those who are perceived to be non-natives (Tadjo, 2008:227). 
  
3.4.8 Denialism and a culture of impunity 
The final set of competing explanations falls within the realm of the political and includes both 
triggers and underlying causes. Denialism by government and a culture of impunity when dealing with 
perpetrators can be argued to have exacerbated xenophobia in South Africa. Both features may not 
explain the emergence of xenophobia but they are critical enabling factors which bring the state into 
sharp focus. They point to a lack of political leadership in acknowledging the existence and extent of 
xenophobia, and in addressing it. The highest political level has been reluctant to use the term 
‘xenophobia’ and, for instance, labelled the 2008 events as ‘criminal acts’. This is despite the evidence 
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from a range of studies, including of the 2008 events, that they were in fact xenophobic (Crush, 2008; 
Dodson, 2010; Everatt, 2011).   
Crush and Ramachandran (2010:219) have observed that political responses to xenophobia are mostly 
characterised by silence. During the 2008 violence, the government was initially slow to respond. 
When it eventually acted, it first denied that there was a crisis, then blamed criminal elements and a 
‘third force’. The Minister of Intelligence at the time, Ronnie Kasrils, later admitted that these 
accusations were ‘misguided’ (Landau, 2011:1). While paying tribute to the victims, President Mbeki 
was adamant that the xenophobic attacks were acts of criminality and not motivated by xenophobia. 
He stated that South Africans were not xenophobic and anyone who said they were was xenophobic. 
He continued:   
These masses are neither antipathetic towards, nor do they hate foreigners… I heard it said insistently 
that my people have turned or become xenophobic… I wondered what the accusers knew about my 
people which I did not know. And this I must also say – none in our society has any right to encourage 
or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of 
xenophobia. (Mbeki, 2008) 
Perhaps Dodson (2010:8) is right that Mbeki’s denialism of South Africans being xenophobic was 
based on the fact that it did not fit into the discourse of an African Renaissance. As Everatt (2011:9) 
adds, Mbeki’s African Renaissance dreams were ‘shredded away’ by the xenophobic violence. 
A year before the 2008 attacks the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) country report on South 
Africa highlighted the poor treatment of migrants by South Africans. It noted that African foreigners 
are being subjected to brutality and detention and recommended that the rising tide of xenophobia 
should be stopped (African Union, 2007:286). The South African government replied that it was 
simply not true that xenophobic tendencies prevail (African Union, 2007:377). In hindsight, this 
reflected the general lack of concern that has prevailed in addressing previous erratic attacks on 
foreigners dating back to the 1990s. As Lefko-Everett notes, the government has all too often 
attempted to downplay xenophobia (2008:27). 
Also of concern is the endemic culture of impunity in relation to perpetrators of xenophobic violence 
in the country (Misago, 2011:96). The fact that xenophobic violence has been an on-going feature of 
post-apartheid South Africa but only a few perpetrators have been charged and fewer convicted 
suggests impunity and complicit policing. In some instances, state agents have actively promoted 
those accused of anti-foreigner violence. As Misago (2011:96) reveals; before, during and after the 
May 2008 violence, some arrests were made at the different scenes of violence but most of those 
arrested were released without charge due to community protests and mobilisation. He observes that: 
The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) seems to share – with political leaders at different levels – a 
lack of interest or incentive to hold the offenders of the xenophobic violence accountable. Indeed, of 
approximately 500 cases that resulted from the May 2008 attacks, police struggled for months to 
investigate, and 41% of the cases (including some murder cases) were withdrawn […]. Only 27% have 
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been finalised thus far, including only one murder conviction. This despite the fact that at least 62 
people were murdered during the violence. (Misago, 2011:96) 
Misago states that the main reason given by the NPA for cases being withdrawn and for the low 
conviction rates is the lack of witnesses or interpreters.  
The denial of the existence of xenophobia and the perceived sense of impunity may not explain the 
appearance of xenophobia. However, such responses illustrate state responses to xenophobia which 
have, in turn, fostered the continuity and spread of attacks on migrants. Indeed, if politicians, most of 
whom remained silent during the 2008 pogroms, are being responsive to public sentiments towards 
African migrants in particular, they have little incentives to protect them. At the same time, if the 
public feels that the government cares little for these migrants, they will only continue to target them. 
The issue of impunity is relevant for this study as it brings the actions of state officials in relation to 
the law into focus. 
 
3.4.9 Micro-politics 
This theory stems from the events of 2008 and draws on the political economy of xenophobic violence 
to explain the territorial variation and timing of the attacks (International Organization for Migration, 
2009:7). Drawing on months of fieldwork in selected sites in South Africa that were affected by the 
2008 attacks, Misago (2011) argues that local politics and local leaders fostered the violence. For 
Misago, this occurred against the backdrop of an existing xenophobic climate and a culture of 
impunity regarding xenophobic violence (Misago, 2011:94). His analysis identified increased crime, 
heightened ethnic tensions, a history of violence, impunity and ineffective local leadership as the main 
issues facing the communities that experienced the violence (Misago, 2011:97).  
Focusing on the issue of local leadership, Misago (2011) discusses three interrelated features observed 
in the communities selected for the study. Firstly, there was evidence of a lack of effective conflict 
resolution mechanisms. This is also noted by Peberdy and Jara (2011:51) in their analysis of the 2008 
violence. Concerns raised by the communities with the police and local councillors about the presence 
of foreigners were dismissed. Misago reveals that there were instances where the local authorities 
knew that communities were organising attacks and took no action, viewing this as an indication of the 
extent to which communities are allowed to govern themselves. Secondly, informal leadership groups 
had sprung up in the affected areas to occupy the vacuum created by local government as a result of 
poor service delivery. Purporting to protect citizens and articulate their demands, these groups are 
characterised by infighting and competition for power and legitimacy. In the process, communities 
have been confused about the mandates of these community leaders and have also been required to 
pay bribes or fees to these leaders in order to get their problems solved. Thirdly, the attacks were 
instigated by these local groups and perpetrated by willing residents who long harboured resentment 
towards outsiders. Indeed, by mobilising action to deal with the problem of foreigners, these leaders 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
62 
 
were seen by residents to be effectively responding to the concerns of local citizens, which in their 
eyes, the police had failed to do. These informal leaders capitalised on the prevailing xenophobic 
attitudes and lack of trust in state institutions among the communities.  
Misago (2011) bolsters his argument by also examining two non-affected areas in the same townships 
where the violence took place. He argues that the distinguishing factors that prevented the violence 
were the composition of the community – which resisted and/or condemned the violence – and the 
ability of the leaders to represent and protect the interests of the residents. Nieftagodien (2011:131) 
agrees with Misago in his analysis of xenophobia in Alexandra township in Johannesburg. He argues 
that undemocratic or fragmented local politics combined with an exclusive political discourse of 
belonging which casts ‘outsiders’ as a threat to ‘insiders’ could explain the occurrence of the violence 
in some areas and not in others. In this argument the state is implicated by alluding to how state 
failures can nurture an environment that engenders lawlessness. According to Fauvelle-Aymar and 
Segatti (2011:60), Misago’s research falls short of explaining the relative importance of structural 
factors, how a history of micro-politics translates into violence and why this remains at the local level 
and does not escalate to the national level.    
Steinberg (2008) also offers an analysis of the local political economy based on interviews conducted 
with perpetrators and victims of the violence around Johannesburg. As with Misago (2011), Steinberg 
(2008:5) also notes the premeditated nature of the attacks in Alexandra where discussions were held in 
public forums and threats to foreigners announced in a police station and church just days before. 
Steinberg (2008:6) notes that it is not only these informal groups that are caught up in power struggles 
but also political parties. For Steinberg (2008:6), it boils down to the politics of deciding who gets 
what. From his interviews with perpetrators and victims of 2008, Steinberg concludes that in addition 
to xenophobia, the violence involved “old ethnic tensions among South Africans themselves and old 
struggles for shares of local booty” (2008:6). For him, the local politics in the affected areas were the 
result of struggles for state patronage (Steinberg, 2008:1). Landau et al. (2010:225-226) point out that 
Misago’s (2011) findings show that violence against foreigners can be viewed as “a continuum with – 
and, indeed, often something which happens in tandem with – violence against marginalised South 
Africans”. Even so, the low conviction rates of the perpetrators of the 2008 violence do not differ 
much from those of other crimes committed towards nationals who are perceived to be outsiders in 
particular environments.  
This theory holds little relevance for the study as this study does not focus on local government 
politics and xenophobic violence at the community level. However, it is included here to acknowledge 
it as an existing political explanation. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
63 
 
3.4.10 State discourse on xenophobia, citizenship and nationalism 
Neocosmos (2006:3) attributes xenophobia in South Africa to a state discourse that is xenophobic. 
Acknowledging that other explanations of xenophobia may include a grain of truth, he still finds them 
inadequate as they do not take into account the role of politicians and state institutions in engendering 
a culture of xenophobia (Neocosmos, 2006:2). He argues that xenophobia must be understood as a 
political discourse and presents four theses: “xenophobia is a discourse and practice of exclusion from 
community; this process of exclusion is a political process; xenophobia is concerned with the 
exclusion from citizenship, which denotes a specific political relationship between state and society; 
and xenophobia is the outcome of a relation between different forms of politics” (Neocosmos, 
2006:15-18). 
According to Neocosmos (2006:124), xenophobia relates to a “‘politics of fear’ and consists of three 
elements: a systemic state discourse on xenophobia; a discourse of state exceptionalism and a 
conception of citizenship founded on indigeneity”. The first element refers to anti-foreigner statements 
made by the state, as well as the mistreatment of migrants by state officials. The second element refers 
to a dominant view held by many South Africans regarding the apparent superiority of their country on 
the African continent (Neocosmos, 2006:5). These two elements have already been discussed 
elswehere; anti-immigrant statements by the state were pointed out in sections 2.3.5 and linked to the 
scapegoating of migrants in section 3.4.3. The mistreatment of migrants by immigration officials and 
the police specifically was briefly reviewed in section 3.3 and is elaborated further in Chapter 4.  
The third element of Neocosmos speaks to the idea that the nation’s resources should be reserved for 
natives who are the rightful beneficiaries. Nyamnjoh (2006:40) describes this as a narrowly defined 
citizenship where only nationals matter. Neocosmos (2008:591-592) argues that the post-1994 state 
has failed to construct a nationalism that is rooted in Africa with the ideas of African Renaissance and 
Ubuntu being mere state slogans. He contends that blackness in South Africa is only stressed in 
relation to whites but not in relation to other Africans (Neocosmos, 2008:591).   
McKinley (2008) purports that xenophobia is the corollary of the nationalist discourse of the post-
apartheid state. He describes South African nationalism as narrow, chauvinistic and exclusivist 
(McKinley, 2008:3). Peberdy (2001:28) states that citizenship is the basic marker of South African 
identity. By delineating who belongs to the nation, the dangerous side of nationalism is exposed as it 
draws lines between citizens and foreigners (Peberdy & Jara, 2011:53). Peberdy (2001:29) adds that 
South Africans feel threatened by the prospect of other Africans becoming part of the nation and thus 
deny them their rights and entitlements, which is why other Africans have come to be defined as a 
“threat” to South Africa. The arguments put forward by the scholars cited here are critical to this study 
in terms of understanding how, in practice, migrants can be socially and politically excluded by 
discourses and practices that cast migrants as a threat to national cohesion, identity and well-being. On 
the one hand there are competing demands on the country’s finite resources while on the other, the 
liberal constitution dissociates a wide range of human rights from citizenship thus making migrants 
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entitled to them. The state discourse on xenophobia, citizenship and nationalism explanation confronts 
the underlying political causes of xenophobia, and is relevant to the study at hand, which seeks to 
advance political understanding of xenophobia.   
This theoretical section on xenophobia has so far discussed ten theories. Nyamnjoh (2006:5) aptly 
captures the economic, sociological, socio-cultural theories discussed above when he states that 
“xenophobia often explains, as much as it is explained by, poverty, underdevelopment, economic 
disparities, and assumptions of social and cultural superiority”. The researcher agrees with this as 
xenophobia in the South African context cannot be narrowed down to one explanation. However, these 
seven explanations are incomplete because they pay little attention to the relationship between the 
state and non-citizens even though some of them do acknowledge the xenophobic discourse of some 
politicians and state agents. This is important to bear in mind for this study, which examines the role 
of the state in shaping xenophobia in the South African context based on how African migrants are 
treated by state officials. As the researcher has already noted, the construction of African migrants as a 
threat to the human security of South Africans in the broadest sense breeds xenophobia. This is also a 
common thread running through most of the non-political explanations, which makes them relevant to 
this study to the extent that they provide a possible underlying motive for some of the actions of state 
officials and could shed light on why African migrants are victimised by state officials. However, due 
to their focus on relations between migrants and their host communities in South Africa, these 
explanations give little attention to underlying political factors that have to do with the way that the 
state relates to migrants.   
This study seeks to expand statist explanations of xenophobia beyond merely describing certain state 
practices as xenophobic by providing empirical evidence of how the state engenders xenophobia on an 
everyday basis through bureaucratic practices. Hence, two political explanations discussed so far are 
regarded as more relevant for the research questions. These are the culture of impunity and the state 
discourse on xenophobia, citizenship and nationalism. This is because they support the author’s view 
that xenophobia is also a political phenomenon brought about by a political discourse which 
characterises migrants as a threat to South African society and that state practices result in the 
exclusion of migrants from citizenship entitlements. A final political explanation discussed below has 
to do with the application or non-application of the law to African migrants by agents of the state and 
how this enables xenophobia. It is dealt with exclusively because it is at the centre of the dissertation. 
The state of exception is adopted as a theoretical basis from which to examine the manner in which 
state power is exercised by South African state officials towards African migrants and the place of 
African migrants in South African society. It has also generated a global literature, which is explored. 
The author’s understanding of the concept and its application in the study at hand are also discussed.  
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3.5 Agamben’s theory of the state of exception 
Contemporary Italian philosopher and theorist Giorgio Agamben begins his theorisation of the state of 
exception in politics and how it constitutes the basis of modern state power in Homo Sacer (1998) and 
extends it in the sequel State of Exception (2005). In both books he theorises the state of exception in 
historical and philosophical context. Agamben’s theory is not a mainstream state-centric theory. 
However, together with his other writings on politics, it has attracted increased scholarly interest in the 
social sciences and humanities. This has made Agamben one of the most important, influential, 
provocative and controversial figures in contemporary political theory (Edkins, 2007:70; Ek, 
2006:364; Murray, 2010:2).  
Agamben’s state of exception is concerned with the law and the conditions of its application or 
suspension. He announces at the beginning of his book State of Exception that his investigation 
explores the “no man’s land between public law and political fact, and between the juridical order and 
life” (Agamben, 2005:1). The state of exception describes a situation in which “the state’s habitual 
nature and culture is suspended” (De la Durantaye, 2005:179). Agamben observes that those caught in 
this suspension are “not simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by 
it, that is, exposed to and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become 
indistinguishable” (Agamben, 1998:28).  
Before going any further, it must be noted that the fact that the law can be suspended is not new in 
politics and history. What is novel about Agamben’s theory is that firstly, as he argues, the state of 
exception becomes the rule, that is, it “becomes a measure of global dominance and control, the 
ground for repressive policies and the surest way to turn everyday life, everybody’s life into naked 
life” (Gullì, 2007:219). Secondly, and in the context of pre-emptive war, is that “the law is suspended, 
not because there is a state of emergency requiring exceptional measures, but because such a state of 
emergency could arise” (Gullì, 2007:219).20 In both of these instances, the suspension of the law 
enters and acts within the sphere of potentiality within which “repression and control become most 
efficient and powerful” (Gullì, 2007:220). In other words, what is new from Agamben about the state 
of exception is that over time, it has ceased to be a provisional measure and has become a working 
paradigm of governments or a fact of everyday life in contemporary politics that is difficult to reverse.  
Agamben takes up and extends the analysis of the sovereign exception by German jurist and political 
theorist Carl Schmitt. The Schmittian exception, or state of emergency, is “a political decision that is 
made outside the juridical order and general rule” (Ong, 2006:5). It is an extraordinary decision 
invoked in a context of war to delineate friends and enemies (Ong, 2006:5). In his book Political 
Theology, Schmitt defines the ‘sovereign’ as “he who decides on the state of exception” (Schmitt, 
1985:1). In other words, the sovereign has the legal authority to decide who shall be removed from the 
purview of the law in the state of emergency (Norris, 2000:46). So “while a judge decides on the 
                                                     
20
 Gullì (2007:220) gives the Iraq war as an example. The invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies in 
2003 was initially justified by allegations that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and then following 
lack of evidence it was justified on the basis of Iraqi capacity to develop such weapons. 
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application of individual laws, the sovereign decision gives the law as a whole the force it needs in 
order to apply and regulate life” (McLoughlin, 2009:247). Schmitt also states that:  
The exception is more interesting than the regular case. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves 
everything: it confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception. 
In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become more 
torpid by repetition. (Schmitt, 1985:15) 
Agamben credits Schmitt for his attempt to construct a theory of the state of exception. However, for 
Agamben, Schmitt’s analysis and definition (the sovereign is the one who declares and decides on the 
exception) are problematic because they are inscribed in the juridical order. Agamben’s understanding 
of the exception moves beyond the Schmittian state of emergency to a “more original function in 
which the exception reveals itself as a kind of exclusion” (Ek, 2006:365). Agamben (1998:181) 
concludes that “the fundamental activity of sovereign power is the production of bare life”. Sovereign 
power then is about bodies and not only about territories (Das & Poole, 2004:10). The exception, 
according to Agamben, is “a kind of exclusion” which “maintains itself in relation to the rule in the 
form of the rule’s suspension” (Agamben, 1998:17-18). Agamben notes that the word ‘exception’ 
refers to its etymological root “taken outside (ex-capere), and not simply excluded” (Agamben, 
1998:18). For Agamben (1998:26-28), the exception is “a fundamental principle of sovereign rule that 
is predicated on the division between citizens in a juridical order and outsiders stripped of juridical 
protections” (Ong, 2006:5). 
Agamben (2005:50) argues instead that the state of exception is “a space devoid of law, a zone of 
anomie in which all legal determinations…are deactivated”. Referring to Schmitt’s identification of 
the paradox of sovereignty in which the sovereign is both inside and outside of the law, Agamben 
argues that it brings into relief a deeper relation between law and violence, in which sovereignty marks 
the limit “in the double sense of end and principle” of the domain of law (Agamben, 1998:15). For 
Schmitt, the exception exists in the sovereign decision, which by virtue of being outside the law, 
permits the normal situation of the law’s operation to be constituted. For Agamben, however, to 
designate the exception as external to the law is not entirely accurate. For him whatever is excluded 
from the juridical order is also included by virtue of its exclusion, a relation he terms as one of 
“inclusive exclusion”. “Being-outside and yet belonging: this is the topological structure of the state of 
exception” (Agamben, 2005:35).    
DeCaroli (2007:54) explains that  
by establishing a threshold between law and non-law the exception effectively produces them both. The 
sovereign exception is, for both Schmitt and Agamben, the condition for the possibility of juridical 
order, for it is through the state of exception that sovereignty creates and guarantees the order the law 
needs for its own validity. 
Agamben makes clear that “the state of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather 
the situation that results from its suspension” (Agamben, 1998:18). Agamben’s approach to the state 
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of exception is said to transcend Schmitt’s which emerges from a sovereign decision that is taken in a 
spatially and temporally bounded space of exception (Hagmann & Korf, 2012:207). For Agamben, the 
state of exception is “not so much a spatiotemporal suspension as a complex topological figure in 
which not only the exception and the rule but also the state of nature and law, outside and inside, pass 
through one another” (Agamben, 1998:37). As Hagmann and Korf (2012:207) put it, “Schmitt’s state 
of exception is an event, a decision that grounds the rule of law; Agamben’s state of exception is a 
rationale that pervades all law and order as the state of exception becomes the rule”. 
Butler explains that for Agamben, sovereignty “names the power that withdraws and suspends the 
laws” (2004:60). When the state annuls its own law, this is “an operation of sovereign power, or, 
rather, the operation by which a lawless sovereign power comes into being or, indeed, reemerges in 
new form” (Butler, 2004:61). According to Butler (2004:98) “sovereignty’s aim is to continue to 
exercise and augment its power to exercise itself; in the present circumstance, however it can only 
achieve this aim through managing populations outside the law”. Therefore, for Agamben, sovereignty 
is “a term that designates a specific relationship between power and law that is played out on the field 
of life” (Erlenbusch, 2013:51). 
Agamben historically traces the state of exception to ‘states of emergency’, ‘states of siege’ and 
‘martial law’ in Western democracies starting with Napoleon and the time of the French Revolution. 
In showing how the state of exception is rooted in the legal traditions of Western states, Agamben 
notes that there has been a division between orders that regulate the state of exception in the text of the 
constitution or by law (such as France and Germany) and those that do not regulate it explicitly (such 
as Italy, Switzerland, England and the United States) (Agamben, 2005:9-10). Agamben highlights that 
these two legal traditions correspond to the scholarship on the state of exception, which divides those 
who include the state of exception within the juridical order (such as Schmitt) and those who consider 
it an external phenomenon (Agamben, 2005:22-23). This leads Agamben to declare that “in truth, the 
state of exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical order”, and “the problem of defining it 
concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, in which inside and outside do not exclude 
each other, but rather blur with each other” (Agamben, 2005:23).   
The state of exception is an increasingly common mechanism used by sovereign states to exert power 
over populations in order to protect the state from threats (Agamben, 2005:1). To demonstrate the 
biopolitical significance of the state of the exception, Agamben cites the United States Patriot Act of 
2001 and the “military order” authorising the “indefinite detention” in Guantanamo Bay, and trial by 
“military commissions” of foreigners suspected of terrorist activities (Agamben, 2005:3). For 
Agamben, these measures have not only resulted in the expansion of executive powers in the United 
States by assuming the power of the judiciary but also radically erase “any legal status of the 
individual, thus producing a legally unnameable and unclassified being” (Agamben, 2005:3). These 
individuals are not even called “prisoners”, or “accused persons” as to do so would suggest that certain 
internationally recognised legal safeguards pertaining to the treatment of these categories ought to be 
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granted (Agamben, 2005:3; Butler, 2004:64; Hyndman & Mountz, 2007:83). Rather they are called 
“detainees” or “enemy combatants”, those held in waiting indefinitely. Butler points out that “neither 
the decision to detain nor the decision to activate the military tribunal is grounded in law” and the state 
effectively maintains that there are those “for whom the law does not apply” (2004:58).  
Agamben compares these measures of the United States’ ‘war on terror’ to the Decree for the 
Protection of the People and of the State of 1933 in Germany, which suspended the articles concerning 
personal liberties in the Weimar Constitution (Agamben, 2005:2). The detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
are similar to the Jews in the Nazi concentration camps “who along with their citizenship, had lost 
every legal identity, but at least retained their identity as Jews”. (Agamben, 2005:4). De la Durantaye 
(2005:181) suggests that Agamben’s isolation of both historical and contemporary instances of the 
state of exception serve to make clear that the state of exception is not only restricted to the instance 
where the sovereign suspends the rule of law. Furthermore, such states of exception are not after all so 
exceptional and have not disappeared from Western politics.   
Mills (2007:191) explains that through the exception’s capacity to bring about the suspension of the 
law, it provides the conditions for the law’s application. She also specifies that the “structure of the 
exception that grounds law is itself the means by which life is taken into law, since the state of 
exception allows for an immediate coincidence of life and law” (Mills, 2007:192). As Agamben 
writes, “law is made of nothing but what it manages to capture inside itself through the inclusive 
exclusion...law has no existence in itself, but rather has its being in the very life of men” (Agamben, 
1998:27).  
The state of exception allows extra-legal practices to occur without the violation of the law 
(Mosselson, 2010:643). It is equivalent to a space that is devoid of law, in which law is emptied of its 
content (Humphreys, 2006:680). This state of affairs can be attributed to the suspension of the 
juridical order, with the state of exception defining the law’s threshold (Agamben, 2005:4). Agamben 
restates the modern state of exception as “the attempt to include the exception itself within the 
juridical order by creating a zone of indistinction in which fact and law coincide” (Agamben, 
2005:26). The state of exception can be described as “a zone in which application is suspended, but 
the law [la legge], as such, remains in force” (Agamben, 2005:31). Agamben adds that not only is 
there a suspension of the law but also a suspension of the administration of justice correspondingly. 
He explains this by using the term ‘iustitium’ (meaning ‘standstill’ or ‘suspension of the law’).  
Agamben describes the state of exception as “an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of 
law without law” (Agamben, 2005:39). This means that in the exception, “the anomie is included in 
law through its exclusion from it” and law is “in force without significance” (McLoughlin, 2009:249). 
“The suspension of the norm does not mean its abolition, and the zone of anomie that it establishes is 
not (or at least claims not to be) unrelated to the juridical order” (Agamben, 2005:23). 
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Describing the contemporary condition of the state of exception at the end of State of Exception, 
Agamben remarks: “the normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with 
impunity by a governmental violence that – while ignoring international law externally and producing 
a permanent state of exception internally – nevertheless still claims to be applying the law” (Agamben, 
2005:87). Here Agamben suggests that the violence of exceptionalism is ever more present and 
pressing than ever before (De la Durantaye, 2005:182). In this condition, life which is excluded from 
the polis initially exists in a zone of exception such as the concentration camp but later such zones 
extend beyond the camp at which point “the exception becomes the norm and all life becomes bare 
life; life under the sway of sovereign power is no longer politically qualified” (Edkins, 2007:75). 
Agamben explains that “the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and law, the 
threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence” (Agamben, 
1998:32). He elaborates: 
To show law in its nonrelation to life and life in its nonrelation to law means to open a space between 
them for human action, which once claimed for itself the name of “politics”. Politics has suffered a 
lasting eclipse because it has been contaminated by law, seeing itself, at best, as constituent power (that 
is, violence that makes law), when it is not reduced to merely the power to negotiate with the law 
(Agamben, 2005:88).  
What Agamben’s writings on the state of exception constantly emphasise is the transformation of the 
state of exception today into a topology of rule and that it results in increasingly large sections of 
people deprived of political rights and reduced to bare or naked life (Agamben, 2000:133). In this 
aspect, he is influenced by Walter Benjamin who in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” 
hypothesised that for the marginalised and poor, the exception has almost always been the rule 
(Agamben, 2005:57). The structure of the state of the exception “is such that bare life is included in 
the sovereign sphere precisely through its exclusion from it” (Edkins, 2007:75).  
 
3.5.1 Migrants, human rights and the nation-state 
Agamben also explains how bare life is embodied by the figure of the refugee and the way the refugee 
throws into question the notion of human rights and the order of the state. Agamben (2000:16) plots 
the appearance of refugees as a mass phenomenon to the end of the First World War in Europe. 
Refugees have since become a dominant feature of international politics.21 According to Agamben 
(2000:17), although a distinction is often made between refugees and stateless people in theory, such a 
distinction is not so simple in reality. He narrates how many refugees in Europe, such as the Polish and 
Roman Jews, who were in France or Germany, preferred to be regarded as stateless people rather than 
return to their country after the war. On the other hand, the Turkish and Soviet governments 
denationalised Russian, Armenian and Hungarian refugees in their territories.  
                                                     
21
 At the beginning of 2013, UNHCR estimated that the global refugee population of concern stood at 10.4 
million. See http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c1d.html.  
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Around the same period, European states had begun passing laws allowing the denaturalisation and 
denationalisation of their own citizens who were alleged to have committed acts that made them 
unworthy of citizenship.22 These laws, to quote Agamben (2000:18), “mark a decisive turn in the life 
of the modern nation-state as well as its definitive emancipation from naïve notions of the citizen and 
a people”. He argues that the United Nations, through which states have tried to solve the refugee 
problem, has proved to be “absolutely incapable not only of solving the problem but also of facing it 
in an adequate manner” (Agamben, 2000:19). The reasons for this, he continues, are not only 
bureaucratic but are grounded “in the ambiguity of the fundamental notions regulating the inscription 
of the native (that is, of life) in the juridical order of the nation-state” (Agamben, 2000:19). So, for 
Agamben, exclusionary practices directed at migrants stem from the originary distinction between 
citizen and non-citizen. 
Agamben draws on the writings of political theorist Hannah Arendt to assert that the idea of human 
rights is a façade as human beings, in reality, are not equal because of their mere humanness. For 
Arendt, refugees represent a problem of political space not of geographic or territorial space (Mehta & 
Napier-Moore, 2010:236). In her book Imperialism, Arendt discusses the refugee problem in a chapter 
titled ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man’. Agamben suggests that the 
title binds the fate of the Rights of Man with that of the modern nation-state in such a manner that the 
waning of the latter necessarily implies the same for the former (Agamben, 2000:19). The paradox 
herein is that the refugee – precisely the figure that should have embodied human rights more than any 
other – marked instead the crisis of the concept (Agamben, 2000:19). Agamben agrees with Arendt’s 
claim that the conception of human rights based on the supposed existence of a human being as such 
becomes untenable when one witnesses a human being reduced of all relations except the fact of being 
human (Agamben, 2000:19). Arendt argues that human rights are lost because they are dissociated 
from political identity and maintains that when all that a person has is his or her humanness, it is 
difficult for others to treat that person as human (Johnson, 2001:24). Arendt’s point is not that 
humanity is externally determined but rather that the humanness of the refugee or stateless person 
becomes most apparent when they are stripped of their rights, thus exposing their vulnerability.   
Arendt also posed the question of the human condition at the end of the Second World War which 
resulted in numerous refugees and stateless people. Our human condition, she claimed, “is given to us 
in three kinds of fundamental human activities in which we engage: as biological life-forms, as 
labouring beings, and as political actors” (Arendt quoted in Ong, 2006:22). Agamben has in more 
recent times recast Arendt’s idea of the human condition to argue that undocumented migrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees are reduced to the human condition of bare life because of their exclusion from 
national citizenship by the sovereign state (Ong, 2006:22). Thus, the state, according to Ong (2006:22) 
is “the producer both of modern humanity, by giving protection to citizens, and of bare life, by 
denying it to non-citizens”.  
                                                     
22
 France was first in 1915, followed by Belgium in 1922, Italy in 1926 and Austria in 1933 and Germany in 
1935. 
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The law of the nation-state does not conceive of a stable statute for the pure human (Agamben, 
2000:20). The evidence lies in the status of the refugee who stands at the threshold of the nation-state. 
Agamben (2000:20) points out that even in the best of cases, refugee status has always been 
considered temporary and possibly resulting in either naturalisation or repatriation. For Agamben 
(2000:20), “human rights represent the originary figure for the inscription of natural naked life in the 
political-juridical order of the nation-state”. The nation-state, by definition, makes nativity or birth the 
foundation of its own sovereignty and rights “are attributed to the human being only to the degree to 
which he or she is the immediately vanishing presupposition of the citizen” (Agamben, 2000:20).  
Refugees defy conventional and formal notions of citizenship as their belonging in host countries is 
thrown into question. They undermine the state-nation-territory triad that defines citizenship in their 
home and host states (Agamben, 2000:22). They also problematise the international system by 
questioning the assumptions that people belong to certain territories bound by harmonious affiliations 
and that states provide protection for their citizens (Kyambi, 2004:29). Thus refugees become an 
aberration to “the national order of things” (Malkii quoted in Mehta & Napier-Moore, 2010:235). 
Agamben’s explanation for this is that “by breaking the identity between the human and the citizen 
and that between nativity and nationality, it brings the originary fiction of sovereignty to crisis” 
(Agamben, 2000:21). Agamben sees the figure of the refugee as a modern example of homo sacer23 
and the sovereign exception. The refugee reveals how sovereign power and the exception operate to 
define the life of the state’s citizens from others (Agamben, 1998:134). Agamben states, 
The refugee must be considered for what he is: nothing less than a limit-concept that radically calls into 
question the fundamental categories of the nation-state, from the birth-nation to the man-citizen link, 
and that thereby makes it possible to clear the way for a long-overdue renewal of categories in the 
service of a politics in which bare life is no longer separated and excepted, either in the state order or in 
the figure of human rights. (Agamben, 1998:134)  
Although Agamben has been criticised for romanticising the refugee as homo sacer (Ek, 2006:371), in 
the author’s mind, the refugee’s position in relation to the nation-state makes it a trope for the different 
categories of migrants whose experiences are similar to those of refugees.  
In the contemporary political context, “if we all have inalienable ‘human rights’ it simply means that 
all of us are reducible to a mere bodily existence, that like refugees we can be excluded, abandoned by 
the sovereign state and reduced to bare life” (Murray, 2010:68). This is because Agamben argues that 
all human life is linked to the order of the state through the logic of the exception. So “whereas a 
citizen of a sovereign nation-state may think s/he is living under the protection of sovereign power, 
s/he is in fact internally excluded within the legal and political community that sovereign power 
founds” (de Boever, 2009:262).  
                                                     
23
 Homo sacer (sacred man) is an ancient Roman figure who may be killed and yet not sacrificed. He is defined 
by “both the particular character of the double exclusion into which he is taken and the violence to which he 
finds himself exposed” (Agamben, 1998:82). 
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In order to show that the concept of ‘citizen’ is no longer adequate for describing the socio-political 
reality of industrial states, Agamben (2000:23) credits Tomas Hammar who coined the term 
‘denizens’. Denizens are non-citizen residents who do not want to be and cannot be naturalised or 
repatriated, and are in a condition of de facto statelessness (Agamben 2000:23). However, Agamben 
also notes that in some industrialised countries some legal denizens are able to become non-citizen 
permanent residents so that in certain social strata citizens and non-citizens enter an area of potential 
indistinction (Agamben, 2000:23). Cohen (in Desai, 2008:61) refers to the more privileged group of 
migrants who enjoy many citizenship rights except voting as denizens while he refers to those 
migrants who have entered the country illegally or overstayed their visas as helots. Helots, according 
to Desai (2008:61), have been the main targets of attack in South Africa. 
According to Ong (2006:6), the elements associated with citizenship – rights, entitlement, 
territoriality, a nation – are not only being brought into question by population movements generated 
by conflicts and wars but are becoming disarticulated and rearticulated by market forces. She notes the 
increasing association between citizenship entitlements and benefits with neoliberal criteria whereby 
on the one hand those with capital or expertise are highly valued and are able to enjoy citizen-like 
claims outside their countries of origin. On the other hand, those seen not to possess such tradable 
competence or potential are seen as less worthy and become vulnerable to exclusionary practices 
(Ong, 2006:6-7). Tuitt and Fitzpatrick (2004:xi) use the term ‘critical beings’ to refer to these 
excluded or marginalised groups of people who are constituent of, and integral to, the unsettled 
processes of national/global affirmation.  
As was discussed in section 2.2, states draft immigration policies in line with their national interests. 
Immigration policies not only in South Africa but elsewhere aim to attract capital and labour in order 
to promote economic growth, which is viewed as the primary benefit of international migration. This 
is important for understanding the influence of big business in immigration policy, for instance, the 
mining sector in South Africa which has over the years been given preferential access in the law to 
low-skilled labour from other countries in southern Africa. The economic considerations reflected in 
immigration policies possibly explain the differential treatment accorded to migrants due to their legal 
status with professionals and the highly skilled (in possession of work and permanent resident permits) 
favoured over refugees and asylum seekers, who are perceived to be low-skilled.24 The former are 
probably able to claim citizenship-like entitlements and benefits based on their legal and socio-
economic status (Ong, 2006:16). As Ong (2006:16) explains, “low-skill citizens and migrants become 
exceptions to neoliberal mechanisms and are constructed as excludable populations in transit, shuttled 
in and out of zones of growth”. All this is because of the neoliberal logic that defines, evaluates and 
protects certain categories of people and not others (Ong, 2006:16). From a neoliberal lens, the line 
between citizens and non-citizens begins to blur as “certain rights and benefits are distributed to 
                                                     
24
 Although among those exiled in South Africa are wealthy remnants of some of Africa’s fallen despotic 
political regimes, intellectuals, and those with some level of tertiary education, the prevailing image of the 
refugee is associated with poverty. 
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bearers of marketable talents and denied to those who are judged to lack such capacity or potential. 
The neoliberal exception is allied to a moralized system of distributive justice that is detachable from 
the legal citizenship status” (Ong, 2006:16). 
 
3.5.2 The camp 
Agamben’s description of the contours of life and politics in contemporary politics is epitomised by 
the ‘camp’ (taken from the concentration camps in National Socialist Germany) – a space of 
suspension of national, territorial law and its replacement by police power. According to him, the 
camps were not born out of ordinary law nor were they the product of a transformation and 
development of prison law. Rather they were born out of the state of emergency, which was essentially 
a temporal suspension of the state of law, which then acquired a permanent spatial arrangement that 
remained outside the normal state of the law (Agamben, 2000:38-39). Although Agamben focuses on 
the Nazi concentration camps, particularly Auschwitz, he traces the origin of the camp to colonial 
spaces of exception with the first camps created by the Spanish in Cuba at the end of the nineteenth 
century and the English in South Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century (Agamben, 
1998:166).   
The camp is “the space that opens up when the state of exception starts to become the rule” 
(Agamben, 2000:39). Law and life become indistinguishable in the camp in the sense that the rule of 
law no longer applies to the living body, but the living body has become the  “rule and criterion of its 
own application” (Agamben, 1998:173). Agamben explains that the camp is not simply a territorial 
space. It is the space “of this absolute impossibility of deciding between fact and law, rule and 
application, exception and rule, which nevertheless incessantly decides between them” (Agamben, 
1998:173). Paradoxically, what is being excluded in the camp in the state of exception is at the same 
time included by virtue of its very exclusion (Agamben, 2000:40).  
If sovereign power is founded on the ability to decide the state of exception, the camp is the structure 
in which the state of exception is permanently realised. Agamben argues that it is because the camps 
constitute a state of exception that anything is possible in them (Agamben, 2000:40). He goes on to 
declare that 
If the essence of the camp consists in the materialization of the state of the exception and in the 
consequent creation of a space for naked life as such, we will then have to admit to be facing a camp 
virtually every time that such a structure is created, regardless of the nature of the crimes committed in 
it and regardless of the denomination and specific topography it might have. (Agamben, 2000:41-42) 
Agamben claims that the camp has in modern times become a permanent spatial arrangement 
inhabited by that naked life that increasingly cannot be inscribed into the underlying order of the 
nation-state (Agamben, 2000:43). To quote him, “the increasingly widening gap between birth (naked 
life) and the nation-state is the new fact of the politics of our time and what we are calling “camp” is 
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this disparity” (Agamben, 2000:44). Agamben adds the camp as a fourth element to the three elements 
that define the nation state – territory, order (the state) and nation (birth) – arguing that it is “the new 
biopolitical nomos of the planet” (Agamben, 2000:44-45).  
The camp “delimits a space in which, for all intents and purposes, the normal rule of law is suspended 
and in which the fact that atrocities may or may not be committed does not depend on the law but 
rather on the civility and ethical sense of the police that act temporarily as sovereign” (Agamben, 
2000:42). In the metaphorical camp, the state is able to act without restraint towards its subjects whose 
capacity to resist is minimised in a state of exception (Sutton & Vigneswaran, 2011:628). 
 
3.6 Critiques of Agamben’s political theory of the state of exception 
Having discussed Agamben’s theory of the state of exception, this section presents some of the 
criticisms that have been put forward by other scholars on his theory, as it has been explained thus far. 
Laclau expresses great admiration for Agamben’s work. Nonetheless, he suggests that perhaps 
Agamben “jumps too quickly from having established the genealogy of a term, a concept or an 
institution, to determine its actual working in a contemporary context, that in some sense the origin 
has a secret determining priority over what follows from it” (Laclau, 2007:11). Laclau’s critique 
considers each of the three theses that summarise Agamben’s argument in the book Homo Sacer:  
1. The original political relation is the ban (the state of exception as a zone of indistinction 
between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion). 
2. The fundamental activity of sovereign power is the production of bare life as originary 
political element and as threshold of articulation between nature and culture, zoē and 
bios.25  
3. Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of 
the West. (Agamben, 1998:181) 
With regard to the first thesis, Laclau recognises that Agamben has touched something crucial 
concerning the political in the ban but questions whether Agamben has exhausted all the possibilities 
that the structure of the ban opens. Laclau also views the history of the state of exception differently 
from Agamben. While for Agamben the state of exception, which is now the rule, inevitably advances 
towards a totalitarian society, Laclau determines countertendencies to the exception, such as social 
movements that point to a more optimistic future (Laclau, 2007:17).   
In terms of Agamben’s second thesis, Laclau (2007:20-21) argues that as much as sovereign power 
can be totalitarian, it can also be democratic, for example, when it “empowers” the underdog and thus 
suggests that sovereignty should instead be conceived as hegemony. He also opposes the role that 
Agamben assigns to the distinction between zoē and bios in historically explaining sovereign power. 
                                                     
25
 The Greeks used two distinct terms for ‘life’. Zoe “expressed the simple fact of living common to all living 
beings” and bios “indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or group” (Agamben, 1998:1). 
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For Laclau, zoē is simply an abstraction because all human beings who have bios, also have zoē. He 
notes that while biopolitics implies that more areas of social life are submitted to control and 
regulation, one does not have to assume, as he suggests Agamben does, that such control assumes 
increasing control by an over-powerful state (Laclau, 2007:18). Agamben’s second thesis also 
effectively dismisses other theories grounded in human rights and justice as they are blind to the 
biopolitical foundation of the state of nature, which makes all humans biopolitical subjects who are 
potentially excludable. Related to this is another criticism that Agamben is dualistic in his theorisation 
of homo sacer or bare life, which should instead be regarded as being “less solid and stable” than 
Agamben submits (Long, in Ek, 2006:371). One is either homo sacer or potentially homo sacer with 
no in-between. 
Laclau dismisses Agamben’s third thesis. He argues that Agamben’s casting of modern politics as 
being constructed around the paradigm of the camp not only distorts history but also “blocks any 
possible exploration of the emancipatory possibilities opened up by our modern heritage” (Laclau, 
2007:22). Agamben overlooks non-state forms of governance through which migrants can obtain 
services and the possibility of migrants accessing their rights through informal or extra-legal channels. 
Therefore, he insufficiently addresses the problem of resistance (Ziarek quoted in Zembylas, 2010:41). 
In Agamben’s defence, Zembylas (2010:41) argues that this is because his focus is on “undermining 
sovereign power rather than on transforming bare life”. 
According to Ong (2006:23), Agamben’s thesis on the production of bare life in the state of exception 
“ignores the possibility of complex negotiations of claims for those without territorialized citizenship”. 
His claim that outside citizenship all non-citizens are potentially reduced to a state of bare life, 
according to Ong (2006:23), “seems to preclude the possibility of non-rights mediation or complex 
distinctions that can buttress claims for moral protection and legitimacy”. She terms it politically and 
ethnographically incorrect and precarious that Agamben presents the camp as the nomos of modern 
sovereignty arguing that the shifting legal and moral terrain of humanity has become more complex 
(Ong, 2006:23). Thus she cautions against a strict adherence of Agamben’s universal division of 
humanity into those with rights and those without as it could lead to missing out on the rich 
complexity and possibilities of multiple ethical systems at play (Ong, 2006:23).  
Agamben’s “overall prognosis is taken by many to be a pessimistic one” particularly his nihilistic 
view of the end of politics with no solutions (Edkins, 2007:70). His arguments that the exception has 
become the rule, that the camp is the nomos of contemporary life and that there is an increasing 
convergence between totalitarian states and democratic states have caused controversy (McLoughlin, 
2009:245). He argues for a rethinking of existing political categories and advocates for a community 
of whatever being as a foundation for a coming politics (Edkins, 2007:71-72). He does this in a 
separate work called The Coming Community not dealt with in this study as it lies outside the 
theoretical framework. Perhaps Agamben’s fourth book in the Homo Sacer series, which is 
forthcoming, may address some of the criticisms that the previous volumes have received. 
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The critiques above show that Agamben’s theory is not without its limitations. Some of these, 
particularly those relating to Agamben’s theorisation of bare life, his claim that the exception has 
become the rule and his non-recognition of countertendencies to the exception, are relevant to this 
study. This is demonstrated by the empirical data and discussed in Chapter 6.    
 
3.7 The application of Agamben’s state of exception in scholarship 
This section reviews the growing literature on Agamben’s theory by highlighting some of the ways in 
which Agamben’s work on politics has been ‘applied’ by others. His work has informed research in 
various topics with the most salient being the condition of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, and 
the security situation since the global ‘war on terror’ (Ek, 2006:370). As Ek (2006:363) observes, 
“Agamben’s writing is usually complex, dense, multi-layered and written in a continental 
philosophical, post-foundation tradition”. Scholars have therefore read and interpreted Agamben’s 
conclusions in different ways and used his work in a multitude of contexts including a range of topics 
not specifically covered by Agamben himself. Some have also used Agamben’s work in combination 
with that of other theorists in their analyses.  
Agamben’s work on sovereign power and bare life has generated much scholarly interest in the 
aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States and the ensuing global ‘war on terror’. 
Some scholars have drawn upon Agamben’s work to investigate the biopolitics of sovereign power 
(Butler, 2004; Ek, 2006; Salter, 2008). Others have explored the increased security practices that states 
have deployed to restrict mobility and enforce their sovereign authority (Salter, 2008). These include 
stringent visa requirements, biometric identification and travel documents, and immigration policing 
inside the state’s territory (Butler, 2004; Salter, 2008).  
Salter’s (2008) analysis of the state border, which sets limits on the political community through the 
decision to admit or exclude, concludes that the border is a permanent state of exception. Jones (2009) 
analyses the borderland between India and Bangladesh where she explores the connections between 
the state of exception and securitisation processes. Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2004) examine the 
detention of irregular migrants in Australia, Malaysia and Thailand using Agamben’s concept of homo 
sacer. Hagmann and Korf (2012) have used Agamben’s work to scrutinise the recurring practices of 
sovereign power that are constitutive of the state of exception in the Ethiopia-Somali frontier. Das and 
Poole (2004) use case studies from Africa, Latin America and South Asia to show how people in these 
regions perceive and experience the agency of the state through everyday workings at the margins of 
the state. They show how Agamben’s bare life is produced by the state and how the state is configured 
at the margins (Das & Poole, 2004:19).   
Brophy (2009) has used Agamben to examine sovereign power in the colonial context, which she 
argues operates in much the same way that Agamben describes in his account of the state of exception. 
She purports that sites of colonialism have always been zones of exceptionalism and therefore a 
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feature of the colonial state. Brophy (2009) proposes that reading Agamben’s work alongside some 
texts of Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire offers insights into the dangers of the state of exception and 
how it can be challenged. 
Agamben’s state of exception, together with Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, has been used by Ong 
(2005) to make an interesting connection between sovereign power and capitalism, which Agamben 
does not. To begin with, Ong (2006:5) conceptualises the exception more broadly as “an extraordinary 
departure in policy that can be deployed to include as well as exclude”. The conventional 
understanding of the sovereign exception is a negative decision. It is an exclusive inclusion which 
marks out those within who can be excluded by being denied protection. However, according to Ong 
(2006:5), the exception can also be a positive decision to “include selected populations and spaces as 
targets of calculative choices and value orientation associated with neoliberal reform”. She applies her 
definition to an ethnographic study in East and South East Asia on how states are making exceptions 
to their usual practices of governing in order to position themselves to compete in the global economy.  
Ong traces how ‘neoliberalism as exception’ and ‘exception as neoliberalism’ trigger practices that 
unsettle established notions of citizenship and sovereignty. Beyond the common view of neoliberalism 
as an economic doctrine aimed at limiting the scope of government, Ong (2006:3) posits that it can be 
viewed as “a new relationship between government and knowledge through which governing activities 
are recast as non-political and non-ideological problems that need technical solutions”. The main 
thrust of her argument is that “neoliberalism is reconfiguring relationships between governing and the 
governed, power and knowledge, and sovereignty and territoriality” (Ong, 2006:3). To this end, Ong 
traces neoliberal governmentality to Foucault’s notion of biopower or biopolitics – “a series of 
regulatory controls exerted on the population and on individuals in order to harness and extract life 
forces” (Ong, 2006:13). For her then, neoliberalism is “a governmentality that relies on market 
knowledge and calculations for a politics of subjection and subject-making that continually places in 
question the political existence of modern human beings” (Ong, 2006:13). 
Finally, scholars in South Africa have also engaged with the state of exception, though not quite in the 
way that this study does. Sutton and Vigneswaran (2011) have established in their study that South 
Africa’s deportation system is a zone of exception which state officials capitalise on. They mention the 
ability of state officials to exert extra-legal power over deportation procedures through temporary 
suspensions to the deportation law, prolonging periods of detention and extending the processes of 
adjudication on deportation as constituting a state of exception.  
In another application of the concept in South Africa, Landau (2005b:1115) defines zones of exception 
in the migration landscape of South Africa as “areas in which the state authorises its agents to work 
outside the law”. This authorisation is not a formal institution of a state of exception in the Schmittian 
sense, but rather is an “endorsement or tacit acceptance of systems in which government officials 
legitimise or help create parallel-extra-legal-systems for policing foreigners” (Landau, 2005a:13). This 
implies the need to also analyse what Neocosmos (2006:3) refers to as a xenophobic state discourse, 
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which effectively permits the targeting of African migrants “by whatever means state officials and 
citizens deem appropriate” (Landau & Monson, 2008:333).  
Landau’s interpretation of the state of exception refers to state sanctioned extra-legal policing of non-
citizens and extra-legal detention and deportation procedures. Landau (2005b:1121) identifies three 
areas in which abuses of migrants are particularly visible: acquiring residence permits from the DHA, 
securing social services and banking services; and migrants’ engagement with the state’s coercive 
apparatus of immigration enforcement. According to him, nativist discourses have given rise to zones 
of exception in South Africa. Landau argues that xenophobic violence – the most extreme display of 
xenophobia – can partly be viewed as “the result of an extended series of actions that has generated a 
segment of the population that is institutionally and socially excluded from legal protection” (Landau, 
2008a:3). Landau (2005a) contends that while extra-legal patterns of immigration enforcement in 
South Africa are popular, they have not succeeded in establishing order or security and instead have 
undermined the sovereignty that the law is designed to protect.  
Gordon (2010a, 2010b) has argued that the logic of South Africa’s immigration policy is shaped by 
the state of exception. Gordon (2010b:45) regards South Africa’s immigration policy as an instrument 
of control which has relegated migrants to a space outside the workings of the law (Gordon, 2010b: 
45). Gordon (2010a:16) suggests that the criminalisation not only of the illegal foreigner but of 
foreignness in itself makes foreigners living in South Africa become homo sacer. Mosselson (2010) 
has used the state of exception to argue that it is key to understanding how the politics of belonging is 
mediated in post-apartheid South Africa. Mosselson (2010:641) argues that xenophobic violence is 
partly the result of “the entrenchment of extra-legal and, in some cases, overtly illegal ways of dealing 
with foreign nationals”. In other words, xenophobic attacks are a manifestation of a state of exception. 
The different applications and renderings of Agamben’s theory discussed above have informed the 
author’s interpretation of his complex conceptual framework in this study. Its application to the 
condition of migrants in different contexts makes it relevant as this study attempts a more empirically 
grounded engagement with Agamben’s work than has been undertaken in South Africa. In addition, 
other scholars’ investigations of the biopolitics of sovereign power, the dehumanising tactics of the 
state and the spatiality of the state of exception are especially salient. They suggest the usefulness of 
Agamben’s work to debates on security, national identity formation and ‘othering’ based on discourse 
and power, which have been highlighted in this study as key elements in political explanations of 
xenophobia in South Africa. Finally, other scholars’ descriptions of what constitutes a state of 
exception in concrete terms are relevant to the author’s definition as discussed next.  
 
3.8 Operationalising the state of exception 
In order to concretely identify evidence of a state of exception in this study and its relation to 
xenophobia, the concept is defined as a structural condition of the political system and of the 
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institutional character of the state consisting of four elements. These are: a rationale of governing 
consisting of a set of recurring state practices, a topology of rule where law and lawlessness blur with 
each other, a condition manifested in different spatio-temporal contexts and the politics of bare life. As 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, the sovereign can declare a state of exception during a period of 
emergency when the constitutional order is at stake or when there is a threat to national belonging, 
security and well-being of the state. The state of exception can be a formal proclamation or an implicit 
authorisation by the state to suspend the law when the order is threatened.  
In this study, the state of exception refers to the implicit authorisation of state officials to operate 
outside the law in order to protect the state from the ‘migrant threat’. The African migrant is marked 
as a threat to the national identity, security and well-being of the South African state. This declaration 
of the state of exception endorses practices in which the law itself is either suspended or regarded as 
an instrument that state officials may enact as a strategy for constraining and monitoring the African 
migrant population. The state of exception impacts negatively on the lives of migrants.   
Thirteen indicators of state practices that constitute a state of exception have been developed for the 
study. These indicators are not stand alone indicators meaning that the presence of one does not 
neccesarily indicate a state of exception. Instead, a combination of these indicators happening on a 
recurring basis constitutes a state of exception. The indicators are presented in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Indicators of state practices which constitute a state of exception 
Indicator 
Flouting the laws relating to migrants 
Overstepping the bounds of designated state authority 
Abuse of official and discretionary powers 
Establishment of barriers to migrants obtaining services and permits from Home Affairs  
Fraudulent practices surrounding the production and acquisition of documentation 
Production or generation of illegal migrants 
Institution of extraordinary measures to exclude migrants from accessing basic social services 
Eliciting of bribes from migrants 
Exploitation and extortion of migrants 
Illegal arrest and detention of migrants 
Illegal raids to homes and businesses of migrants and/or looting of the same by Home Affairs and the 
police 
Irregular policing of migrants 
Impunity from any penalty of perpetrators of xenophobic violence and other crimes against migrants 
 
Jones (2009:880) notes that “sovereign power operates as a few particular agents of the state make the 
decision to target a few particular individuals for the exception, a process that occurs in a few 
particular places much more frequently than others”. She proposes that in order to understand the state 
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of exception, it is critical to identify the agents, the targets, and the spaces where the practice of 
sovereign power occurs. This study adopts this approach. As shown in Figure 3.1 below, state officials 
from the DHA, SAPS and CoCT are identified as the possible agents of the exception. They are what 
Butler (2004) calls the ‘petty sovereigns’ or agents of governmentality. The targets of the state of 
exception are African migrants in Cape Town who have been resident in South Africa for at least one 
year. The spaces where the practices of sovereign power occur are the situations and sites in which 
state officials and migrants interact, shown by the shaded area in Figure 3.1.  
 
 Agents of the exception Targets of the exception 
 
 Spaces of interaction 
Figure 3.1: The state of exception in operation 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on xenophobia and how the study will add to this literature. 
Xenophobia was identified as a longstanding and widespread phenomenon, which makes for a hostile 
reception for many African migrants in South Africa. It showed that xenophobia ranges from the 
expression of general attitudes of intolerance to violence. However, in the context of this study the 
definition of xenophobia was limited to an attitudinal response to foreigners. It also examined some of 
the theories that have been put forward to explain the causes of xenophobia from the disciplines of 
economics, sociology, psychology and political science. It acknowledged the extent to which these 
explanations hold relevance for this study.  
The chapter then located the study at hand within the state of exception theory of Giorgio Agamben 
(1998, 2005) by linking xenophobia to official legal discrimination as well as withdrawal and non-
application of the law when it comes to migrants. Underlying the detailed discussion of Agamben’s 
biopolitical theory of sovereignty is the argument that sovereign power is not only about territories but 
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also about bodies and that this power is exerted over populations in order to protect the state from 
threats. It also reviewed the literature on Agamben’s theory, which has informed research in various 
country settings on topics such as the condition of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, and the 
security situation since the global ‘war on terror’.   
This study shifts away from mainstream analyses which attempt to explain xenophobia on the basis of 
strained relations between African migrants and their host communities due to the contestation of 
resources, a legacy of apartheid and citizens’ disillusionment with the socio-economic performance of 
the ANC led post-apartheid administration, which dominate the literature. Instead, it deploys 
Agamben’s theory to argue that having construed the unprecedented arrival of African migrants as a 
national human security threat, the South African state has implicitly sanctioned extra-legal measures 
to control and discourage immigration, with serious consequences on the dignity and welfare of 
African migrants. 
The chapter then explained the application of Agamben’s theory in this study. The state of exception 
was defined as the implicit authorisation of state officials to operate outside the law in order to protect 
the state from the migrant threat to the national identity, security and well-being of the South African 
state. This declaration of the state of exception endorses practices in which the law itself is either 
suspended or regarded as an instrument that state officials may enact as a strategy for constraining and 
monitoring the African migrant population. The state of exception impacts negatively on the lives of 
migrants.   
Thereafter 13 indicators were developed in order to identity the state of exception. These indicators 
include the following practices by state officials: flouting the laws relating to migrants; overstepping 
the bounds of their authority; abuse of official and discretionary powers; irregular policing of 
foreigners; perpetration of human rights violations; institution of extraordinary measures to exclude 
migrants from accessing basic social services; impunity of perpetrators of xenophobic violence; 
barriers to accessing documentation from Home Affairs; fraudulent practices surrounding the 
production and acquisition of documentation; production or generation of migrants who are extra-legal 
by denying them documentation; exploitation and extortion; irregular arrest and detention of migrants; 
illegal raids and looting of migrants’ property; and corrupt behaviour in service provision, for example 
bribery. These indicators will be operationalised alongside two other concepts – bare life and 
xenophobia – which were also defined in this chapter. Lastly, the possible agents, targets and spaces of 
the state exception were identified for the operationalisation. The potential agents of the state of the 
exception are state officials from the DHA, SAPS and CoCT, the targets are African migrants and the 
spaces are the various sites where the state officials and migrants interact.  
In conclusion, this study addresses two gaps which can be identified from the literature review. The 
first is that the studies on the prevalence of xenophobia provide insufficient explanation of the 
variables which determine how migrants experience xenophobia, for example nationality and 
immigration status. Secondly, the reviewed political explanations of xenophobia do not sufficiently go 
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beyond describing certain state practices and discourses as xenophobic to provide supporting empirical 
evidence of how the state engenders xenophobia on an everyday basis through its practices. This study 
builds on previous research by attempting to fill these gaps with empirical evidence. It seeks to 
provide a nuanced understanding of how migrants experience xenophobia based on variables such as 
their legal status and nationality. In addition, it attempts to expand on existing statist explanations of 
xenophobia by bringing in the element of state power. After 20 years of democracy in South Africa, 
the relationship between the state and African migrants living in the country warrants further 
investigation. Underlying this investigation is the implicit alienation of non-citizens in the definition of 
the state and in Agamben’s theory, on the one hand, and the state’s obligations towards non-citizens, 
on the other. The following chapter examines the legal framework relating to migrants, the functions 
of the three selected state institutions and their operating context.   
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Chapter 4: Legal foundations and institutional context: Migrants and the 
Department of Home Affairs, the South African Police Service and Local 
Government 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Given that the main research question of this study attempts to understand the practices of South 
African state officials in dealing with African migrants and relate such practices to xenophobia, it is 
necessary to highlight the legal framework, which forms the basis for interaction between the selected 
organs of state and international migrants. These laws also outline the different categories of migrants 
and their rights and obligations. Highlighting three key laws relating to migrants and their rights 
enables the researcher in the subsequent empirical chapters to identify instances when state officials 
violate the law and deny migrants their rights. The legal framework is therefore the focus of the first 
part of this chapter as it relates to migrants, the potential targets of the state of exception. 
It is also vital to have an overview of the context within which these institutions operate in democratic 
South Africa and the way they are experienced by African migrants. The three state institutions – the 
Department of Home Affairs (DHA), the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the City of Cape 
Town (CoCT) – have been chosen because of the extent to which they interact with African migrants. 
Chapter 3 identified the state officials of these institutions as potential agents of the state of exception. 
The second part of the chapter provides a brief overview of the mandate and structure of these 
institutions, their operations, their general performance as perceived by the public and some of the 
broad challenges that they face in fulfilling their mandates. It also points out some of the possible 
spaces of the exception. 
 
4.2 Legal framework 
In terms of legislation this chapter focuses on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 
of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution), which came into effect in 1997, the Refugees Act 
130 of 1998 (hereafter referred to as the Refugees Act), which came into force in 2000 and the 
Immigration Act 13 of 2002 (hereafter referred to as the Immigration Act), which came into effect in 
2003. It also makes reference to relevant amendments to the Refugees and Immigration Acts and to 
the Regulations of the respective Acts. Where necessary, enabling legislation is also mentioned. As 
Neocosmos (2010:84) points out, “the importance of legislation is that it consists of the fundamental 
way in which the state addresses sections of the population under its control. It is also indicative of a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
 
specific form of politics, state politics”. The abovementioned laws describe the legal categories that 
the state uses to define non-citizens living within its borders as well as their rights and obligations. 
 
4.2.1 The Constitution 
The Constitution as the supreme law of South Africa is particularly relevant for a number of reasons: it 
establishes South Africa as a unitary state with federal features, namely, the three different tiers of 
government and state institutions; it outlines the role of local government; it contains the Bill of 
Rights, which is a cornerstone of South Africa’s democracy; and it distinguishes between citizens and 
non-citizens. 
The use of the language of rights is commonly used by citizens and non-citizens alike in post-
apartheid South Africa to articulate needs and make demands on the state (Amisi & Ballard, 
2006:301). In theory every person, by virtue of being human, is entitled to the rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly in 1948. The domestication of these rights in the South African context is found in Chapter 
2 of the Constitution, known as the Bill of Rights. As Albertyn (2008:176) notes, the language of the 
Constitution extends beyond a narrow notion of citizens to an inclusive society of all who live in 
South Africa. The preamble of the Constitution states clearly that the South African people “believe 
that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity” (Republic of South Africa, 
1996). Albertyn (2008:178) also points out that the subject of almost all of the rights entrenched in the 
Bill of Rights is ‘everyone’, which is interpreted to include those who are not citizens. Everyone has a 
right to equality; dignity; life; freedom and security of the person; privacy; fair labour practices; 
freedom of religion, belief and opinion; freedom of expression; assembly, demonstration, picket and 
petition; freedom of association; and freedom of movement and residence. Everyone is also given a 
range of socio-economic rights, such as housing; healthcare, food, water and social security; and 
education.26 Rights to access to information; just administrative action; and access to courts are also to 
be enjoyed by everyone. 
Only two sets of rights in the Bill of Rights are limited to citizens of South Africa. They include 
political rights (Section 19) and freedom of trade, occupation and profession (Section 22). The former 
includes the right to form or support a political party, vote and stand for public office.  
The application of human rights to everyone, however, has been formally contested from time to time 
and the Constitutional Court has been called upon to make judgements. Albertyn (2008:178) states 
that the Constitutional Court has “established citizenship or nationality as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination in South Africa and confirmed foreign nationals as part of the community of people 
                                                     
26
 With respect to the rights to housing, healthcare, food, water and social security, the Constitution requires the 
state to “take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights” (Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
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protected by the Constitution”.  The equality clause in Section 9 (3) of the Constitution provides the 
grounds which prevent the state from unfairly discriminating against anyone. Albertyn makes 
reference to the Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education (North West Province)27 case concerning the right 
of permanent residents to be granted permanent teaching positions in which the court was asked to 
consider adding citizenship or nationality as a prohibition. The court agreed with the request and 
concluded that “unjust treatment based on nationality has the potential to impair the fundamental 
dignity of persons as human beings” (Albertyn, 2008:178). Stated differently, in terms of Agamben, 
unjust treatment of foreigners potentially reduces them to bare life. 
Migrants are entitled to administrative justice as outlined in the Constitution and in the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. Examples of where this right is applicable include in the 
adjudication process to determine migrants’ legal status and when migrants are detained and/or 
arrested for being on the wrong side of the law. 
 
4.2.2 The Refugees Act 
The Refugees Act (as amended in 2008 and 2011) governs migrants who are generally classified as 
involuntary or forced migrants. These include asylum seekers and refugees. The Act gives effect to the 
relevant international legal instruments, principles and standards relating to refugees. International law 
obliges states to protect non-citizens residing within their borders (Mehta & Napier-Moore, 2010:233). 
South Africa’s Refugees Act reflects its commitment to international legislation relating to refugees 
that it is bound to. South Africa is a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. It has ratified the 1969 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa and is party to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Refugees Act 
provides for the reception of asylum seekers; the regulation of applications for, and recognition of, 
refugee status; and the rights and obligations of refugees (Republic of South Africa, 1998).  
An asylum seeker refers to a person who is seeking recognition as a refugee in South Africa (Republic 
of South Africa, 1998). A Section 22 asylum seeker permit allows the applicant to remain in the 
country temporarily as their claim for asylum is examined to determine whether they qualify for 
refugee status. By law a foreigner arriving at any port of entry in South Africa without a valid visa 
may seek asylum in South Africa. An asylum transit permit, which was until recently valid for 14 
days, is issued to the foreigner at the port of entry and he/she must report to a Refugee Reception 
Office (RRO) to apply for asylum before the transit permit expires. The validity period has been 
reduced to five days in the 2014 Immigration Regulations. 
According to Amit (2012:10), many asylum seekers, however, do not receive an asylum seeker transit 
permit at the border. Immigration officials refuse to issue these permits in an attempt to deny asylum 
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 1998 (1) SA 245 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1655 (CC). 
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seekers access to asylum (African Centre for Migration and Society & Lawyers for Human Rights, 
2013:5). There are also reports that those who manage to gain entry into the country without an 
asylum transit permit and report to a RRO to lodge an asylum claim are turned away for not being in 
possession of an asylum transit permit (African Centre for Migration and Society & Lawyers for 
Human Rights, 2013:5). The non-issuance of asylum seeker permits at the border and the refusal to 
issue asylum seeker permits at RROs to those without an asylum transit permit are contraventions of 
the Refugees Act and the Immigration Act (African Centre for Migration and Society & Lawyers for 
Human Rights, 2013:5).  
The application process for asylum is explained in Section 21 of the Refugees Act and states that 
applications for asylum are to be made in person at a RRO. Once an asylum claim is lodged an asylum 
seeker, or Section 22, permit is issued to the applicant. It is printed on A4 security paper and contains 
a photograph of the applicant and his/her fingerprint. Asylum seeker permits, which are issued for 
between one and six months, have to keep being extended since the adjudication process usually takes 
longer than the legally stipulated 180 days. 
A refugee in South Africa is one who has been granted asylum in terms of the Refugees Act and is in 
possession of a Section 24 refugee permit. With this permit a refugee can then apply for a maroon 
refugee identity document (ID) book. Section 3 of the Act defines a refugee as a person who,  
a) Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his or her race, tribe, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of his or 
her nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or, 
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former habitual residence is unable 
or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it; or  
b) Owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing or 
disrupting public order in either a part or the whole of his or her country of origin or nationality, is 
compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge elsewhere; or  
c) Is a dependent of a person contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b). (Republic of South Africa, 1998) 
Refugee status is initially granted for a period of two or four years. Thereafter, it is renewable at the 
discretion of the DHA. The asylum application and adjudication process leading up to the 
determination of whether an asylum seeker qualifies for refugee status is summarised in Figure 4.1: 
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Figure 4.1: The refugee status determination process in South Africa 
Source: University of Cape Town (No date:6). 
 
In addition to the Constitution, the Refugees Act also extends rights and obligations to asylum seekers 
and refugees. With regard to asylum seekers, Section 27A of the Refugees Act provides for their right 
to remain in South Africa pending the outcome of their application for asylum; protection from 
unlawful arrest or detention, and the rights contained in the Constitution in so far as those rights refer 
to an asylum seeker. This suggests that asylum seekers may not be entitled to the full spectrum of 
rights while awaiting determination of their status, but the law is silent on the exact limitation of 
rights. Perhaps the tenuous nature of asylum seeker status is itself a limiting factor to enjoying a broad 
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range of rights. The Act also provides for non-refoulement, a fundamental tenet of refugee protection, 
which prevents individuals from being returned to their country of origin or any other country where 
their life or liberties may be at risk (Amit, 2012:17).  
In line with the Constitution, the Refugees Act entitles refugees to “full legal protection, which 
includes the rights set out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
except those rights that only apply to citizens” (Republic of South Africa, 1998). In addition, other 
refugee rights included in Section 27 of the Act are: permanent residence status after five years of 
continuous residence in South Africa from the date asylum was granted if they are certified to remain 
a refugee indefinitely; an identity document and a travel document. They also have the right to work 
and to “the same basic health services and basic primary education which the inhabitants of the 
Republic receive from time to time” (Republic of South Africa, 1998). Section 29 (1) protects refugees 
from arbitrary detention and arrest. An amendment to the regulations of the Social Assistance Act 13 
of 2004 in 2012 extends social assistance to impoverished recognised refugees.  
The Refugees Act grants full rights to work to both asylum seekers and refugees.28 It also requires that 
asylum seekers and refuges respect the laws of South Africa. Asylum seekers and refugees are also 
obliged to provide the RRO with their current residential address.29 Asylum seekers must also renew 
their Section 22 permits in person at any RRO. 
 
4.2.3 The Immigration Act 
The Immigration Act regulates the entry of foreigners, their residence in, and their departure from 
South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 2002).30 Permits and visas are generally issued at South 
African consulates outside the country to foreigners before they arrive in South Africa with the 
exception of asylum seeker and refugee permits. The Immigration Act allows foreigners to change 
from one legal status to another and extend their permits once in the country. However, since the 
enactment of new Immigration Regulations in May 2014 this no longer applies to those with visitor’s 
visas and medical visas. Those in possession of these visas have to make an application in their home 
country if they wish to change their status in South Africa. The Act also allows illegal foreigners to 
become legal subject to certain conditions prescribed in the Immigration Regulations.  
The Immigration Act of 2002 (as amended in 2004, 2007 and 2011) provides for two categories of 
voluntary migrants in South Africa – temporary residents and permanent residents. These are further 
                                                     
28
 Under the regulations of 2000 asylum seekers were not allowed to work, study or be self-employed until they 
were granted refugee status however, they could apply for special consideration to work after being in the 
country for six months (Crush & Williams, 2003:9). This changed in 2004 following a court order. 
29
 In South Africa asylum seekers and refugees enjoy freedom of movement and are not confined to camps. 
Instead they are required to live among local communities, a policy which is seen as progressive (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009:6). 
30
 The Immigration Act defines a foreigner as “an individual who is neither a citizen nor a resident, but is not an 
illegal foreigner” (Republic of South Africa, 2002). 
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categorised based on their intended purpose and duration of stay in South Africa. Migrants applying 
for the different categories of temporary and permanent resident permits are required to meet a set of 
criteria determined by the type of permit they wish to apply for. These criteria are contained in the 
Immigration Act and Regulations. Temporary residents include migrants who are students, workers, 
investors, retired and dependant foreign relatives of citizens or permanent residents. They are issued 
with one of the 13 different types of temporary residence permits in the form of a sticker in their 
passport, which qualify them as temporary migrants. The general expectation is that they are not 
accompanied by their families and will depart South Africa after a particular duration. 
Temporary residents are distinguished from those whose stay in the country is seen to be of a long-
term or unlimited nature as contemplated in the Immigration Act. Commonly known as immigrants, 
this category consists only of permanent residents (who may or may not have previously resided in 
South Africa). It is worth noting that those with temporary resident permits may after continuous 
residence in South Africa and subject to certain conditions become eligible to apply for permanent 
resident status (Sections 26 and 27 of the Immigration Act). Permanent residents get a permit stamped 
in their passports and also receive a permanent residence certificate. With this status they are required 
to apply for a South African green ID book. Permanent residents risk losing their status if they stay 
away from South Africa for more than three consecutive years (Section 28). After a further five year 
sojourn in South Africa permanent residents may acquire South African citizenship thus becoming 
naturalised South Africans.  
According to Section 25 (1) of the Immigration Act, “the holder of a permanent residence permit has 
all the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of a citizen, save for those rights, privileges, duties and 
obligations which a law or the Constitution explicitly ascribes to citizenship” (Republic of South 
Africa, 2002). In affirming the rights of permanent residents Albertyn (2008:180) refers to the 
Constitutional Court’s judgement in the Khosa v Minister of Social Development case.31 In the case a 
community of indigent permanent residents of Mozambican origin challenged the notion that only 
citizens had a right to social grants from the government and argued against their exclusion. In the 
landmark judgement the court held that their exclusion from social grants was not only discriminatory 
and unfair but also infringed their constitutional rights.  
Poor permanent residents are also eligible for state housing. They qualify for a ‘Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP)’ house if they have dependants and earn less than R 3,500 a month 
and for subsidised rental housing if they earn less than R 7,500 a month (Silverman & Zack, 
2008:148&150). Of course with the demand for government housing far outstripping supply in South 
Africa, many of the poor end up housed in informal settlements rather than in government houses in 
townships.  
                                                     
31
 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC), (2004) 6 BCLR 569 (CC). 
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Not all migrants have the right to employment as the right to be in South Africa is distinct from the 
right to work. Those granted full rights to work by the Immigration Act include work permit holders 
and permanent residents. Those with study permits and retired person permits may be granted limited 
working rights subject to conditions set out by the DHA. Those with relative’s permits are not 
authorised to work.  
The aforementioned categories of temporary and permanent residents relate to migrants who are in 
South Africa legally. However, there are migrants who reside in the country unlawfully. They could 
either have entered the country through irregular means or legally, but became undocumented while in 
the country. The law uses the term ‘illegal foreigner’ to refer to a foreigner who is in the country in 
contravention of the Immigration Act. According to Section 32 of the Immigration Act, illegal 
foreigners are to be deported unless authorised by the DHA to remain in the country pending their 
application for status (Republic of South Africa, 2002). 
Illegal foreigners are, arguably, not entitled to any constitutional rights by virtue of the fact that they 
are in the country unlawfully. The Immigration Act implies that once detected illegal foreigners are, 
however, entitled to just administrative action during detention and deportation. The status of illegal 
foreigners raises moral issues with regard to human rights. While human rights are accorded to all the 
question arises as to whether states are morally responsible to those residing within their territory 
illegally and are not engaged in crime, but are merely trying to better their lives. It also highlights the 
tension raised by Weiner (1996:176) between migration serving the interests of the host state and 
migration serving the interests of migrants. 
A shared obligation in the law for all migrants is that they abide by the laws of the Republic of South 
Africa. It is clear from the above that the Constitution, Refugees Act and Immigration Acts guarantee 
migrants a broad range of human rights and legal protections. As such, South Africa is regarded as 
having one of the most expansive rights in the world for migrants (Human Rights Watch, 2009:2). 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that these rights are fully realised by migrants as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 6. This may be due to several reasons; however worth highlighting at this 
point is the fact that the legal status of a foreigner by definition means having inferior claims on the 
state in contrast to citizens (Amisi & Ballard, 2006:321). Chapter 2 on xenophobia alluded to state 
officials violating the human rights of migrants with impunity. This section paves the way for the 
discussion in Chapter 6 on whether African migrants exist in a state of exception where they are not 
afforded the protections guaranteed in the Constitution, the Immigration Act and the Refugees Act in 
practice. The focus now shifts to the three state institutions. 
 
4.3 Institutional context 
Due to its immigration-related responsibilities, interaction with the DHA at ports of entry and DHA 
offices forms an integral part of the life of migrants in South Africa. All the migrants in the study 
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therefore have had one or more encounters with the Department when applying for documentation, 
renewing their permits, changing their immigration status, or when entering and departing the country. 
To this extent, the DHA interacts with foreigners extensively albeit, differently from the way it 
interacts with citizens because it provides different services to citizens and to foreigners. The SAPS’ 
main responsibilities relate to crime, public order and security. However, it has been known to conduct 
immigration-related responsibilities, such as immigration policing and border management (Apleni, 
2012). This means that SAPS officials come into contact with both citizens and non-citizens alike in 
several sites. These include police stations, the streets, business premises and even private residences. 
Local government is the tier of government that is closest to the people and is responsible for 
providing basic public services to all persons living in South Africa. Local government in this study is 
represented by the City of Cape Town (CoCT). It interacts with migrants as users of the various 
services it provides which are not only limited to basic services, but also include issuing of trading 
licences to street traders, by-law enforcement and policing crime (under the Metro Police).  
The institutional context in this section covers the following aspects for each of the institutions in turn: 
mandate and functions; leadership and executive structure; operations; and challenges facing the 
institution. It is by no means exhaustive, but is aimed at providing some context to these institutions 
which also serve South Africans. It is also meant to draw attention to the gap between the formal rules 
that define institutional structure and functions, and the real politics of how government agencies work 
as pointed out by Boone (2003:4), among others. In the section on the DHA recent policy and 
administrative changes affecting migrants are also discussed. 
 
4.3.1 The Department of Home Affairs 
The DHA deals with citizens and foreigners by providing both civic and immigration services. It 
describes itself as “the custodian, protector and verifier of the identity and status of citizens and other 
persons resident in South Africa” (Department of Home Affairs, 2012). This role involves maintaining 
the National Population Register; managing the birth, marriage and death records; determining and 
granting citizenship; issuing travel documents and passports; and issuing identity documents. The 
DHA also “controls, regulates and facilitates immigration and the movement of persons through ports 
of entry” (Department of Home Affairs, 2012). This includes administering admissions into South 
Africa; determining the residency status of foreigners and issuing permits; custodianship over refugee 
affairs; and policy directives. Because of its functions, the DHA is regarded as “the backbone of 
national security, service delivery and development” (African National Congress, 2012:3).  
The headquarters of the DHA is in Pretoria like all national government departments. The Department 
also has offices throughout the country and is present in all South African embassies and high 
commissions and at all ports of entry, which include 10 airports, nine harbours and 53 land border 
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crossings.32 While all the DHA offices throughout South Africa provide civic services only a few 
provide immigration services. There are two DHA offices that offer immigration services in Cape 
Town. These are the Bellville and Cape Town offices.  
The Department’s services for international migrants, which are of interest to this study, fall under the 
National Immigration Branch. Its functions are to implement the Immigration Act and its 
accompanying Regulations (2005, 2014) as well as the Refugees Act and its Regulations (2000). The 
regulations contain, among other things, detailed application information for the various permits such 
as the forms to be completed, the procedures to be followed and the accompanying documentation that 
must be submitted to the DHA. While implementing the Immigration Act the Department pledges to 
prevent and counter xenophobia, promote a human rights culture and issue permits expeditiously and 
on the basis of simplified procedures (Republic of South Africa, 2002).  
The DHA has also established RROs in different parts of the country to deal specifically with the 
asylum process. Figure 4.2 summarises the executive structure of the DHA. For this study the Deputy 
Director-General in charge of Immigration Services, who is based in Pretoria, was contacted for an 
interview but never responded despite several follow-up attempts. Following this the Provincial 
Manager of the Western Cape, who is based in Cape Town, was contacted. He said that he was unable 
to grant an interview without permission from the headquarters and this permission was never 
forthcoming.  
Home Affairs is led by a Cabinet Minister who is appointed by the President. The current Minister of 
Home Affairs is Malusi Gigaba. The first post-apartheid minister of Home Affairs was Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party. He led the DHA from 1994 to 2004. He was famous 
for his xenophobic utterances, drawing links between migrants and crime and depicting illegal 
migration as a threat to the development of South Africa (Klotz, 2012:1999; Crush, 2008:16; Lefko-
Everett, 2008:6). During his tenure administrative irregularities flourished in what was already 
regarded as one of most corrupt departments under apartheid (Landau et al., 2005:25). Furthermore, 
the DHA adopted a protectionist approach to immigration and a tough stance towards undocumented 
migrants (Segatti, 2011:55; Vigneswaran, 2008a:18).  
According to Vigneswaran (2008a:18), Buthelezi’s ideas live on in the current administration. Yet the 
African National Congress (ANC)-led government has blamed the failure to effectively manage 
migration to the appointment of an opposition figure to the head the Department for a decade (African 
National Congress, 2012:5). Certainly, the lack of consensus, confusion and political deadlock, which 
characterised the process of developing the current Immigration Act in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
was partly due to the tension that existed from having a minority political party being part of a 
coalition government with the majority ANC (Handmaker, de la Hunt & Klaaren, 2008:3). However, 
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 See DHA website http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/south-african-ports [2012, December 14].  
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placing the blame for an inadequate immigration policy squarely on Buthelezi glosses over the fact 
that the ANC undermined his authority throughout his tenure (Vigneswaran, 2008b:792). 
Buthelezi was succeeded by his deputy Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula from 2004 to 2009 under whose 
leadership the Department embarked on the implementation of a turnaround plan. In 2010 Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma was appointed Minister, a position she held until 2012. Under her term in office the 
Department was credited with strengthening internal systems, streamlining the process of applying for 
official national documents, improving service delivery to citizens and obtaining its first unqualified 
audit. Naledi Pandor took over executive authority of the Department in 2012 and was replaced by 
Malusi Gigaba in May 2014 after a new administration was ushered in following the national 
elections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The Department of Home Affairs executive structure 
Minister 
Malusi Gigaba 
Deputy Minister 
Director-General 
Deputy Director-General 
Civic Services 
Deputy Director-General 
Immigration Services  
Deputy Director-General 
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Chief Directorate  
Port Control 
Chief Directorate 
Asylum Seekers & Refugees 
Chief Directorate 
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Chief Directorate 
Immigration Services Support 
Chief Directorate Foreign 
Offices Coordination & Support 
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Source: Adapted from DHA (2012:21). 
 
In terms of its internal operations and professionalism the DHA has over the years attracted immense 
public criticism for its poor service standards in comparison to other government departments (Davids, 
Lefko-Everett & Williams, 2005:5; Hoag, 2010:205). Media reports indicate a widely held perception 
that the DHA is inaccessible, unresponsive and poorly managed (Davids et al., 2005:5). It has also 
been riddled with widespread corruption (Mail & Guardian, 2009). Interestingly the findings of a 
SAMP survey conducted in 2004 to test perceptions on the quality of DHA services were inconsistent 
with the negative media reportage of the DHA, public opinion and the Director General’s assessment 
(Davids et al., 2005:4). The surveyed customers, both citizens and non-citizens in and around DHA 
offices countrywide, generally reported rather positive experiences regarding the DHA’s service 
delivery, customer relations and staff attitudes. In a separate study of the DHA from 2008-2009 almost 
everyone Hoag (2010:205) came across had a personal experience of corruption, inefficiency and/or 
disarray with DHA officials. Indeed, for many citizens and foreigners alike, the DHA represents 
“government bureaucracy” at its worst and the use of the label “horror affairs” has become common 
when referring to Home Affairs (Hoag, 2010:205). 
In 2003 the Department’s Director-General announced a Turnaround Strategy after publicly admitting 
that the DHA was in a “scandalous” state and that immigration services were a “joke” when compared 
to other countries (Xundu, 2003; BBC, 2003). The Turnaround Strategy called for radical changes in 
the DHA in order to efficiently service its customers (Mail & Guardian, 2007). Significant 
improvements have been observed since the inception of the strategy and hailed by the public, the 
media and government (Amit, 2012:15). However, a decade later Amit (2012:15) argues that these 
improvements are not reflected in the immigration activities of the DHA. Segatti (2011:58) also notes 
that there have been notable improvements in civic affairs services under the successive ministers but 
immigration services have been disappointing. Amit (2012:15) describes the DHA’s performance in 
immigration services as “highly dysfunctional” and criticises the asylum system for “consistently 
failing to carry out its functions in accordance with the law”. This is despite the establishment of the 
National Immigration Branch in 2005 as part of the strategy with the aim of professionalising the 
implementation of its immigration services (Human Rights Watch, 2005:19).  
The Department has been conducting an immigration policy review over the years but the details have 
not been made public. However, the annual reports of the DHA suggest that the review entails an 
overhaul of the asylum system (Department of Home Affairs, 2012:10), separation of economic 
migrants from asylum seekers, and facilitating the entry of skilled migrants (Department of Home 
Affairs, 2011:10) but they are thin on details. Amendments to the Immigration Act announced in 2014 
were thought to be part of the immigration policy review. However, the former Home Affairs minister, 
Naledi Pandor, explained that they were only interim measures to address some shortcomings of the 
Immigration Act while the review was underway (Paton, 2014). She added that the Human Sciences 
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Research Council (HSRC) has been commissioned to conduct a review on managing migration taking 
into account international perspectives. Nevertheless, the new regulations, which took effect in May 
2014, point towards a hardening stance towards immigration. According to Segatti (2014), many 
migration experts believe that in the short term, they will result in more chaos in an already inefficient 
bureaucracy and an increase in litigation against the DHA by those declared ‘undesirable’ by the new 
rules while in the long term they will result in more costs to taxpayers.  
The closure of some RROs in the last couple of years can be viewed in the context of the DHA’s 
policy changes and deserve a more detailed discussion. The RROs exist to receive and adjudicate 
asylum claims. The RROs also extend asylum seeker permits for those who are waiting for their claim 
to be adjudicated and those whose claims have been rejected, but have appealed and are waiting for a 
hearing. Section 8 of the Refugees Act gives the Director-General powers to establish RROs after 
consultation with the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs. An RRO must consist of at least one 
Refugee Reception Officer and a Refugee Status Determination Officer (RSDO). When the Refugees 
Act took effect in 2000 the DHA established five RROs based in Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, 
Port Elizabeth and Pretoria. Following a steady increase in the number of applicants seeking asylum 
the DHA’s administrative capacity was stretched to the limit and it experienced a backlog in 
processing applications. This led to the opening of additional offices in Durban, Johannesburg, 
Musina, Port Elizabeth and Pretoria. However, in 2011 it began a series of RRO closures reducing its 
administrative capacity for asylum seekers and refugees (Amit, 2012:16). The closures of the 
Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town RROs in 2011 and 2012 mean that asylum seekers must 
travel to Durban, Musina or Pretoria to submit their applications.  
The Department has announced plans to relocate the RROs to the land borders of South Africa through 
which many asylum seekers enter the country. However, the closures have taken place before the 
infrastructure to facilitate this move has been put in place. As already mentioned details of these 
changes have been scanty. The DHA has maintained that “it is not changing policy but merely 
implementing existing policy through administrative decisions” (African Centre for Migration and 
Society & Lawyers for Human Rights, 2013:13). Whatever the case may be internal discussions within 
the ANC shed some light on the thinking behind these changes and are a sign of the ruling party’s 
endorsement of the steps being taken by Home Affairs.  
The ANC policy discussion document discussed at the party’s 2012 policy conference in Mangaung 
states that it is unusual for a country to have RROs right in the middle of the country and that 
relocating them along the border will “alleviate this problem” (African National Congress, 2012:7). 
Moreover, it claims that “over 95% of those claiming asylum in SA are not genuine asylum seekers 
but rather looking for work or business opportunities” (African National Congress, 2012:5). It then 
suggests a “risk-based approach” in which asylum seekers who present a high risk will be 
accommodated in a secure facility in the border until their status has been determined (African 
National Congress, 2012:6). If this document is anything to go by then the changes, some of which are 
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already being implemented, indicate both a shrinking space for asylum and a crackdown on asylum 
seekers in South Africa.  
The closure of the Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town RROs was challenged in court by 
organisations which champion migrants’ rights. The court established that the closures were unlawful 
“due to a lack of substantive consultation with the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs or with 
affected groups”, but the DHA has disregarded court orders to reopen the RROs or offer the equivalent 
services in these cities within three months of the ruling (African Centre for Migration and Society & 
Lawyers for Human Rights, 2013:7). The Cape Town RRO closure was contested in the Western Cape 
High Court by organisations working with refuges in the case Scalabrini Centre Cape Town and 8 
others v the Department of Home Affairs and 4 others.33 Following the court ruling the DHA then 
opened a temporary office in the city centre to finalise existing claims and deal with renewals of 
permits. It appealed the court ruling so it is still not accepting new applications. Since it is not offering 
the full range of services that an RRO should it is not a RRO by definition and the DHA officials have 
been referring to it as a ‘centre’, although for the sake of consistency the researcher continues to refer 
to it as a RRO. 
 
4.3.2 The South African Police Service 
Chapter 11 of the Constitution states that the SAPS, which is the national police service, is part of the 
security services of the country. Other security services include the defence force and intelligence 
agencies. According to Section 205 (3) of the Constitution, the objectives of the police service are “to 
prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants 
of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law” (Republic of South Africa, 
1996). The SAPS Act 68 of 1995 and SAPS Amendment Act 83 of 1998 further establish the powers 
and functions of the SAPS and Municipal Police Services. National legislation provides for policing in 
the three spheres of government, namely, national, provincial and local government. This study will 
focus on policing at the national and local government levels. This section addresses the national 
police, the SAPS, in Cape Town. The local government police in Cape Town, known as the Metro 
Police, will be addressed in the next section as it falls under local government.  
The SAPS falls under the executive authority of the Minister of Police (currently Nkosinathi Nhleko). 
The National Commissioner of Police (currently Mangwashi Phiyega) is responsible for the control 
and management of the SAPS. Both officials are appointed by the President. There is a SAPS head in 
each of the nine provinces whose title is Provincial Commissioner. Provincial Commissioners report to 
the National Commissioner. For this study the Western Cape Provincial Commissioner was contacted 
for an interview. He then referred the researcher to the Deputy Provincial Commissioner in charge of 
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operations who granted the researcher an interview. An organogram of the executive structure of 
SAPS is shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The South African Police Service executive structure 
Source: Adapted from SAPS website.34 
 
South Africa experiences exceptionally high rates of violent crime despite longitudinal analysis of 
crime statistics revealing a downward trend in crime (South African Police Service, 2012). The high 
crime rates have broadly been attributed to the legacy of apartheid and colonialism, and factors in 
post-apartheid South Africa, which reinforce the apartheid legacy (Centre for the Study of Violence 
and Reconciliation, 2009:5-10).  
The South African police force is frequently at the receiving end of public criticism and has struggled 
to project a professional image. Members of the police have been found to engage in crime and 
corruption at all levels. A former national police commissioner, Jackie Selebi, lost his job after he was 
charged and found guilty of corruption (News 24, 2010). The use of lethal force has become an 
established reality (The Guardian, 2013). This has hampered SAPS’ efforts to transform itself from its 
previous apartheid and militaristic orientation into community policing (Matshedisho, 2011:222). 
Generally, and when dealing with migrants, the police have been accused of replicating apartheid-era 
policing and justifying morally compromising practices as the fulfilment of duty (Vigneswaran, 
2011:166).  
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In March 2012 an eye-witness released video footage showing police officers assaulting a 
Mozambican taxi driver who they then dragged for metres attached to the back of their police van to 
the Daveyton Police Station. He later died a gruesome death in police custody (Zvomuya, 2013). In 
March 2014 two Cape Town policemen were caught on video assaulting a Nigerian man who had 
apparently been arrested following a robbery complaint. The video shows the two officers on a street 
in the central business district stripping the handcuffed man naked and then repeatedly punching and 
kicking him in the groin area (Phakathi, 2014). 
The police have also been accused of engendering impunity and complicit policing during and after 
xenophobic violence. For example, they were accused of doing little to protect Zimbabweans and not 
making a single arrest following the 2009 xenophobic violence in De Doorns in the Western Cape, 
where over 2,500 Zimbabweans were displaced and their property looted (Solidarity Peace Trust, 
2010:38). This was the largest xenophobic eruption since the 2008 national one where only a few 
perpetrators were arrested, and even fewer charged and convicted. 
Questions have been raised about the impact of SAPS’ involvement in immigration enforcement 
activities on its capacity to conduct its other duties. Vigneswaran and Duponchel (2009:2) have drawn 
attention to the diversion of large amounts of resources towards immigration policing in Gauteng 
Province at the expense of visible policing; the tension between SAPS responsibilities to police 
communities while at the same time protecting the country’s borders; and the negative impact of 
immigration policing on police integrity. 
What is the legal basis for police involvement in immigration policing? It is believed, on the one hand, 
that the immigration enforcement powers of the SAPS to search, arrest, detain and deport illegal 
foreigners are delegated by the DHA owing to a shortage of staff (Human Rights Watch, 2007:45-46). 
Section 3 of the Immigration Act permits the Minister and Director-General of Home Affairs to 
delegate some powers to other officers, employees and persons in the Public Service (Republic of 
South Africa, 2002). On the other hand, Section 41 of the Immigration Act is believed to be the key 
clause that outlines a role for the police in immigration enforcement (Vigneswaran & Duponchel, 
2009:4). Section 41 states that: 
When so requested by an immigration officer or a police officer, any person shall identify himself or 
herself as a citizen, permanent resident or foreigner, and if on reasonable grounds such immigration 
officer or police officer is not satisfied that such person is entitled to be in the Republic, such person 
may be interviewed by an immigration officer or police officer about his or her identity or status, and 
such immigration officer or police officer may take such person into custody without a warrant, and 
shall take reasonable steps, as may be prescribed, to assist the person in verifying his or her identity or 
status, and thereafter, if necessary detain him or her in terms of section 34 (Republic of South Africa, 
2002).   
Aglotsson and Klaaren (2003:3) observe that “police officials have interpreted the ‘reasonable 
grounds’ test as a right to arrest and detain persons who look or behave foreign, not illegal”, 
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particularly black foreigners. Whereas Section 41 empowers the SAPS to conduct a range of 
immigration enforcement activities Vigneswaran and Duponchel (2009:4) emphasise that the law does 
not oblige them to do so. This means that the Section 41 powers or police involvement in immigration 
enforcement are discretionary. Mosselson (2010:646-647) argues that Section 41 places all migrants, 
whether legal or illegal, in an exceptional and vulnerable space because anybody suspected of being a 
non-citizen can potentially be turned into an illegal person. 
 
4.3.3 Local government 
Chapter seven of the Constitution is dedicated to local government. In addition to the Constitution, the 
Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998, Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, Municipal Electoral 
Act 27 of 2000, Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003, 
and other supplementary legislation provide a comprehensive regulatory framework for local 
government. It is one of the three spheres of government, which are “distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated” (Republic of South Africa, 2006). South Africa is a unitary state which has federal 
features with the government constituted at national, provincial and local level. Section 152 of the 
Constitution outlines the purpose of local government as: 
a) To provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;  
b) To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;  
c) To promote social and economic development;  
d) To promote a safe and healthy environment; and  
e) To encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local 
government. (Republic of South Africa, 2006)  
Municipalities have extensive executive and legislative powers contained in Sections 156 and 229 of 
the Constitution. They include, inter alia:   
a) The right to administer the local government matters entrusted to it in schedules 4(B) and 5(B) of the 
Constitution; 
b) The authority to make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of the matters assigned 
to it, and to impose rates, taxes and surcharges for the services provided by, or on behalf of, the 
municipality;  
c) The right to develop and adopt policies, plans and strategies, promote development, and implement 
national and provincial legislation as assigned to it; and  
d) The right to do anything else within its legislative and executive competence. (Thornhill, 2008:73) 
The day-to-day municipal functions in schedules 4(B) and 5(B) of the Constitution are grouped 
according to functional areas and summarised in Table 4.1. The three shaded rows indicate the areas in 
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which the migrants interviewed in this study interacted with local government officials from the 
CoCT.  
Table 4.1: Functions of municipalities 
Functional Area  Description  
Water Services – Water and 
Sanitation  
Water supply services and sanitation services  
Electricity and Gas Reticulation  Electricity and gas reticulation, Street lighting  
Municipal Transport  Municipal public transport, Municipal airports, Pontoons, 
Ferries and harbours  
Waste Management  Refuse removal, Refuse dumps and solid waste disposal, 
Cleansing  
Roads and Stormwater Systems  Municipal roads, Stormwater systems in built-up areas  
Community and Social Services  Beaches and amusement facilities, Local amenities, Local 
sports facilities, Municipal parks and recreation, Public 
places, Cemeteries and crematoria, Child care facilities, 
Libraries, Museums 
Planning and Development  Municipal planning, Building regulations, Land use 
management, Property development (non-municipal 
property)  
Emergency Services  Fire fighting, Rescue services, Disaster management, 
Ambulance services  
Municipal Health  Municipal health, Licensing and control of undertakings that 
sell food to the public, Noise pollution, Pounds, 
Accommodation, Care and burial of animals, Licensing of 
dogs  
Primary Health Care  Primary health care facilities (e.g. day hospitals and clinics 
etc)  
Environmental Management  Environmental planning, Bio-diversity management, Climate 
change interventions, Alternative energy planning, Air 
pollution  
Economic Development  Local tourism, Markets, Abattoirs, Trading regulations, Street 
trading, Billboards and the display of advertisements in public 
places, Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public, 
Fencing and fences, Local economic development  
Housing  Housing facilitation (managing developers, housing lists etc), 
Acting as developer of housing projects, Landlord (owning 
and managing housing stock)  
Traffic and Policing  Traffic and municipal police, Community Safety, Control of 
public nuisances, Driver licensing, Motor vehicle licensing  
Source: Municipal Demarcation Board (2012:6-7).  
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Local government is made up of 278 municipalities, which cover the entire territory of South Africa. 
These include eight Category A (metropolitan) municipalities, 226 Category B (local) municipalities 
and 44 Category C (district) municipalities.35  
Municipal elections to elect councillors are held at intervals of not more than five years in accordance 
with the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 2000 and Regulations. In the Western Cape 
where this research is conducted, the Democratic Alliance – the official opposition party in parliament 
– won the most municipalities in the 2011 local government elections.36 It won seats in all but one of 
the municipalities in the province but not by a majority. Municipal elections are conducted using a 
mixed electoral system, i.e. on a 50% ‘first-past–the-post’ ward and 50% proportional representation 
basis (Zybrands, 2006:137). The councillors then elect officials to the various decision-making 
positions, which comprise the Speaker, Executive Mayor or members of the Executive Committee, 
and in some municipalities, members of permanent and ad hoc committees (Zybrands, 2006:139). 
Municipalities operate on the basis of an Integrated Development Plan, which is the strategic plan 
developed by every municipality. The main sources of local government finances are revenues 
generated by the municipality and an equitable share of national revenue.  
Local government is crucial to the realisation of many socio-economic rights not only of citizens but 
also of migrants. This is because the realisation of these rights requires state intervention and the use 
of public resources (Kabeer, 2005:2). However, local government performance varies greatly with 
some performing well and others performing poorly (Municipal Demarcation Board, 2012:151). 
Indeed, a large number of municipalities face major challenges in fulfilling their obligations. De 
Villiers (2008:18) attributes many of the service delivery challenges experienced by South Africans to 
“poor understanding of the Constitution, lack of training and coordination, and inadequate sharing of 
resources”. According to Cloete (2008:100-101), poor service delivery at the local government level is 
the result of weak leadership, political party turf wars and “the bad implementation of an appropriate 
(constitutional) system”. Zybrands (2006:149-150) states that several municipalities are in a precarious 
financial position due to a culture of non-payment for services, poor financial management and the 
lack of legal measures to enforce accountability. 
The poor performance of many municipalities has led to widespread and often violent community 
protests. Over the period 2007 to 2012 a total of 218 protests over poor service delivery were reported 
in the media second to 303 protests over land and housing (de Visser & Powell, 2012). Protestors were 
aggrieved by municipalities’ poor delivery of electricity, water, sanitation and transport infrastructure. 
The Multi-level Government Initiative shows that there has been a dramatic rise in the number of 
protests between 2007 and 2012 with 2012 having had more protests than 2011, and more protests 
than 2010 and 2011 combined (de Visser & Powell, 2012). In 2012 the Western Cape not only 
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 See Electoral Commission website 
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reported the highest number of protests but also the highest number of violent protests (de Visser & 
Powell, 2012).   
Having said that, the Western Cape has some of the best-performing municipalities in the country. The 
CoCT is the top ranked metro and seven out of the top-ten best-performing local municipalities are 
located in the Western Cape (Municipal IQ, 2013). This makes the province among the most 
productive in the country and hence attractive to both local and international migrants (Municipal IQ, 
2013).  
The CoCT has an estimated population of 3.2 million inhabitants. It is the only Category A (metro) 
municipality in the Western Cape Province, which has a total of 30 municipalities.37 The executive 
structure of the metropolitan municipality is shown in Figure 4.4 below. An interview was conducted 
with the City Manager, who has held this position since 2006. The City Manager is in charge of the 
municipality’s administration and is also the accounting officer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: The City of Cape Town executive structure 
Source: Adapted from City of Cape Town website.38 
 
The role of local government in the provision of services to migrants is not explicitly stated in the 
Refugees Act and the Immigration Act. However, the terms ‘everyone’ and ‘communities’, used in the 
Constitution and local government legislation respectively, imply that all categories of migrants are 
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 https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/Management/Documents/CoCT_Structure_130912.pdf [2013, December 
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included. The expectation that asylum seekers and refugees should live side by side with South 
African citizens as opposed to living in camps, where they receive specific services, suggests that they 
are expected to receive basic services in the same way that local communities do, which is through 
local government.  
The City Manager confirmed to the researcher that the municipality does not distinguish between 
citizens and non-citizens and is there to serve all residents of the CoCT (City Manager, respondent 
48). International migrants are therefore entitled to municipal services by virtue of the fact that they 
live in Cape Town. The fact that migrants have a right to access local government services does not 
mean that they are free of charge. Only primary healthcare facilities are accessible free of charge. All 
migrants interviewed in this study were renting private housing and they pay for water, electricity and 
refuse collection, which are provided by the municipality. Those who use the City’s public 
transportation system, MyCiti, pay for it. Migrants are thus expected to be self-sufficient by the state. 
The ability of migrants to support themselves is based on the right to work and the right to freedom of 
movement in the Constitution (African Centre for Migration and Society & Lawyers for Human 
Rights, 2013:37).  
Although all migrants receive services from the CoCT only a handful of them have had any encounter 
with municipal officials. Most migrants are tenants and the monthly rent that they pay covers their 
utilities such as water, refuse collection and electricity, which the tenant could also pay for directly 
using a pre-paid system, which does not entail any contact with a local government official. As a 
result, they do not have face-to-face contact with local government officials with regard to the basic 
services they receive in their homes. The number of migrants in this study who have had face-to-face 
interaction with CoCT officials are those who have made use of local clinics, those who operate 
businesses in the municipality and those who have come into contact with the Metro Police at 
roadblocks. The Metro Police are responsible for traffic control, policing municipal by-laws and 
regulations, and crime prevention. These are the areas highlighted in Table 4.1. 
Some local authorities have expressed the view that foreigners use scarce municipal resources meant 
for South Africans and are to blame for crime and violence (Palmary, 2002:17). This is similar to the 
broader perceptions of migrants in South Africa examined in Chapter 2 where their presence is widely 
seen as threatening the socio-economic rights and lives of South Africans. However, the lack of 
evidence to support these perceptions, alongside the reasons for poor service delivery presented above, 
suggest that migrants are used as scapegoats for the government’s shortcomings.  
The Cape Town City Manager holds a different view, which he shared with the researcher. According 
to him, international migrants are not a strain on the resources of the city, but rather the general influx 
of people and the rate at which the city is growing (City Manager, respondent 48). For him, these are 
challenges of urbanisation, which Cape Town is confronted with and the city has to plan to 
accommodate its growing population. Furthermore, he mentioned that the CoCT does not gather 
statistics on its migrant population as it is more concerned with the total population of the city not 
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where people come from. In planning for the city’s development, it works with future projections of 
population growth estimates.  
Additional contact between municipalities and migrants has occurred in the context of large scale 
attacks on foreigners none of which took place during this research. Violent outbreaks of xenophobia 
have compelled the Metro Police and Disaster Management to intervene in conflicts between South 
Africans and migrants living in the same communities, for example, by providing temporary shelters 
and food to displaced victims of xenophobic attacks. The CoCT established temporary camps to host 
foreigners who had been victims of the 2008 xenophobic attacks. Palmary (2002) states that the CoCT 
have revealed that they do not have the resources to provide such services in a sustainable manner and 
have also questioned whether providing such services to victims of xenophobic violence are within the 
domain of local government, provincial or national government. 
It is important to mention that this study did not venture into local government politics and focused on 
the administrative side of local government. Previous studies by Steinberg (2008), Misago (2011), 
Nieftagodien (2011) and Peberdy and Jara (2011), have linked local politics to xenophobic violence 
and the City Manager acknowledged that the role of politics in xenophobic violence in Cape Town 
cannot be disputed. He noted that some of the service delivery protests are genuine and others are 
politically instigated particularly around election time (City Manager, respondent 48). While the 
distinction between the administrative and political domains might not be explicit to those 
disadvantaged communities that protest about service delivery, this distinction is clear when it comes 
to foreigners. Migrants neither engage in local politics at the ward level nor take part in service 
delivery protests. This is because they are generally not reliant on the state for welfare and the quality 
of basic services they receive are determined by where they can afford to live. In urban areas in South 
Africa these services are bound to better than those provided by African governments in other African 
cities. However, a common aftermath of these protests is that migrants are targeted and their 
businesses are looted and their property destroyed.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter began by outlining the legal context that regulates the rights and obligations of migrants. 
The focus was on the Constitution, the Refugees Act and the Immigration Act. With regard to the 
Constitution, the focus was on the Bill of Rights and the provisions that establish the different tiers of 
government. The discussion on the Refugees Act and Immigration Act highlighted the legal categories 
covered under the respective Acts, i.e. asylum seekers and refugees in the former, and temporary 
residents, permanent residents and illegal foreigners in the latter. These are the potential targets of the 
state of exception. It then highlighted the rights and obligations of migrants stated in these laws. This 
section concluded that, according to the letter of the law, the South African laws grant migrants of 
different legal status a broad range of rights and protections. In fact, the Constitution and the Refugees 
Act are regarded as among the best in the world.  
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The chapter then turned to the three state institutions as possible agents of the exception. It outlined 
the situations and sites in which officials interact with migrants, or the potential spaces of the state of 
exception. Furthermore, it described the legislated functions of the DHA, SAPS and local government 
broadly and then in relation to the services they provide to migrants in particular. It also sketched a 
picture of the context within which these institutions operate and are perceived in terms of service 
delivery. Common to all of them are issues of capacity, skills, resources and delivery. It also noted 
some of the policy shifts in the asylum system being implemented by the DHA.   
By pointing out the regulatory and institutional environment in which the possible agents of the 
exception operate, the possible spaces of exception and the rights of migrants, this chapter has laid the 
basis for the presentation of the empirical data in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. This is in terms of 
analysing the practices of state officials in their dealings with African migrants, which may be 
inconsistent with the laws discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5: African migrants’ experiences with state officials  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is on the results of the ethnographic field research conducted between July 
and October 2013 in Cape Town, and whose methods were discussed in Chapter 1. It is informed by 
interview transcripts and field notes. This chapter is the first of two results chapters that answer the 
central research question which is: Do the practices of state officials as experienced by African 
migrants, reinforce xenophobia in South Africa? It is addressed through the following two sub-
questions:  
a) How are the practices of South African state officials experienced by African migrants? 
b) To what extent are African migrants treated differently by South African state officials in 
terms of their legal status or nationality? 
The state officials in question are those from the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) and the City of Cape Town (CoCT). The results are presented in order 
of the research questions above. The findings are presented with respect to the selected institutions 
starting with DHA officials, then SAPS officials and, lastly, CoCT officials.  
 
5.2 Experiences of African migrants with state officials 
The findings reported here are the outcome of the data analysis process outlined in Chapter 1. In order 
to answer the first research question the responses of migrants were analysed in their totality to 
interpret the way that they are generally treated by state officials. This was bearing in mind that in 
order to ensure objectivity, the interview questions were phrased in a neutral rather than a 
presumptuous manner. For example, what was your experience when you visited the DHA office? 
How were you treated by SAPS officials? This allowed a variety of responses with thick descriptions 
to emerge. Using Atlas.ti, the first step was to group all the experiences according to the three 
institutions. Secondly, the experiences were coded using short descriptive labels. Thirdly, the codes 
were grouped broadly into positive and negative experiences and reports generated for each state 
institution. Fourthly, a frequency test was run to see which experiences were cited most commonly. 
The results are analysed below. 
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5.2.1 Department of Home Affairs officials 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, all migrants interact with DHA officials as they rely on them to process 
and issue them with residency permits. Consequently, every migrant had had an experience with a 
DHA official in a DHA office, SA embassy or at street level when DHA officials were going about 
immigration enforcement. During the interviews, respondents were asked to talk about the treatment 
they received when they visited the RRO or DHA offices. The responses were mixed.  
Firstly, a small group of migrants described their experiences as sometimes positive and sometimes 
negative. Speaking about customer service they stated that the treatment varied depending on the 
individual official, with some treating them well and some not treating them well. This suggests that 
there was no consistency and predictability in the way they expected to be treated whenever they 
visited the DHA as shown by the quotes below:  
It depends on the actual official. I know the ones in Cape Town and I know the ones who are 
nice and the ones who are not so I always pray that I get a nice one. In Zim they are not as 
nice as the nice ones in Cape Town. They are not very happy to see us. I can’t say they are 
evil but they are not nice. (Zimbabwean woman, respondent 2) 
Sometimes you can go and be lucky. I am planning to go there but I don’t know. If they are in 
a good mood they can extend. If not, they will not. (Malawian woman, respondent 11) 
Secondly, migrants said they had positive experiences. These were described in terms of customer 
service and in the success of permit applications. Some examples of each of these from both DHA 
offices and RRO are quoted below.   
The service is fine. The only thing is that you have to queue. (Mozambican man, respondent 
15) 
I’ve never met anyone who has ever applied for a permit and had it declined. (Zimbabwean 
woman, respondent 2) 
That time they were still in Foreshore where they are now. There I get my first asylum 
seeker… There was no problem. When they close the Foreshore office, they move it to 
Nyanga… I just went there I think twice to extend my asylum and then after that I was booked 
for interview. So I went for interview, I was issued or granted refugee status. Ja, I didn’t have 
any complications or any bad experience of Home Affairs myself. When my wife came from 
DRC, also she didn’t have any problem. I brought her there and it was already on their file, so 
they check the file and everything and then they issue her permit as well. (Congolese man, 
respondent 23) 
There was a very dedicated lady at DHA. She said after 6 months I will give you status. Then I 
received 2 years status and after that 4 years. Personally I have had no problem. The way they 
treat me is not like how others are treated. They assist me. I know how to express myself and 
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speak for my rights. Some refugees can’t express themselves well. That’s a big problem. 
(Ethiopian man, respondent 35).  
Interestingly, what the last quotation above suggests is that even though the migrant had experienced 
being treated well he was aware that he was somewhat of an exception. The migrant also implies that 
it is not only because of the individual official that he was treated well but also because he was able to 
assert himself. It is also worth noting that he had only recently moved to Cape Town and his 
experience was with the RRO in Port Elizabeth. This respondent’s experience also suggests that even 
though migrants have rights, it does not necessarily mean that those rights are recognised by state 
officials and migrants may be required to assert their rights in order for those rights to be respected.  
Thirdly, and for the most part, migrants reported negative experiences during their encounters with 
DHA officials. One respondent claimed that most officials do not treat migrants well and those who do 
are the exception. He was speaking from his experience when he worked at the RRO. 
You see a few that they are very quiet, very humble when you talk to them, one or two. If you 
have twenty, two of them are nice, eighteen is nonsense. Very, very rude... (Somali man, 
respondent 26)  
Negative experiences reported by migrants ranged from poor customer service, verbal and physical 
abuse and unfair treatment to generally ill treatment as a result of their foreignness. Examples of each 
are provided below. 
In terms of poor customer service, migrants gave examples where the officials were slow to attend to 
them or were rude to them.   
There is people that have got babies, there is old people… but they don’t help them. They just 
busy with Whatsapp and Facebook. (Ugandan woman, respondent 30) 
I heard one day at Home Affairs an official saying to a refugee, but ‘I didn’t ask you to be a 
refugee’ and that’s not an answer they should give to a person… Maybe I didn’t understand 
what was the question but that’s the answer she gave. Whatever was the question that’s not 
the correct answer. (Angolan man, respondent 34) 
There is one official there who is very rude… His name is Luyanda. One day I was even 
thinking of calling the minister because there is no help for us. Sitting in front of him he starts 
insulting you, chasing people. He starts asking you ‘what are you doing here? why don’t you 
go back to your country?’ He is still there. Most of us we know him but we don’t know where 
to complain. One day we even complain to the manager but he is doing nothing. (Congolese 
man, respondent 21) 
The above quotes are also a demonstration that migrants felt powerless at the hands of frontline DHA 
officials. In the first two excerpts, the migrants share their observations of how other migrants have 
been poorly treated in their presence as if to show that it is normal for migrants to be treated poorly. 
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The first quotation implies that mothers with children and the elderly, who would normally get priority 
service, are treated no better.  One of the migrants just quoted went further to narrate the verbal abuse 
and humiliation he suffered from a DHA official when he went to apply for family reunification after 
his wife had joined him later from the DRC.  
He started insulting me in front of my wife. I cried that day. He said to me, ‘this is a street 
woman. You took a street woman, it’s not your wife’. I had a letter from UCT Law Clinic 
stating that this woman is my wife. I got married to her in DRC... I showed the letter to that 
guy, he threw it away. I went to pick it there… Until now they never join my wife to me. She is 
still holding an asylum seeker. I have tried twice they are refusing. (Congolese man, 
respondent 21) 
Migrants revealed having been assaulted by DHA officials and the security guards, who are not state 
officials but are from a private security company that has been hired by the DHA. One key informant 
confirmed that such incidents are commonly reported to them (Community Liaison Officer at 
PASSOP, respondent 47).  
They slap sometimes… They kick in your face. (Ethiopian man, respondent 36) 
I saw the securities beating people.  (Rwandan man, respondent 28) 
Such brutality illustrates power relations at play between officials and migrants. It is an example of 
abuse of power and of officials acting as a law unto themselves.   
Migrants also spoke of just being treated unfairly in decisions about their legal status: 
We are treated unfairly by DHA. It’s not the law. It’s not only me. I know people who have 
been living here for 10 years and they still have asylum papers. (Congolese man, respondent 
33) 
Finally, some migrants used what could be regarded as strong language to highlight the plight of 
migrants at the mercy of DHA officials. It also shows that their legal status is taken for granted and 
officials treat them as they please:   
That place is terrible! They treat people like criminals! ...The staff there, I don’t know how 
they perceive a refugee. You know when they look at you they see you as nothing. They talk to 
you the way they like. (Ugandan woman, respondent 31) 
They are either inhuman or they are ignorant… They lack this empathy. I was actually 
reading about the slave trade yesterday and it sort of brought back how people were 
dehumanised and all that and brought back to me this thing of Home Affairs. You are not seen 
as a person, you are seen as this thing that is there to be accommodated, but reluctantly. 
(Rwandan woman, respondent 29)  
You go into Home Affair you are like a slave. Serious, they are like treating someone as a 
slave because…you are a refugee, you are seeking for a refugee, you are a foreigner. That’s 
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the reason why… Talking about the attitude of the people there, you know, the people that are 
trying to attend to us. Those people, some of them they don’t have manner of approach or they 
like taking advantage…because we don’t even have anything to say even if they are insulting 
us because there’s something we need there from them. They will just bring down our self to 
do whatever thing they want us to do. (Nigerian man, respondent 17) 
I see others how they are treated, it’s inhuman. The time I was like working there you have to 
accompany women who are pregnant. Some they were pushed, squashed, almost 
miscarriages, people who faint on the queue. There was even a guy who died. (Burundi 
woman, respondent 37) 
The Burundian migrant quoted above had worked as an interpreter at the Cape Town RRO and 
observed on a daily basis the interaction between migrants and DHA staff. The fact that three of the 
four migrants quoted above who reported such treatment, even though they have refugee status, is 
concerning. This is because in terms of rights, refugees are afforded almost the same rights as 
permanent residents, whose rights are the same as citizens with few exceptions. Yet in practice, their 
treatment does not match up to their legal status, which means that the treatment is based on the fact 
that the migrants are non-citizens regardless of the legal identity they have been granted by the state, 
which should translate into better treatment. Their experiences would not be surprising if they were 
illegal foreigners as their status tends to be criminalised and that is used to justify denying them their 
dignity as human beings, even when such treatment is unlawful.  
The negative experiences reported thus far resonate with Agamben’s notion of bare life where certain 
lives are treated as not worth living or protecting. They are also examples of the state treating migrants 
as undesirable and singling them out for harassment as Mngxitama (2008:195-196) has noted in his 
analysis of race, class and nation in South Africa.  
To sum up, it is worth pointing out that the above experiences have little if anything to do with 
bureaucratic issues or the institutional challenges facing the DHA outlined in Chapter 4. Instead, they 
have to do with the perceptions that DHA officials have of migrants, their treatment of these migrants, 
and the power relations between state officials and migrants.  
 
5.2.2 South African Police Service officials 
Migrants who had encountered the police had done so in police stations, on the streets and in their 
homes and businesses. As with the DHA, migrants’ experiences with SAPS officials were mixed.   
The positive experiences were almost entirely in cases where the migrants went to the police to get 
affidavits, police clearance and certification of documents. Migrants expressed satisfaction in how 
these administrative services were provided by the police. A few positive examples related to the 
response of the police to migrants who were victims of crime. For example, a Somali woman 
(respondent 25) appreciated the role of the Delft police who came to her aid when her shop was being 
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looted by transporting her together with her goods to Bellville. A Burundian woman (respondent 37) 
said that despite an initial reluctance by the police to open a docket after she went to report having 
been physically assaulted, they arrested the perpetrator and he was later charged in a court of law.  
Migrants spoke of their negative experiences in terms of police unresponsiveness and ineffectiveness; 
impunity; extortion and harassment. Each of these are addressed in turn. The most common complaint 
mentioned was the unresponsiveness and ineffectiveness of the police. For instance, respondents 
talked about the police coming when it was too late or not at all and the police not investigating their 
cases. There were other complaints regarding impunity from sanction of those who stole from or 
attacked migrants, and abuses of power displayed in the manner in which the police raided migrants’ 
homes and businesses, exploited and extorted them. Others spoke of being threatened and harassed or 
intimidated by the police. Lastly, the police were accused of not being impartial. Some of these 
experiences come up again as practices that constitute a state of exception and/or xenophobia in 
Chapter 6. 
One migrant’s experience elaborates on the unresponsiveness and delayed response of the police:  
I was attacked and bitten by dogs on the way to the shop and the owner just came out and took the 
dogs inside and did nothing. I went to the police and they said ‘sorry we can’t help you, just go to 
the hospital’. The second time I was ‘arrested’ at the Retreat Station after I found that I had lost 
my ticket. I was going to buy another but they said no, I had to pay a fine. The security guard 
handcuffed me, took me to a room, smacked me and do all kind of nonsense. While they were 
attacking they were telling me that I have to go back to my country. After three hours they kicked 
me out and I went to the police station by the train station and they said ‘no, we’re only here for 
metro-rail people. We don’t help any other people’. The third time, three guys robbed me on my 
way home from school. I saw a police van and I told them those guys had just robbed me they said 
‘sorry, we can’t help you’ and the guys who robbed me were there. (Congolese man, respondent 
19) 
On impunity, an Ethiopian man (respondent 36) said that locals can get away with robbing a foreigner. 
Firstly, they think that there is nothing that the foreigner can do and secondly, even if the police come 
and arrest them they will soon be released. Another migrant reported: 
If you look into the incident last year, I think in Bishop Lavis… Somali shops have been looted and 
petrol bombed… There was one media which took some pictures and they were showing that the 
police were just standing while the people were looting the shops. (Kenyan man, respondent 39) 
On extortion, a key informant and migrant explained what happens when police conduct searches and 
raids:  
The locals are aware that these people are having money in their houses and money on them and 
now that’s where the police is doing a lot of havoc. They go to people, for instance, those who are 
running shops. They will come and pretend they are looking for guns, they will take out the money 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
112 
 
and people can’t go to police to report because the same police who are looting them are the 
police you want to report to. (Advocacy Officer at ARESTA, respondent 45) 
I was at home one night and I saw six police officers. They came and said that they received 
information that there is somebody selling drugs. I told them we are from DRC and we don’t do 
that so they started searching the house. I was so disappointed cause I used to keep my two 
pornography DVDs and my wife didn’t know about them. They picked them and put them in my 
DVD player and they start watching them in front of my wife and three year old child. I told them 
it’s not right, what they’re doing is not right. I never watch this with my wife. They said ‘this is not 
your country’. (Congolese man, respondent 21) 
Lastly, in terms of negative experiences migrants spoke of police harassment:   
I was coming to report an incident that happened to me… I was attacked in the shop and it 
was actually a physical attack and some things were damaged…and my cousin who was with 
me was injured and I was trying to report that … So instead of helping me there was this 
police officer who was giving me a history of who we are and how we live in South Africa, and 
why we should leave, and all these things. So when I challenged him, he threatened me and 
told me, ‘look here I am the one who is opening dockets here and I am the one who is 
investigating cases. If you argue with me or challenge me I am not going to help you at all and 
you can do nothing’. I told him, ‘you are not the only police officer and this is not the only 
police station. I am going to move to another police station and I am going to he helped while 
you are still here and I can be without you’. (Kenyan man, respondent 40) 
Migrants attributed their negative experiences with SAPS officials to general police ineffectiveness, 
geographical location, the fact that they were not from South Africa, and to the personalities of 
individual SAPS officials. In the case of general ineffectiveness of the police force, migrants did not 
see their experiences as different from those of many citizens and thus share in the lack of public 
confidence in the police force that exists in South Africa. As discussed in Chapter 4, the country 
experiences high rates of crime and the police are known to be corrupt and have been guilty of also 
engaging in criminal activities. Some migrants even went as far as stating that it is a waste of time to 
report a crime to the police.  
In the case of geographical location, migrants were suggesting that better resourced areas had better 
policing. This highlights another challenge faced by the police, that of resources. So while in theory 
the police are duty bound to protect everyone, they do not always have the necessary capacity to do so. 
They noted that those in the suburbs tended to have better responses from the police than those dealing 
with police in the townships as exemplified in the quote below. By extension, migrants also felt safer 
and less prone to crime in the suburbs than in the townships.   
I was staying in Plumstead. I know in Plumstead when you call the police they don’t take time, 
they will come quick. But I’m more interested to see the dynamics between someone who’s in 
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Plumstead and someone who’s in Gugulethu. (Congolese man, respondent 32) 
Maybe if I get robbed in Blouberg, cause it’s a nice area the cops might be more professional 
but if I get robbed in Khayelitsha or De Noon the cops might not act the same cause I’m not 
from there. I’ve seen that happen. (Zimbabwean man, respondent 3) 
By migrants ascribing their negative experiences with the police to the ineffectiveness of the police 
and the residential area of the migrants, they are showing that the South African state is unable to 
provide security, the most critical public good, uniformly to its citizens let alone non-citizens.   
Thirdly, migrants attributed their poor treatment by SAPS officials to their foreignness. For instance, 
they talked about how the police picked up on their foreign accents while speaking to them on the 
phone and as a result failed to arrive at the crime scene or to assist them. One migrant respondent who 
works with migrants gave the example of what he had heard from fellow migrants. 
When the husband pick a phone and call the police and when the accent, the English it’s 
mixed French or Swahili, it’s a problem. The ambulance sometime will not come. I don’t have 
really evidence but you know we have to sometime respect what the person is saying. And to 
say the ambulance doesn’t come but compare when the same person take the phone and give 
to a citizen neighbour and talk in a few minute the ambulance is there or the police. 
(Congolese man, respondent 32) 
Another migrant seemed to confirm that such things do happen:  
I was calling police and what I notice when they hear that it’s a foreigner talking over the 
phone, they not take it serious. (Congolese man, respondent 24) 
Since English is one of the official languages in South Africa, one would expect that the ability of 
migrants to speak English would give them a sense of inclusion and enable them to access services 
easily. However, it seems that their ability to speak English is used to exclude them in certain 
instances. Apparently, the use of English when speaking to a black South African is an indicator of 
being a foreigner because of the tendency of black South Africans to speak to fellow blacks in the 
indigenous African languages. When migrants speak to officials of other races in English, it is their 
foreign English accents that are the basis for discrimination. So, the inability of migrants to speak 
indigenous South African languages spoken in the area where they reside and their English accents are 
used by officials to single out migrants as not belonging to South Africa. These are the irrational 
standards that the police and immigration officials apply to determine foreignness as also observed by 
Morris (1998) and Harris (2001), and which are evidence of institutional xenophobia.  
Interestingly, migrants who spoke about xenophobic police went further to single out black or Xhosa 
police as particularly disliking foreigners and being unhelpful towards them adding that their 
experiences with coloured and white policemen were better. 
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Honestly, I think they ignore it because I am a foreigner. Don’t go Steenberg Police Station. 
They’re not gonna help you as a foreigner. Believe me. Go to Muizenberg. But if you go to 
Muizenberg you find the Xhosa polices, you just wasting your time. It’s better you find a 
colored one or a white one. The first investigation, everything was written by a Xhosa. He 
never even contacted me but the second one it was a coloured one and he did contact me. He 
did try his best but that one never. (Malawian woman, respondent 10) 
I think the white and the coloured are understanding but the black they don’t like us, they say 
go back to your country. (Ugandan woman, respondent 30) 
These remarks ironically reveal how the same blacks who were historically oppressed in South 
Africa’s racist history have now taken on the character of their ex-oppressor towards African migrants 
(Matsinhe, 2011). It also suggests a narrow definition of belonging or citizenship by black South 
Africans based on autochthony, which alienates not only African migrants but also citizens who are 
not black.  
In the excerpts below, migrants reported how they were treated negatively because of their 
foreignness. They bemoaned the fact that foreigners generally, and members of the Somali and 
Ethiopian communities particularly, had been injured or lost their lives in what they believe were hate 
crimes, but no action had been taken by the police simply because they were foreigners.  
In Capricorn it was every weekend the foreigners dead and we never see the police 
investigate. (Malawian woman, respondent 10) 
A lot of people have been killed here and the police are not taking any proper action. There is 
too many dockets, files of Somalis who have been killed, Somalis who have been robbed, 
Somalis who have been injured, Somalis who have been looted… and I think police are very 
well aware of this. Even the leadership they are very much well aware of this. There is 
nothing, there is no development in the whole thing and we have even gone to them several 
times and complained to them. (Kenyan man, respondent 39)  
I have seen this six years more than ten Ethiopians bodies being sent home... That is why I 
decided to run out of township... So the inspectors, what what, they never found anyone from 
all of them…They take the body but afterwards when forensics or the ones taking body they 
take then the case goes zero. No response will come afterwards. Police! There isn’t any that I 
can say they found the criminals or the person who shot and this one is sentenced for this. 
Never been. (Ethiopian man, respondent 36) 
The non-responsiveness of the police to crimes committed against foreigners was echoed by one key 
informant respondent: 
On Monday and Tuesday two Somalis were attacked by gun wielding youths who robbed them 
and apparently shot them as well and the police is 500 meters from where the incident 
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happened and they told them they didn’t have a car to go and attend to the incident. They 
don’t need a car; they can just walk up there. It’s not far. (Community Liaison Officer at 
PASSOP, respondent 47) 
Furthermore, migrants stated that the police displayed xenophobic attitudes and verbally abused them. 
Some police are very helpful but others are very negative. When it comes to helping the 
foreigners they have got the very negative perception. Unless if they see you that you are a bit, 
maybe sometimes educated, or maybe you are going with someone who is a citizen, that time 
maybe they might help you, but if you go alone in many cases they usually do not, they don’t 
treat you very nicely. (Kenyan man, respondent 39) 
The police are rude with us foreigners... He said, you are kwerekwere, he shouted at me. He 
said so many things, you are for Mugabe. It was the first time I saw a policeman shouting 
that’s why I think they are rude. If I was South African they would never have done that. 
(Zimbabwean woman, respondent 7) 
According to police issues we are facing a lot of problems. And sometimes the police will not 
talk to you...not respect you as a human being. They are the ones saying kwerekwere. (Somali 
man, respondent 26) 
‘Oh you are a refugee, you don’t have something to eat in your own country, you run away, 
and now you have eaten our bread and now you look nice and good…Your physical 
appearance, you have changed it. I have seen how your people die from the TV because of 
hunger’. I have heard that from police officers. (Kenyan man, respondent 40) 
It seems that the police take the categories of migrants and the corresponding rights for granted seeing 
them simply as foreigners or amakwerekwere.  In addition, they have little incentives to protect 
migrants. This is not only due to institutional xenophobia but also because they are aware of the 
broader public sentiment on migrants and so they can get away with discriminatory attitudes and 
practices towards migrants.   
There are two elements to the way that negative treatment is linked to foreignness from the above. One 
aspect has to do with xenophobia, where the foreigner is disliked because of not meeting the criteria 
for membership of the national body and is thus an alien body. The use of the derogatory term 
kwerekwere also symbolises the ‘othering’ of African migrants at the level of the state. It also points to 
broad xenophobia, which according to Harris (2001) is based on foreignness relative to South African 
nationality. Then there is the aspect where the migrant’s life is viewed as not having any worth which 
translates into the migrant being this powerless or defenceless individual. Some police officers regard 
migrants as the underdogs of society who can be trampled on by the police and citizens. Worth 
highlighting are the reported deaths of Somalis and Ethiopians due to alleged hate crimes and the 
police inaction and impunity of perpetrators that followed. This indicates that migrants are killable, 
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which relates to Agamben’s explanation that bare life is ‘bare’ because it can be taken without any 
intervention of the law and without anyone incurring the guilt of murder.39 
Finally, migrants attributed their experiences with SAPS officials to the individual official they came 
across. In other words, they avoided making any generalisations about SAPS officials. One key 
informant acknowledged just as the migrants did that “there are good apples and bad apples” 
(Director at CTRC, respondent 41). 
 
5.2.3 City of Cape Town officials 
As already pointed out in Chapter 4, although migrants receive services from the CoCT, they have 
little face-to-face interaction with the officials. The few migrants who reported any direct encounters 
said that these were with health workers at public health facilities, with officials at the Civic Centre 
and with the Metro Police in their businesses or at road blocks. Their experiences were also mixed. 
In terms of positive experiences, one migrant said that he was satisfied with the service he had 
received when he went to register his business. Other migrants spoke positively of the health officials. 
They said that they were treated the same way that they saw South Africans being treated, that they 
faced no problem of acceptance and that the service was good. Two other migrants spoke positively of 
the basic services they receive from the CoCT notwithstanding the fact that they had never 
encountered any officials from there. One acknowledged with appreciation that the services they 
receive in the township where he lives are better than those he received from the government in his 
home country (Zimbabwean man, respondent 4). The other stated that regardless of the shortcomings 
in service delivery, South Africa was doing better than other African countries (Mozambican man, 
respondent 14). 
Some migrants and key informants seemed to confuse public hospitals (which fall under provincial 
government) with public clinics (which fall under local government). This was evident when they 
spoke of the negative treatment of pregnant women at the hands of nurses in government hospitals 
because municipal clinics do not offer maternity facilities. Nevertheless, their experiences are worth 
including.  
Nurses are saying ‘these refugees are making rubbish to our country. Why you making kids and 
why you get pregnant each and every year? You are making us poor’.  (Somali man, respondent 
26). 
They say, ‘Every year you come here to give birth, you’re making the cost of living higher and 
higher’. (Somali woman, respondent 27) 
A key informant also confirmed the migrants’ experiences with health workers in public hospitals: 
                                                     
39
 Agamben (1998:82) gets his notion of bare life from the ancient Roman figure of homo sacer who may be 
killed and yet not sacrificed. 
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They are always accused of coming here to give birth so that they would access grants, which is a 
lie. It’s a lie. I saw that on TV sometime and I wanted to complain honestly because there was an 
article that said Zimbabweans cross the border and give birth in South Africa so that they would 
claim grants. It’s not the case. (Community Liaison Officer at PASSOP, respondent 47) 
The above accusations are part of the negative discourse that constructs migrants as a threat. They 
reflect the contest over resources that citizens feel only they are entitled to. Furthermore, the scarcity 
of these resources is implied by suggesting that migrants benefit from state services at the expense of 
citizens, whether or not they are paying for these services or have a right to them.  
Another example of negative experiences was related to extortion. These experiences came from 
migrants who were operating or had previously operated businesses, as well as a key informant. They 
were similar to migrants’ experiences of extortion by SAPS officials discussed earlier. This shows that 
migrants who run businesses are soft targets for law enforcement officials wishing to take advantage 
of them.   
Finally, one migrant narrated how she experienced a xenophobic attitude from the Metro Police after 
she was found to be driving without her driving licence at a police road block. The migrant was not 
stopped because of her nationality but when the policeman discovered that she was not South African, 
probably due to her accent and her inability to speak Xhosa, he became hostile. Her experience is also 
an example of the inability to objectively distinguish between African migrants and black South 
Africans at face value.  
One day I left my driving permit at home then there was a road block. They stopped me and 
ask for my driving licence. I say I left it at home. He say, ‘we are tired of you people, you 
foreigners. I don’t know why you don’t go back to your country, what’s happening in your 
country?’ The guy was very cross my friend. We argue, I say, brother, I never do something to 
you, what’s the problem? You don’t need to argue with me if I don’t have a driving licence. 
You know what you are supposed to do.’ (Ugandan woman, respondent 30) 
All of the above experiences contained in this section can be summarised as follows in order to answer 
the first research question: the experiences of migrants with state officials were mixed. In some 
instances, migrants had positive experiences with state officials and in other instances they had 
negative experiences. Furthermore, the positive and negative experiences were not balanced when it 
came to the DHA and SAPS. Experiences with officials from these two institutions were heavily 
skewed towards the negative. The worst experiences migrants had were by far with DHA officials 
especially those at the RRO, followed by those with SAPS officials. Migrants’ experiences with CoCT 
officials, however limited they were, were more balanced between positive and negative.   
The findings show that state officials are not impartial when discharging their duties. This is despite 
the existence of service delivery standards for state officials, for instance the Batho Pele principles, 
which include courteous treatment of all customers. Migrants experiences with state officials were the 
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result of the officials’ own perceptions of migrants. Such perceptions included their own interpretation 
of the power relations between them and migrants and their own first impressions of individual 
migrants. Migrants also stated that they felt less prone to crime and negative treatment from SAPS 
officials in particular, in suburbs than in townships implying that a migrant’s socio-economic status 
and residential area were possible determinants of how they experienced particular state officials.  
The finding that migrants had mostly negative experiences with state officials is not surprising. 
Chapter 2 has already pointed out the negative attitudes towards migrants, particularly those of 
African origin, that prevail in South Africa. This finding can be seen as a reflection of that at the level 
of the state. It also an indication that things do not seem to have changed over time as state officials 
generally continue to treat migrants poorly. Further analysis and theorisation of the negative 
experiences of migrants will be conducted under subsequent research questions. In the next section, 
which is an extension of the research question just addressed, the researcher investigates if there were 
any nuances, along the lines of migrant categories or migrant’s nationality, that could be observed in 
how state officials treated migrants. 
 
5.3 Differential treatment of African migrants by state officials 
This section answers the research question: to what extent are African migrants treated differently by 
South African state officials in terms of their legal status or nationality? In order to answer this 
question, the researcher used the Atlas.ti query tool to filter all the experiences (positive and negative) 
of migrants according to the five legal categories of migrants sampled. In addition, the experiences of 
migrants were filtered according to the 13 different nationalities. The results are presented below in 
order of state institution. 
 
5.3.1 Department of Home Affairs officials 
Although the focus of the research question was on differential treatment on the basis of legal status 
and nationality, migrants also pointed out differential treatment based on race and differential 
treatment between migrants and citizens, which are worth stating before moving on to the findings on 
the specific research question. According to one migrant, race or colour plays a role in how they are 
treated by DHA officials: 
An England or white woman or an American white man in Home Affairs is a privileged client, 
even Chinese. I happened to see Chinese applying for asylum although by law it’s debatable 
but Chinese at Maitland Home Affairs were given certain priorities and people from 
Bangladesh. (Congolese man, respondent 32)  
This quote alludes to Afrophobia or negrophobia, which is a more appropriate term for xenophobia in 
the context of South Africa where it is racialised. It also implies that migrants are aware that the racial 
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dynamics in South Africa affect not only citizens but also foreigners. The migrant cited above is 
essentially pointing out that there is a ranking of races with white migrants being at the top, closely 
followed by Asian migrants and then black migrants at the bottom. Gqola (2008:221) and Bekker 
(2010:136) recognise this differential treatment extended to migrants and associate it with stereotypes 
of the different migrants. White migrants are viewed as investors and tourists, hence bringing 
something positive to South Africa, while black migrants are seen as criminals and freeloaders (Gqola, 
2008). These are, however, unexamined prejudicial attitudes as there a number of examples that do not 
fit within the stereotypes. For instance, the media has reported about mafia type crimes committed by 
Eastern Europeans living in South Africa and there are several Nigerian and Congolese doctors 
working in South Africa.  
The researcher then asked him if he had observed any differences in the way black people were treated 
by DHA officials. He said that black migrants were generally treated poorly. However, if a black 
person looks good and makes an impression he is treated well.  
Black, you must have money and you must have power, people who we call in French 
‘impressionist’- people who impress you. They look nice, will put a suit, nice cut hair and nice 
perfume. African people some of them need that. (Congolese man, respondent 32) 
Another migrant compared how asylum seekers and refugees are treated at the RRO to how South 
African citizens are treated at the civic offices. From his assessment below, the staff are courteous to 
citizens and rude to foreigners. He attributed the poor treatment of migrants at the RRO to xenophobic 
attitudes within DHA staff arguing that xenophobia does not have to be physical, that is can be mental 
(Ethiopian man, respondent 36). 
If you go to the Department of Home Affairs in town, the one which deals with South African 
citizens, there are proper seats, there is a proper line, no one will shout at you. ‘My sister’, 
‘my brother’, ‘sir’, ‘madam’ and ‘miss’ that is how you are called in the line. But here even if 
he is old, no ‘sir’ here. ‘Don’t go there’, ‘hey you, come here’. (Ethiopian man, respondent 
36) 
Although this research did not sample citizens in order to compare whether or not they are treated 
differently from migrants, the above quotation suggests that officials treat citizens better than 
migrants. From the above quote, one gets the impression that the migrants who are served at the DHA 
office have better facilities and probably better client service because the office primarily provides 
civic services to citizens and that if the RRO also served citizens, migrants’ experiences might have 
had similar facilities and services as the DHA office. The respondent above is also aware that 
xenophobia is not only expressed through violence towards foreigners but also through other subtle 
ways. 
The findings of the previous research question were that most migrants experienced DHA officials 
negatively rather than positively with a few exceptions. In terms of the second stated research 
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question, the experiences with DHA officials were first analysed in relation to the legal categories to 
see if certain categories were treated better or worse than others. The data showed that all negative 
experiences came from asylum seekers, refugees and illegal foreigners. The other negative experiences 
were confirmed by the key informant organisations, whose clients are almost exclusively asylum 
seekers and refugees. There were also migrants who reported both good and bad experiences from the 
categories of refugee, temporary resident and illegal foreigner. They said that the treatment they 
received was not consistent. Sometimes they were treated well and sometimes not. They said it 
depended on the individual one encountered. Positive experiences were reported by asylum seekers, 
temporary residents and a key informant.  
The data revealed differences in the way migrants were treated by DHA officials based on legal 
standing. This has to do with the administrative distinction the government makes between migrants 
that fall under the Refugees Act and those that fall under the Immigration Act. Asylum seekers and 
refugees are served at the RRO. There is only one RRO in the Western Cape Province located in the 
Cape Town Business District. Temporary and permanent residents are served in selected Home Affairs 
offices, which mainly exist to provide civic services to citizens but also serve migrants. As stated 
earlier, there are two in the Cape Town Metro which perform immigration functions – the Bellville 
Home Affairs office and the Provincial headquarters in central Cape Town.  
The findings, which also include the researcher’s personal observations, suggest that the distinction is 
not merely administrative. There are differences in the facilities that these offices have, the manner in 
which services are provided and the way migrants experience them. The researcher visited the RRO on 
two occasions. The first time there were was a very long queue outside the office. Access to the main 
service area was denied by the security guards because entry is only permitted upon presentation of an 
asylum seeker or refugee permit. However, she was able to access a different service area. This area 
also had long queues flowing out of the building. Inside there was a reception area which was crowded 
and the room was stuffy. There were also service cubicles. A few of them had DHA officials in them 
serving clients. However, there were more which either had an official without a client or were just 
empty. It was difficult to make out what services clients were waiting for as there are no signs. When 
the researcher tried to inquire from those in the queue they said that that area was for those who 
required other services other than the routine asylum permit extension. For example, those who had to 
pay fines for having expired permits.  
The second time the researcher visited the RRO it was less crowded. There was only one queue 
overflowing to the outside unlike the previous time. This queue was not from the main service area but 
from the same area that had been previously visited. It was just like it was the last time. In addition, 
the researcher noticed that the corridor and staircase where the queue had spilled over were littered 
with empty plastic cups and plastic bags and wrappings from food and drinks consumed by the clients. 
Migrants spoke of the unpleasant environment at the RRO. The toilets are filthy, migrants spend long 
hours standing in queues and because of the crowds it is very prone to chaos.  
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The crowding at the RRO could be partly be explained by the fact that it is the only one in the 
province that serves asylum seekers and refugees while there are at least two offices that serve 
temporary and permanent residents. Other explanatory factors include the fact that the RRO issues 
permits with shorter validity periods compared to those issued by the DHA offices which means that 
migrants served at the RRO – asylum seekers in particular – have to make regular visits to the RRO. 
The crowds can also be explained by the fact that asylum seekers and refugees have to appear in 
person to apply for documents while migrants served at the DHA do not always have to do so. Finally, 
the crowding at the RRO has been linked to bureaucratic inefficiencies such as poor staff supervision, 
high staff absenteeism and sudden changes to office procedures. 
The two other DHA offices visited were accessible without presentation of any identification. The 
immigration sections at the DHA offices in Bellville and Cape Town are clearly demarcated from the 
civic sections thus making it easy to identify the foreigners. The immigration section in Bellville 
consists of two service counters, a waiting area, interview rooms and offices all of which are clearly 
labelled. On the afternoon that the researcher visited it was very quiet with only a handful of clients. 
The Cape Town office has a much larger immigration section. In fact the entire first floor is only for 
immigration. It is made up of a waiting area and several service counters which are clearly marked. 
The waiting area was not being used and clients were queuing at the respective counters. It was much 
busier than the Bellville office and some of the counters had queues but not as long as those at the 
RRO. In all three offices it was noted that some DHA officials wore uniforms and name tags while 
others did not.   
The Home Affairs offices are more orderly, cleaner and more aesthetically pleasing compared to the 
RRO. One refugee who went to the Barrack Street office to apply for permanent residence noted that 
the differences in the ‘look and feel’ of the RRO and DHA are apparent from the facilities they have to 
receive clients. “The reception place is different. The refugee one, they don’t have. Even during winter 
it’s raining you are outside. But the civic one, there’s a nice place with TV, seats…” (Burundian 
woman, respondent 37).  
According to one migrant who had changed his status from asylum seeker to temporary resident 
(general work permit), and had therefore been served at both offices, clients are also treated differently 
at the RRO from the way they are treated at the Home Affairs office. At the RRO the officials are 
inhumane, which is not the case at the DHA office (Congolese migrant, respondent 32). According to 
him, this difference is because immigration services provided in these offices are not free like they are 
at the RRO, so migrants are often required to pay for their permits. For some of the services, for 
example, acquiring a work permit, one has the option of paying an immigration agent or broker to deal 
with Home Affairs on one’s behalf and hence avoid having to go to Home Affairs in person. On the 
other hand, the services at the RRO are provided for free (except in cases of corruption where migrants 
pay officials) and so, according to the migrant, this could be an excuse for Home Affairs to provide 
them with inferior customer service and an inferior environment. However, another migrant opined 
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that the DHA office was better because the bulk of its customers were citizens whereas the RRO only 
caters to foreigners. While there might be some truth in the two respondents’ opinions, there should 
not be such disparities observed within the same government department regardless of the differences 
in their clients.  
Asylum seekers and refugees had common experiences of the sovereign power of DHA officials by 
virtue of being served in the same office and those with temporary and permanent resident permits 
also shared similar experiences by virtue of being served in a different office. The former group 
reported most of the negative experiences. Temporary and permanent residents seem to have had it 
better at the DHA offices, and this was supported by a key informant who said that “those who apply 
for permits are treated differently. Yes, there are hassles here and there but there’s no pushing and 
shoving, there’s no verbal abuse” (Community Liaison Officer at PASSOP, respondent 47). He 
continued: 
Ja, those that apply for permanent residence from the refugee status are also treated 
differently because they are sent to Barrack Street to do that. Or even when one wants to 
apply for a refugee ID, they no longer do it at Foreshore, they go to Barrack Street. So that's 
preferential treatment. (Community Liaison Officer at PASSOP, respondent 47)  
This differential treatment suggests a ranking of migrants and that differences in legal migrant 
categories translate into a hierarchy in practice. Asylum seekers and refugees are viewed as less 
desirable than so-called economic migrants. So, although refugees have been granted more 
entitlements in the Refugees Act than asylum seekers and temporary residents, in practice they are 
viewed more like asylum seekers who are less privileged than temporary and permanent residents. 
This low perception of refugees in particular could have implications for how they are able to enjoy 
their rights in practice. They could be the ‘critical beings’ who, according to Tuitt and Fitzpatrick 
(2004:xi), are excluded or marginalised by the processes of national affirmation.   
The experiences of migrants with DHA officials were also analysed to observe for any differences in 
terms of nationality as stated in the research question. No pattern was observed. Where there were 
cases of migrants from the same country reporting both positive and negative experiences, which were 
in conflict with the already stated differential treatment based on legal category, it came down to the 
individual official they experienced. As has already been acknowledged, there are some good DHA 
officials, although they are the exception. On the whole then, migrants were treated differently by 
DHA officials based on their legal status as opposed to their specific country of origin. Therefore, 
besides bearing the status of non-citizen, immigration status rather than nationality seems to be the 
determining factor in how migrants are treated by DHA officials.  
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5.3.2 South African Police Service officials 
The specific details of migrants’ experiences with SAPS officials have been described in 5.2.2. Here 
they are interpreted in terms of legal codification and nationality. Migrants in possession of the 
following immigration status reported positive experiences with the police: asylum seeker, refugee, 
temporary resident (visitor, student and worker) and permanent resident. They were from Malawi, 
Rwanda, DRC, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burundi, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Congo. No positive 
experience emerged from the category of illegal foreigner. Migrants’ experiences differed in terms of 
the way the police dealt with specific incidents affecting them, such as violence and crime, or how the 
police interacted with them at street level, such as during spot-checks. Only a few commended the 
police for responding immediately and successfully investigating their cases.  
On the other hand, negative experiences were reported by those belonging to the following legal 
categories: illegal foreigner, asylum seeker, refugee, temporary resident (work permit) and permanent 
resident. This represented the following nationalities: Zimbabwe, Malawi, DRC, Nigeria, Uganda, 
Congo, Somalia, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Burundi and Kenya. It was only migrants from two out of the 13 
countries represented who did not have a negative experience with the police – Angola and 
Mozambique. No negative experiences were reported by temporary residents in possession of a study 
permit and visitor’s visa. This means that they either had positive or no experiences to report.  
It is also worth stating that positive experiences were reported at the institutional level by respondents 
from three of the key informant NGOs – CTRC, PASSOP and Scalabrini. They regarded SAPS as 
quite receptive to them as migrant organisations and said that they had good relations with SAPS. 
Some of them had even provided training to the police on the different categories of migrants and their 
rights because they had recognised that there was a lack of knowledge on the different types of 
migrant permits as expressed below. This is commendable if the police actually rely on the migrants’ 
immigration documents to determine their status rather than the irrational standards based on 
physiognomies identified by Morris (1998) and Harris (2001). 
For instance we’ve had police officers ask us, ‘what does a refugee permit look like?’ They 
should know. They really should know. ‘What’s the difference between a refugee and an 
asylum seeker? What is that maroon book? Is that real?’ But they’re asking. And so that’s 
been quite good. (Director at CTRC, respondent 41) 
Part of the work of these NGOs involves encouraging migrants to report any problems they have with 
the police to them and they then contact the police on the migrants’ behalf. This is because they 
believe that the SAPS takes organisations more seriously than it does individuals and it knows that 
these organisations are well versed in the law. As one key informant put it:  
I discovered that the police are scared if they find out it’s lawyers calling or like a human rights 
organisation calling because they know that those people know the law, they can sue him, we can 
lodge a complaint against the police. But as an individual they don’t worry about you. Sometimes 
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they can hit you, so it’s just better if we only advice people, ok, if you are having similar 
difficulties with the police, come and report them to us and we will phone them. (Community 
Liaison Officer at PASSOP, respondent 47) 
This statement implies that as the police exercise their sovereign authority, they have their own 
preconceptions of the relative power of different segments of society vis-à-vis their sovereign power. 
Individual migrants are seen as powerless when faced with the sovereign power of the state. At the 
same time they recognise, or do not underestimate, the power of agency in challenging state power to 
realise justice. It is worth pointing out that the staff of these NGOs include both South African and 
non-South Africans. So when the foreign staff interact with the police in their organisational capacity 
they are likely to be treated better than if they did so in their individual capacity or without any 
institutional affiliation. The above statement also demonstrates the value of migrant organisations as 
they assist migrants to access justice by acting as an interface between migrants and the police. It also 
implies that even though the state is the guarantor of rights in theory that is not necessarily so in 
practice and that non-state actors, in this instance, NGOs, can be used as a channel to access certain 
rights and services from the state.  
Although the police are expected to be impartial and be of service to all, regardless of nationality, they 
appear to side with citizens when they are called to deal with issues between migrants and locals. As 
migrants live among citizens, they are in a position to observe how the police act towards them and 
towards citizens at the community level. Moreover, they stated that the police are reluctant to 
intervene in incidents between migrants as the excerpts below demonstrate.  
Suppose you have a problem with a South African guy they may not listen. They are coming 
there and if he’s coloured they’ll talk their own language and he’s leaving. If he’s a black they 
will speak Xhosa then he will not listen what you are saying. You didn’t understand what they 
said, they speak their own language. Then why did I call him? (Ethiopian man, respondent 26) 
I was attacked at the Home Affairs by people from my country…and  I called the police. I told 
them where I was and they never came…And I just realised after that maybe because of my 
foreign accent they’re thinking, oh, he’s a foreigner, and he’s claiming that foreigners like 
him are doing this to him, so they will finish it amongst themselves. This is what I always think 
because if they are there to protect they should be able to protect anybody who lives in the 
country, not only citizens. (Congolese man, respondent 22) 
The Director of the CTRC also confirmed the reluctance of SAPS officials to intervene in conflicts 
between migrants: 
If there is ever, let’s say, a Congolese issue, so one Congolese faction is causing trouble for 
another Congolese faction or there are political problems or there’s violence of one against 
the other. Then they say it’s not our problem, it’s a Congolese problem… You sort yourselves 
out, which is also frustrating because particularly some of our clients they’re refugees, they’re 
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fleeing from their governments and then they have government spies or whatever who are here 
and they are targeting our clients and our clients should have protection from that. That’s 
what the state is all about. The police should get involved but also it’s an international 
relations issue because there shouldn’t be Burundian informants in South Africa. So the police 
need to escalate that to security services or to foreign relations to sort out that problem but 
they don’t want to. It’s a Burundian issue. They don’t want to get involved but they should and 
they don’t. (Director at CTRC, respondent 41) 
The above implies that SAPS officials do not make a distinction of migrants based on which foreign 
country they come from; the only line they draw is between citizens and foreigners.  
Migrants from all legal categories and nationalities with the exception of Angola, had an encounter, 
either positive or negative or both, with the police. There was no evidence to suggest that the manner 
in which they were treated by the police had anything to do with their specific legal status or 
nationality. Rather the evidence suggests that when police appear to act differently towards migrants it 
is more likely because they are non-South Africans. Migrant respondents mostly used the terms ‘we’ 
or ‘us’ when they spoke about how they felt they were perceived by the police, as members of the 
foreign community collectively. Likewise, the key informants who interact with migrants from several 
countries and with various types of permits spoke in more general terms about African migrants. They 
were not able to single out any legal category or nationality.    
Certain distinct traits and stereotypes associated with African migrants from specific countries might 
make them either more visible to state officials or more prone to being targeted by state officials. For 
example, the entrepreneurial spirit of Somalis means that they are active in the informal sector 
operating tuck shops, street-side and market stalls where they are likely to come into contact with law 
enforcement and immigration officials. Unfortunately, as will be revealed in anwering the next 
research question, these officials often extract bribes and extort these migrants while going about their 
law enforcement duties. The majority of Somalis are Cushitic and have distinct physical features from 
the minority Bantu Somalis and other African Bantus. As a result, many Somalis stand out as 
foreigners. However, there is also a general assumption that all migrants with these features are from 
Somalia when in fact Somalis as an ethnic group can be found in four African countries – Ethiopia, 
Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia. Indeed, two of the migrant respondents were ethnic Somalis but of 
Kenyan nationality. 
Migrants may also experience differential treatment from the police based on their level of education, 
geographical or residential location and related to the first two, their socio-economic status. In terms 
of education, the two respondents below suggest that a migrant’s familiarity with the law empowers 
them to demand certain treatment from the police, whereas ignorance of the law can result in the 
police taking advantage of the migrant.    
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Another experience was when I travelling to Mozambique by bus from Joburg and there was a 
misunderstanding between me and the conductor. So the conductor ordered the driver to take 
us to a police station because things were getting out hand. So we went to Germiston police 
station and there I was identified as a foreigner by both the driver and conductor who were 
both South African. I know the South African legal system and I am a practicing lawyer so I 
started speaking about my rights and what I expected the police to do so I wasn’t mishandled. 
They interviewed me, opened some of my documents and were actually ashamed and released 
me immediately. It was a conversation in the station but not inside the cell. (Mozambican 
man, respondent 14) 
There’s cases where you can see they’re just not applying themselves because they’re trying to 
take advantage because the person doesn’t know. But it’s isolated cases. (Advocacy Officer at 
Scalabrini, respondent 44) 
Migrants noted the difference in police treatment in the Cape Town suburbs versus the townships. For 
example, in 5.2.2 a comparison was drawn between police stations in richer and poorer areas such as 
Blouberg and Du Noon, Plumstead and Gugulethu, and Muizenberg and Steinberg. Also, the 
respondent below experienced different levels of service in two different provinces. 
I think it’s always a geographical situation. Like Melkbosstrand where I stay, they are very 
helpful. I went for police clearance. Eastern Cape was a bit tricky. (Zimbabwean man, respondent 
3) 
The researcher acknowledges that the differential treatment experienced by migrants from the police 
force mirrors what takes place in the wider South African society. Many poor and uneducated South 
Africans living in impoverished areas experience inferior services from the police and other state 
institutions in relation to their richer and educated counterparts living in the suburbs. This inequality in 
distribution of resources has been attributed to the country’s apartheid past as well as capacity 
constraints and corruption in the post-apartheid state.  
 
5.3.3 City of Cape Town officials 
Both positive and negative experiences with CoCT officials were reported by key informants and the 
following legal categories of migrants: asylum seeker, refugee, temporary resident (work permit 
holder) and undocumented migrants. Positive experiences were reported by refugees, illegal foreigners 
and temporary residents (work permit holders) with local government officials at municipal clinics 
around Cape Town. Migrants, just like South Africans, are entitled to free primary healthcare in local 
government clinics.  
It is worth noting that when clinics face challenges in delivering services, such as poorly administered 
clinics, these challenges affect both citizens and foreigners alike negatively. However, the focus here 
is on migrants’ perceptions of differential treatment by state officials at the level of interpersonal 
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interaction. Negative experiences were reported by refugees, asylum seekers and NGOs particularly 
with health officials and the Metro Police. According to the Community Liaison Officer at PASSOP 
(respondent 47), migrants have reported to the organisation that they are not treated well especially in 
clinics in townships. They are called names like kwerekwere, told that they are exhausting the 
medicines and even told to go and die at home. The respondent’s observation about township clinics 
seems to suggest a geographical and socio-economic element. However, of the few migrants who had 
been to a municipal clinic, those who reported negative experiences with the staff lived in different 
areas from those who reported positive experiences but these areas were not very different in terms of 
socio-economic status to suggest any trends. For instance, migrants reported negative experiences in 
clinics in Belhar, Mitchell’s Plain, Mowbray and Retreat while migrants reported positive experiences 
in clinics in Capricorn, Imizamo Yethu and Kraaifontein. 
The researcher concluded that migrants are not treated differently in terms of their legal status or 
nationality by CoCT officials. Rather African migrants are treated differently either based on the 
individual official they encounter or because of their status as non-citizens. The former is supported by 
findings from refugees who reported both positive and negative experiences with local government 
officials, such as at clinics as pointed out above. Out of the categories of migrants who had 
experiences with local government officials, only refugees reported both positive and negative 
experiences. Other categories that reported positive experiences were illegal foreigner and temporary 
resident (work permit holder). The different experiences of refugees could be due to the individual 
officials they dealt with or the clinic they went to and not due to their refugee status.  
It was also not due to their nationality that all categories that perceived CoCT officials positively did 
so. This is explained by the fact that the migrants came from countries such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Angola, Malawi and Zimbabwe and their counterparts from two 
of these countries (Somalia and DRC) also experienced negative treatment. 
The fact that negative experiences came from asylum seekers and refugees from Uganda, Somalia and 
DRC, and from key informants who interact with different legal categories (although they are 
predominantly asylum seekers and refugees), is evidence that state officials who treat migrants 
differently seem to view them homogenously as outsiders and do not distinguish them by their legal 
status or nationality.  
There was an indication that migrants who run businesses are soft targets for law enforcement officials 
regardless of where they come from or their legal status. This is informed by the experiences of 
Somali, Ethiopian and Nigerian migrants who had refugee and asylum seeker status. Their identity as 
non-South Africans combined with their occupation as informal traders appeared to give them a 
double disadvantage. Evidence of the vulnerability of migrants who are informal traders can be 
obtained from reports on the attacks against them such as the one by CorMSA in Appendix B. Not 
only are they at high risk of xenophobic violence and criminal acts from citizens but they are also soft 
targets for local government law enforcement officials and the police.   
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To summarise the findings pertaining to the second research question, an inference must be made from 
the findings of the previous research question as the research question here is an extension of the first 
question. Given that the majority of migrants’ experiences with state officials were negative, it can be 
inferred that migrants generally experience poor treatment from state officials. Taking this into 
account, the second question then is essentially about the extent to which this poor treatment has 
anything to with legal status or nationality.     
To this end, no patterns were visible in how migrants were treated by SAPS and CoCT officials based 
on either legal category or nationality. It matters little to SAPS and CoCT officials what legal status 
migrants hold in South Africa or their country of birth. Their basis for treating migrants poorly is 
simply their status as non-South Africans. This would be expected to translate into xenophobia on the 
basis of foreignness as opposed to xenophobia based on nationality. This finding is despite the 
knowledge that there are negative stereotypes associated with certain nationalities, which single them 
out for public xenophobia in South Africa. This is what Harris (2001) refers to as xenophobia based on 
nationality. For example, Nigerians are associated with drugs, Mozambicans with illegal migration 
and Somalis as shrewd businessmen, which makes people generalise about migrants coming from 
these countries. According to the researcher, her finding which implies xenophobia based only on 
foreignness is not necessarily inconsistent with that of other researchers but rather it is a question of a 
different methodology and research question. The researcher did not ask South Africans for their 
opinions of different nationalities of migrants, which would likely have been similar to popular 
stereotypes such as those mentioned. Instead, this research was based on migrants’ experiences of state 
officials. 
In addition, although the research did not specifically investigate this by way of a research question, 
there seems to be a geographic, socio-economic and racial element to how migrants experience SAPS 
and CoCT officials. This implies that with regards to the police and local government officials, while 
their status as African migrants might explain their differential treatment, the fact that other factors 
such as area of residence and class come into play suggests that their experience might also be similar 
to those of South Africans, where such socio-economic factors determine the quality of services they 
receive from the government.   
In contrast, when it comes to DHA officials there is an apparent difference in the poor treatment they 
extend to foreigners based on legal category. Migrants that are served at the RRO – asylum seekers 
and refugees – were treated differently from temporary and permanent residents who are served in 
DHA offices. Interestingly, administering migrants in different offices based on whether they fall 
under the Refugees Act or the Immigration Act translates into different treatment of migrants on the 
ground. Those with asylum seeker and refugee permits are treated worse than those with various 
categories of temporary residents and permanent residents. This implies that there is a hierarchy of 
migrants in the eyes of DHA officials with temporary and permanent residents at the top and asylum 
seekers and refugees at the bottom. This finding is consistent with one of the aims of immigration 
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policies discussed in Chapter 2, which is to prescribe degrees of membership through the codification 
of migrants in order to facilitate management and control of foreigners. Immigration policies view so-
called economic migrants as more desirable than asylum seekers and refugees. While according to 
immigration policies not all migrants are equal, in South Africa, they almost are, at least in theory. 
This is because South Africa has a liberal Constitution and a liberal Refugees Act, which grant all 
categories of migrants a generous range of rights, with refugees and permanent residents having the 
most extensive rights. However, the findings show that the treatment of migrants has less to do with 
the extent of rights they are entitled to and more to do with which DHA office they receive their 
services from depending on whether they are classified under the Refugees Act or the Immigration 
Act. 
From the two research questions discussed so far, the mostly negative experiences of migrants can be 
linked to the prevailing negative discourse on African migrants which casts them as a danger to the 
South African nation. In addition, the diverse experiences with state officials from within the same 
institution or from a different state institution, already point to inconsistencies between theoretical 
definitions of the state as a coherent set of institutions and practices and the day-to-day realities. 
Hence shedding some light on the real politics of how state institutions operate. This is discussed in 
further detail under the next research question.    
Up to this point, the level of data analysis undertaken in relation to the first two research questions, 
which are interlinked, can be said to be largely descriptive. The nature of the questions lent themselves 
to broad interpretation. Thus descriptive coding of positive and negative experiences was sufficient. In 
the subsequent questions, analysis at the descriptive level is not sufficient and abstraction is required 
in order to analyse the data conceptually. The questions seek to analyse at what point the treatment of 
migrants can be viewed in terms of the state of exception or as xenophobia.  
It is worth noting that while the state of exception has not appeared as a term in the findings of the first 
two research questions xenophobia has. For the sake of clarification, where the term xenophobia has 
been used it was because the word had been explicitly used by the respondents themselves due to the 
familiarity of the term in South Africa. However, in the interview questions the researcher was wary of 
not initiating the use of the term so as not to pre-empt a specific response. Instead the questions were 
phrased in terms of the indicators of xenophobia used by the researcher, which included hostility, 
intolerance and discriminatory attitudes as was done with questions on the state of exception. In cases 
where respondents described the experiences of migrants in terms of xenophobia, the researcher 
attempted to get them to unpack it. However, in the final analysis left for section 5.5, their 
understanding of xenophobia was consistent with that of the researcher.  
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the results of the primary data collected in Cape Town from African 
migrants, migrant organisations and state officials with respect to the first two research questions of 
the qualitative study using Atlas.ti and interpreted them. The key findings are summarised below. 
In relation to the first research question, the experiences of migrants with state officials are mixed. 
Both positive and negative experiences were reported with the migrants saying that their experiences 
depended on the individual state official. However, on the whole the majority were negative, 
especially with DHA officials, followed by SAPS officials. It was therefore inferred that migrants 
generally experienced being treated poorly by state officials. Experiences with DHA officials at the 
RRO were singled out as being particularly appalling.  
With regard to the second research question, the findings indicate that the basis for state officials 
treating migrants poorly is simply their status as non-South Africans. No patterns along the lines of 
specific legal category and nationality were observed in how migrants were treated by SAPS and 
CoCT officials. However, when it comes to DHA officials there is a subtle difference in how they treat 
foreigners based on legal category which is interpreted as a hierarchy of migrants in the eyes of DHA 
officials. Migrants who are served at the RRO – asylum seekers and refugees – were treated worse or 
felt powerless at the hands of officials than temporary and permanent residents who are served in 
DHA offices. With regard to differential treatment by SAPS and CoCT officials, legal category is not 
a distinguishing factor. Officials appear to take the categories of migrants for granted seeing them 
simply as foreigners or amakwerekwere.  Instead, what matters is the officials’ perceptions of migrants 
either as powerless and rightless individuals or as powerful due to their perceived social standing. This 
means they are perceived as either empowered or disempowered to challenge abuses of state power. 
The signs of empowerment that were gleaned from the research include having a good education, 
living in a suburb as opposed to a township, having local networks or having knowledge of the law or 
access to human rights NGOs. In this regard, there seems to be a socio-economic, geographic and 
racial element to how migrants experience state officials although the research question only limited 
itself to differences based on nationality and legal status. The semi-structured interviews enabled the 
migrants to expand on their experiences so the researcher was able to derive some trends based on 
these elements. 
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Chapter 6: African migrants, the state of exception and xenophobia  
 
6.1 Introduction 
This is the second results chapter of the study. It addresses the remaining secondary research 
questions: 
a) Is the approach of South African state officials towards African migrants evidence of a state of 
exception? 
b) If so, to what extent has a state of exception in dealing with African migrants shaped 
xenophobia in South Africa? 
The findings of the first research question are presented with respect to the selected institutions 
starting with DHA officials, then SAPS officials and, lastly, CoCT officials. The findings of the last 
question are reported broadly as they bring together the concepts of a state of exception and 
xenophobia. 
 
6.2 Evidence of a state of exception in the three state institutions 
Is the approach of South African state officials towards African migrants evidence of a state of 
exception? This question seeks to find out if Agamben’s theory of the state of exception, as outlined in 
Chapter 3, can shed light on the practices of state officials towards African migrants. The state of 
exception, in this study, is defined as the implicit authorisation of state officials to operate outside the 
law in order to protect the state from the ‘migrant threat’. The African migrant is marked as a threat to 
the national identity, security and well-being of the South African state. This declaration of the state of 
exception endorses practices in which the law itself is either suspended or regarded as an instrument 
that state officials may enact as a strategy for constraining and monitoring the African migrant 
population. The state of exception subsequently impacts negatively on the lives of migrants. 
Using Atlas.ti, the experiences of African migrants with state officials were coded according to the 
indicators of the practices of state officials which operationalised the state of exception shown in 
Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. Thereafter reports where generated of these codes for each institution and the 
findings are presented below.   
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6.2.1 Department of Home Affairs officials 
The practices below collectively point to the flouting of laws relating to migrants, overstepping the 
bounds of state authority and abuse of discretionary powers by DHA officials in their dealings with 
African migrants and in reaching decisions about permit related issues. 
6.2.1.1 Unlawful closure of the RRO 
The closure of some RROs over the last few years, including the Cape Town RRO and the litigation 
by advocates of migrants’ rights dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 4 were part of recent asylum 
policy changes announced by the DHA. It is mentioned here as evidence of a state of exception where 
the state acts with disregard for the law from the researcher’s interviews with key informants who are 
litigating against the DHA. In the case Scalabrini Centre Cape Town and others vs the Department of 
Home Affairs and others, the court ruled that the closure of the RRO in 2012, which was located in 
Maitland at the time, was unlawful due to “a lack of substantive consultation with the Standing 
Committee on Refugee Affairs or with affected groups” (African Centre for Migration and Society & 
Lawyers for Human Rights, 2013:7). The court then ordered the DHA to re-open the office. The RRO 
was re-opened in a different location in downtown, which is the one visited by the researcher as part of 
this study. However, when the DHA opened this office they did not resume offering the full range of 
services a RRO should typically provide, as it said that this was only a temporary office. The 
Department then later lodged an appeal whose outcome is still being awaited.  
The temporary office, which still exists to date, only serves those who had been issued with asylum 
seeker and refugee permits before the closure of the Maitland office. It has not been processing asylum 
applications of those who arrived in Cape Town since 2012 when the Maitland office was closed. 
Such people must apply for asylum in Durban, Musina or Pretoria. To this extent, it is only offering 
limited services and has only partly complied with the court order. Since it has not resumed the 
functions of a RRO as legally constituted it is not a RRO technically speaking. However, to avoid 
getting bogged down by the technicalities brought by the court case, the researcher continues to refer 
to it as the Cape Town RRO simply referring to the office which serves migrants that fall under the 
Refugees Act. It is also useful for the reader to have this background on the court case in mind as it 
should clarify why in some instances reference is made to the RRO as if it still exists and in other 
instances as if it was closed down.  
During interviews with key informant non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that work with asylum 
seekers and refugees, a number of concerns were raised about the changes in the policy and practice of 
the asylum system: 
It would force refugees and asylum seekers to essentially live at the borders if they have to 
constantly renew their permits and they can’t do so in Cape Town…Or they have to be at 
Musina because every three months they have to travel there anyway, so why leave? And it 
will create a system of de facto camps with no thought to the fact that those border towns, they 
don’t have the infrastructure, they don’t have water, sanitation, space, schools, anything to 
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take care of essentially an influx of tens of thousands of people to these small towns, just so 
that they can go deal with their permits. (Director at CTRC, respondent 41) 
It’s against everything that South Africa signed on for when they decided to accept refugees… 
If they want to have camps then they need to put their reservation in at the UN level and say 
we have a reservation to freedom of movement and we’re going to move towards a camp 
system. If they’re going to do that they need to do that but they need to inform UNHCR and go 
through the proper channels to be able to do that not set up a de facto camp system that just 
pushes the problems out of the cities and makes the ugly problem go away. (Director at CTRC, 
respondent 41) 
Just imagine the social and economic effect of having asylum seekers and refugees living only 
in certain areas not being able to integrate, look for a job and look after themselves. Maybe 
it’s an effort to repel people from coming to the country. (Advocacy Officer at Scalabrini 
Centre, respondent 44) 
It is going to create a morass of problems with the people effectively living in camps or shanty 
towns unable to work, unable to get access to social services … and one fears that the 
experienced refugee status determination officers will not want to relocate, so they will have 
to train a new batch, and one fears that the people will be in increased danger of unlawful 
refoulement to the countries they came from. (Attorney at LRC, respondent 46) 
People will still end up down here but they’ll do so without documents and that puts them at 
risk. (Director at CTRC, respondent 41) 
In addition to the closure being unlawful, it was done without any preceding policy documents 
explaining the policy change. It was also done prior to creating the necessary infrastructure for the 
new RROs. Both of these conditions created a climate of uncertainty for asylum seekers and refugees 
who rely on these offices to legalise their stay in South Africa. From the above statements, there are 
five possible implications of the unlawful closure and relocation of RROs which suggest that this 
policy measure could have serious consequences for the livelihoods of migrants in South Africa.   
Firstly, there is a fear that relocating the RROs to the border will in effect curtail the freedom of 
movement of asylum seekers provided for in the Refugee Act, again highlighting the disjuncture 
between law and practise. If asylum seekers are expected to return to these RROs every few weeks or 
months to renew their permits, this will essentially force many of them to live at the borders to avoid 
having to regularly travel from the metropolitan cities where most of them currently reside. 
Secondly, and flowing from the first, it will hamper the achievement of socio-economic rights by 
asylum seekers as guaranteed in the Constitution and Refugees Act.40 Currently, most asylum seekers 
are self-sufficient due to the freedom of movement and rights to work and study afforded to them. 
                                                     
40
 Linked to this is also a proposal to deny asylum seekers the right to work and study while their asylum claim is 
being considered. 
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However, opportunities to eke out a living are severely limited in the border areas and this would 
render many of them reliant on the state or humanitarian organisations for their survival. Moreover, 
many of these towns do not provide the social services and social amenities that asylum seekers 
require in order to earn decent livelihoods in South Africa. The DHA needs to avoid a recurrence of 
the 2009 humanitarian crisis that occurred in Musina, close to the Zimbabwean border, where 
thousands of asylum seekers were forced to find shelter in the open-air Musina Showground in the 
absence of other options in the border town (African Centre for Migration and Society & Lawyers for 
Human Rights, 2013:50).  
Thirdly, it is likely to have the unintended consequence of increasing illegal migration which the 
government aims to reduce. This is already evident in Cape Town where the High Court heard 
evidence from NGOs in their litigation against Home Affairs in 2013 that there are undocumented 
asylum seekers in Cape Town as a result of the closure of the RRO. Therefore, asylum seekers will 
find ways of getting to the main cities where there are more job opportunities and better infrastructure. 
From the perspective of ‘genuine’ asylum seekers (as opposed to those trying to abuse the asylum 
system to gain entry into the country for economic reasons), being undocumented puts them at great 
risk as they do not enjoy state protection. In the cities they will be prone to extortion and exploitation 
by South Africans who are ready to benefit from their desperation. This will also serve to criminalise 
migration despite the fact that the primary reason for illegally migrating to the cities will be in search 
of a better life rather than out of criminal intent. There is already a perception that ‘illegal migrants’ 
are responsible for the high crime in South Africa, as well as a tendency to conflate the different types 
of migrants into the category of ‘illegal migrants’.  
Fourthly, it will severely limit the ability of asylum seekers to be integrated into South African society, 
which is the intention of the Refugees Act. By isolating them and casting them as a danger to the 
security of South Africans, xenophobic sentiments – which are already widespread – are likely to 
exacerbate.  
Finally, it is likely that DHA refugee status determination officers and other key staff will be unwilling 
to relocate to these border offices. This may affect the DHA’s capacity to make status determinations 
and worsen existing problems in the asylum system. There is therefore a real fear of unlawful 
refoulement – the return of asylum seekers to the countries they came from or to any other country 
where their lives or rights may be at risk – which goes against the tenets of international refugee law.   
The unlawful closure of the RRO, which the DHA is standing by despite the consequences for 
migrants outlined above, gives the impression that it is trying to discourage foreigners from seeking 
asylum here. Thus it can be viewed as an exceptional mechanism in the Agambian sense, in a bigger 
state security strategy directed at migrants, although it might prove to be counterproductive as 
explained.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
135 
 
6.2.1.2 Non-compliance with court orders 
Two examples of the DHA failing to comply with court orders emerged from the data. The non-
compliance has impacted negatively on asylum seekers and refugees. After the DHA was taken to 
court by civil society groups for the unlawful closure of the Cape Town RRO in 2012, the court 
ordered the Department to resume issuing asylum seeker permits to new asylum seekers from July 
2012. However, it did not comply with the court order and to date the Cape Town RRO is not serving 
newcomers and has lodged an appeal. One migrant explained the current situation thus:  
They are using the appeal process to say no, we are stopping for now to see what the outcome 
is, but in reality they are not supposed to stop because the original order exists until it is 
either overturned or maintained. (Rwandan woman, respondent 29) 
Asylum seekers and refugees face challenges trying to renew their permits in a different office from 
the one that issued the initial permit because of the refusal of DHA officials to do it as it entails a 
transfer of files from one office to the other. This practice has been contested in court a number of 
times and each time the court has ordered the DHA to extend permits issued at any RRO in the 
country.41 In a more recent case, narrated to the researcher by the UNHCR Head of Field Office 
(respondent 43), the UCT law clinic took the DHA to court on behalf of some refugees who wanted to 
extend their permits in Cape Town and were sent back to the RROs where they initially applied (Head 
of field office at UNHCR, respondent 43). The court ruled in their favour and the DHA was compelled 
to extend these permits in Cape Town regardless of where they were initially issued. However, 
according to the Advocacy Officer at Scalabrini Centre (respondent 44), it seems that the DHA only 
applies the court orders to those migrants directly involved in the court cases as it continued to violate 
the orders when dealing with others. 
The non-acceptance of newcomers, which is in contempt of court, is contributing to the presence of 
illegal migrants, as will be discussed below, while the refusal to renew permits issued elsewhere in the 
country has adversely affected the freedom of movement of asylum seekers and refugees, a right 
protected in the Refugees Act. This is because it seeks to confine them to the cities where their 
original applications were made and it can be quite costly to travel from one city to another each time 
a permit lapses. 
Apparently, the non-compliance of the DHA with court orders is not limited to the two examples 
provided here, which were mentioned by the research respondents. DHA officials have been found to 
violate several other court orders and its officers as having acted with flagrant disregard for human 
rights. It seems that with the DHA there are those for whom the law does not apply. The court orders 
as well as some of the court judgements mentioned in Chapter 4 relating to migrants’ rights show that 
courts are more sympathetic to foreigners than the government. Thus not all state institutions are 
enacting a state of exception. 
                                                     
41
 Examples include case numbers 9179/00, 167/01, 16863/08 and 7705/13.  
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6.2.1.3 Production of illegal migrants 
In a departure from the past, the DHA no longer makes provision for new asylum seekers who plan to 
reside in Cape Town and those whose first port of entry into South Africa is Cape Town to apply for 
asylum. As already stated, this is in contempt of court. It is also a contravention of the Refugees Act, 
which allows any foreigner entering South Africa to apply for asylum. The refusal of the RRO to issue 
new asylum seeker permits has given rise to foreigners living in the country illegally since the RRO 
stopped receiving new asylum seekers in 2012. The illegality of these migrants is arguably through no 
fault of their own as one key informant told the researcher.  
It’s not their fault that they are not documented. It’s the fault of the Department of Home Affairs. 
They have been appealing the court decisions for quite a long time now and so they are still 
waiting. These people are still waiting. They came here with the intention of applying for asylum 
only to find Home Affairs is not complying with the court order. So it’s not their fault that they are 
here undocumented. (Community Liaison Officer at PASSOP, respondent 47) 
The findings of the research show that the DHA not only contributes to the illegality of migrants who 
have been in the country since the closure of the Cape Town RRO in 2012, but also to the illegality of 
migrants who have been in the country prior to that. One Zimbabwean migrant reported how he was 
still waiting for a quota work permit from Home Affairs three years after applying for it. In the 
meantime he clutches on to the application slip he received from them after he submitted his 
application as proof. However, this proof is not considered a legal status in terms of the Immigration 
Act but it has been generally accepted given the delays within the DHA in processing permits. So he 
has been able to get a job with that document. However, it is an unskilled job in a supermarket 
whereas he is a trained teacher and had applied for a quota work permit on the basis of his 
qualifications and the shortage of teachers facing South Africa.  
In another example, one Malawian asylum seeker who has been living in South Africa for nine years 
explained how she has been undocumented since May 2012 due to the DHA. When she had routinely 
gone to extend her permit, the officials said they could not find her file and asked her to return at a 
later date. She then made multiple visits to the RRO and the officials maintained that the file was lost 
and they were therefore unable to assist her in any way. She remains in the country undocumented as a 
result. It makes little sense that officials are unable to replace a permit as a result of their own acts of 
omission. Just as lost passports and national IDs are replaceable so should asylum seeker permits. One 
would have expected the DHA to explain to the Malawian respondent the procedure for obtaining a 
new permit and facilitate this. Since they did not do this, it can be construed that they were simply 
unwilling to regularise her stay and insensitive to the implications this would have for her life in South 
Africa.     
Another asylum seeker who has been in the country legally since 2007 went to renew his asylum 
seeker permit in May 2013 and it was withdrawn and he was issued with a rejection letter by DHA 
officials. He claimed that the RRO decision was procedurally flawed as it did not grant him a hearing 
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or interview and the right to appeal. In other words, the refugee status determination process described 
in Chapter 4 was not followed in his case. As a result, he is challenging the DHA's decision in court on 
the grounds that he was denied the right to administrative justice.  
Being undocumented has major implications for migrants’ lives as they are unable to access various 
services and opportunities, which threatens their very existence in South Africa. They also live in 
constant fear of detection as it is an offence to be in the country illegally. The same Malawian migrant 
explained how it had been impossible for her to obtain a birth certificate for her child who was born in 
South Africa after her permit had lapsed. While it is legally permissible for an illegal foreigner to 
become legal while in the country, it is improbable given the examples cited here which point to the 
DHA itself curtailing rather than enabling the issuance of documentation. The production of illegal 
migrants as discussed above is one way of ‘irregularising’ migrants as observed by Klaaren and Ramji 
(2001:39). The examples go beyond issues of bureaucratic inefficiency to unwillingness of officials to 
assist, to legal violations of the Refugees Act.  
6.2.1.4 Lack of administrative justice 
Section 24 of the Refugees Act details the process to be followed in making a decision about an 
asylum application. In addition, it states that while considering an application a Refugee Status 
Determination Officer (RSDO) must do so in line with section 33 of the Constitution which provides 
everyone with a right to just administrative action. The undocumented Congolese asylum seeker 
whose permit was withdrawn contends that administrative procedures were not followed implying that 
the officials acted unconstitutionally. In addition, he explained that he was unsure of what the official 
who received him wrote down in his application when he first arrived in the country because at the 
time he was struggling to speak English. He recalls that when he explained his grounds for applying 
for asylum, which were the persecution he faced due to his sexual identity as a homosexual, the 
official was not prepared to listen and asked him if he knew that being gay was against the Bible, to 
which he replied that he was explaining his situation and felt that the question was not relevant. So 
although he had been waiting for his claim to be adjudicated for six years, he was still looking forward 
to the interview where he would have a chance to defend his claim. He felt that he was not getting the 
protection provided for in the law and that the decision to withdraw his asylum permit and effectively 
deny him refugee status was unfair.  
A researcher at ACMS argued that experiences such as the one of the Congolese migrant are not 
unique by stating:    
The asylum system isn’t really functioning. They’re not listening to individual claims and 
conducting proper assessments and investigations in giving people decisions. They’re just 
issuing rejections. It’s just a mechanism for rejecting people and getting them out of the 
country. (Researcher at ACMS, respondent 42) 
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The key informant explained that the disregard for administrative procedures stems from an 
underlying belief in the DHA that asylum seekers are not in the country legitimately and are taking a 
chance by using the asylum system as a way to gain entry into the country. Indeed, it is possible to 
enter the country without being a genuine asylum seeker. One of the reasons for this is that corrupt 
DHA officials fraudulently issue permits in exchange for a bribe. Another reason is that the DHA 
takes very long to adjudicate claims. Instead of the stipulated six months it could take them up to ten 
years. Therefore, desperate migrants who do not meet the criteria for being granted refugee status can 
take advantage of this delay to regularise their stay in the country for a long time even if their asylum 
claim is bound to be rejected eventually. It is incumbent upon the DHA to speedily issue decisions in 
order to advance protection to those genuinely in need of it and to deter those seeking to exploit the 
system rather than abandoning the principles of legality. 
6.2.1.5 Barriers to accessing services 
Just about every migrant has to visit a DHA office to regularise his/her stay in South Africa or for 
some other permit related issue. Such visits are much more frequent for asylum seekers as their 
permits are valid for a limited period of between one month and six months at a time. A visit to a DHA 
office, especially the Cape Town RRO can be a very stressful experience as described by one migrant. 
‘A week prior you go for the extension it’s a stressful week and you are thinking about your dignity, 
you are thinking about other issues, you are thinking about losing your humanity, value and ja’ 
(Congolese man, respondent 32).  
The stress is largely as a result of the obstacles to accessing immigration services which exist at the 
RRO. These include disorder, long queues and bureaucratic indifference. What is more, migrants often 
had to make multiple visits to the RRO before getting any service. Migrants mentioned that the queues 
are often so long that one can easily spend the entire day in a queue. Some people have even taken to 
spending the night outside the RRO in the hope of being guaranteed a good spot in the queue the 
following morning. During the researcher’s visit to the RRO she observed that there is nowhere to sit 
or take cover from the hot sun or rain while queuing outside, there are only a few portable toilets 
which are filthy and there is no drinking water available for clients. The inside reception areas are 
crowded and stuffy with people overflowing onto the corridors and stairways.  
Some days can be quite chaotic outside the RRO with migrants being physically assaulted by security 
guards and fights breaking out, some of which have attracted the attention of the media. Migrants 
reported that people had fainted due to dehydration and spending long hours exposed to the sun, 
pregnant women had collapsed and people had even died after having been severely beaten by security 
guards (Congolese man, respondent 32; Burundian woman, respondent 37). While these incidents had 
apparently prompted some improvements at the RRO, they were usually short lived and with time 
things would deteriorate again.  
There is no guarantee that one will be served on the day he/she visits the RRO. Often people were 
turned away after queuing the whole day and told to return the following day to face the same long 
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queues and uncertainty. Some migrants said that it could even take a week or more of going there 
before one could get their permit renewed and people's permits had expired while they were trying to 
renew them. In addition, migrants were more often than not ill-treated by state officials. Migrants gave 
examples of staff being condescending towards them, abusing their authority and being xenophobic. 
With the Cape Town RRO not serving new comers, most of its work involves only the extension of 
asylum seeker permits. Migrants bemoaned the slow pace at which staff work pointing out that the 
process of extending asylum seeker permits was very simple, yet it takes a very long time. One 
migrant who had previously worked at the RRO as an interpreter explained the procedure that a DHA 
official follows to extend a permit:  
Just punch a number, system will open it up. You just check the validity, date of expiry – you 
just check the permit that the person has. Then they scan the permit, the old permit. Then I 
think when you scan old permit it is going to request to scan the new one. You scan the new 
one because you are extending. So you put the old one in the box because it is supposed to be 
wasted away. So then just scan the new one. After they scan they just put in a printer and click 
print. That’s it. That is how extension is. That is the procedure. I have seen while they are 
interviewing someone... I have never had a training but if they give me to do that, I will do like 
four, five times more than them. It is very easy and simple thing....You are dealing with PC, 
just click, click, click, scan, the person has to go. Imagine if that takes five minutes, but it 
won’t take five minutes. If it takes that five minutes, working hours are eight and less the one 
hour for lunch, one hour for break. But all of them they can’t finish it. You see the difference 
now. (Ethiopian man, respondent 36) 
From the above narrative staying legal can be a very time consuming exercise and dehumanising 
experience at RROs. To the researcher’s knowledge, the overall environment at the RRO is unlike that 
of any other government office in the country’s metropolitan areas that regularly receives citizens let 
alone other DHA offices that provide both civic and immigration services. One cannot help but notice 
the appalling environment, which happens to be in an office that only serves foreigners. In addition, 
migrants see these barriers as deliberately aimed at frustrating them and not as the daily expression of 
the administrative inefficiencies that the DHA has come to be associated with. This is perhaps due to a 
number of reasons including the unnecessary complication of what the respondent above describes as 
the uncomplicated task of renewing permits, which does not require any specialised skills and is not 
time-consuming. The persistence of the barriers to access even after temporary improvements in the 
RRO following complaints by migrants and their advocates point to other reasons such as a lack of 
political will. The decreasing numbers of asylum seekers in recent years, and the refusal of the RRO to 
accept new asylum applications since 2012, which has significantly reduced the number of clients the 
staff have to deal further point to a lack of political will to improve access to services by migrants.  
The physical abuse experienced by migrants at the hands of state officials impinges the right to 
freedom and security granted by the Constitution. Section 12 affords protection against a range of 
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abuses such as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. While other barriers to accessing immigration 
services are not explicitly extra-legal, the sloppiness that migrants are subjected to goes against the 
spirit of the law. Also, their uniqueness to the RRO suggests institutional xenophobia. Taken together, 
they seem to be aimed at putting their legal identity, which is vital for the realisation of their human 
rights while in South Africa and integration into society, at risk.  
As far as South African immigration statutes are concerned, only illegal foreigners lack a legal 
identity. Yet the asylum seekers and refugees who have legally guaranteed rights may not be able to 
experience them due to the barriers that the DHA has erected. Migrants are treated as if they are 
unworthy of the citizenship rights they are entitled to in the Constitution. This is reminiscent of 
Agamben’s assertion that human beings, in reality, are not equal, a notion that he borrows from 
Arendt. It seems that the state sees these migrants as less deserving of government services than 
citizens, as well as temporary and permanent residents who are served in different offices. 
6.2.1.6 Delays in permit-related processes 
The findings here pertain to delays in adjudicating asylum claims; hearing appeals of rejected asylum 
applications; verification of asylum and refugee permits; issuing refugee identity documents (IDs) and 
refugee travel documents; processing permanent resident permits of refugees; and processing 
temporary residence permits.  
According to the Regulations of the Refugees Act (2000) made by the Minister of Home Affairs, the 
whole process of determining whether an asylum seeker can be granted refugee status takes 180 days. 
In practice, however, this is rarely the case. Asylum claims can take years to adjudicate due to a 
backlog in the DHA in processing claims with some taking as long as ten years as already stated 
elsewhere. During this time the asylum seeker is on a temporary status that is renewable every few 
months. Although this status comes with rights to work and study it is an unstable status and even after 
having had this status for years one's claim can still be rejected, which is often the case because of the 
high rejection rate of applications. For example, out of the 78,142 applications for asylum received in 
the 2012 to 2013 year, only 3,908 were successful (Department of Home Affairs, 2013:90). 
If a claim is rejected as unfounded, the asylum seeker can lodge an appeal with the Refugee Appeal 
Board within 30 days of rejection. In general administrative law terms an appeal hearing should take 
place within a reasonable time. However, this is rarely the case as the DHA is said to have built up an 
enormous backlog over the years. The appeal hearing backlog in 2013 stood at 10,553 (Department of 
Home Affairs, 2013:90). Some migrants have been waiting for an appeal hearing for between three 
and four years. They typically wait indefinitely as RSDOs who are required by law to give the 
applicant an indication of the date of their hearing or when they will receive a decision are unable to 
do so. However, while waiting for the hearing to take place migrants can renew their asylum seeker 
permits.    
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Asylum seekers and refugees have to get their permits verified by the DHA when they apply to open a 
bank account or to receive social grants (for those refugees who qualify). Because of the existence of 
fraudulent documents issued by the DHA, the banks and the South African Social Security Agency 
(SASSA) ask the same department to verify that the permits it issues are genuine. While verification is 
meant to take 48 hours, it is a very cumbersome process that can sometimes take a very long time thus 
inconveniencing migrants. It is rather ironic that state officials do not trust the very documents that 
they are responsible for issuing as reliable and verifiable evidence of legal identity. Yet the culprits 
who issue fraudulent documents are the state’s own corrupt officials. 
With regard to refugees, section 30 of the Refugees Act states that a refugee can apply for a refugee ID 
book after being issued with a refugee permit. These IDs are critical as they are more widely accepted 
by institutions and employers than the section 24 paper permits. Despite submitting ID applications 
within the required 30 days of being granted refugee status, some migrants do not receive their IDs 
during the entire period that their permit is valid for, which initially is two years and thereafter can be 
anything between one and four years. The ID is valid for the same period as the refugee status even 
though it is only issued after. Among those migrants who had received IDs, some said they had 
received them within three to six months of applying while others received them a few days before 
expiry or even after they had expired.  
Refugees are also entitled to apply for travel documents to enable them to travel out of the country. 
However, this document is only accepted by very few countries. The document is valid for one year 
and similar to the refugee IDs, the process is fraught with delays. Even though the DHA says it takes 
three months to issue a travel document, the experience of refugees is that is takes longer, if it is issued 
at all.   
Section 27 of the Refugees Act provides that a refugee who has been in the country for five years can 
apply for permanent residence if the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs certifies that he/she is 
likely to remain a refugee indefinitely. It is not clear what yardstick is used to determine 
'indefiniteness', but this is another area in which the DHA has amassed a backlog. The process of 
certification which is expected to take six months can take up to three years. According to one key 
informant respondent, these delays can be attributed to the Committee: 
The Standing Committee is an extraordinary body which is most reluctant to provide people 
with that 27 C Certificate... It is difficult for people to get permanent residence through their 
having been refugees because the Standing Committee is not efficient. There is also a huge 
backlog there and at present they only have two members, the chairperson and one other 
member. (Attorney at LRC, respondent 46)  
If a refugee is lucky to get certified and apply for permanent residence, his/her application is likely to 
be delayed indefinitely if the application does not get lost. Although no fixed timeframes are stated in 
the law for processing permanent resident applications, DHA officials should be guided by the 
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preamble of the Immigration Act. It strives to ensure that “permanent residence permits are issued as 
expeditiously as possible and on the basis of simplified procedures and objective, predictable and 
reasonable requirements and criteria” (Republic of South Africa, 2002). Some migrants have been 
waiting for four years for their permanent residence permits and within that time some have had to 
resubmit their applications after finding out in the course of following up that the DHA could not trace 
their application. The DHA has set a target of processing permanent residence applications within 
eight months but is far from achieving it (Department of Home Affairs, 2013:102). 
It is not only those migrants under the Refugees Act who have to deal with delays. Those with 
temporary resident permits issued under the Immigration Act also reported waiting for nine months for 
an exchange permit and three years for a work permit, which the DHA claims takes them eight weeks 
to process. Those applying for study permits seem to get them faster than any other temporary 
residence permit. However, it depends on whether they apply for them in South Africa or in their 
home countries. Interestingly, those who had applied in their home countries said it took an average of 
one week to get their permit while when they applied here it often took longer. They said it takes about 
30 days to get the study permit extended in South Africa but one student stated it can take up to nine 
months. This is perhaps because the DHA in South Africa deals with a much higher number of 
applications than an Embassy. However, this in itself is not a good reason as the office capacity should 
be commensurate to the work load.  
It’s a bit upsetting as a foreigner to have to travel outside to organise permits whilst you can 
do it here. It’s time consuming and time wasting and then you come back with the same result. 
So what’s the point of not facilitating the process here? I think if the applicant is able to 
provide all the necessary documents then there must be no delays. I don’t see why the process 
should be delayed to the extent that you have to incur huge expenses to go out and renew 
permits that could be renewed here in SA. (Mozambican man, respondent 14) 
On the surface, the major backlogs in issuing various permits are an indication of serious deficiencies 
in the DHA's National Immigration Branch, which can be attributed to administrative red tape. 
However, the researcher believes that at the heart of these deficiencies is a lack of political will to 
serve migrants better despite being well aware of the damage that such delays and uncertainties can 
have on a migrant’s life as this is the same department that issues IDs and birth certificates to its 
citizens. Permit delays also violate the Refugees Act and Regulations and the intent of the Immigration 
Act. They can also be described as unfair because implicit in the notion of a fair procedure is 
reasonable dispatch (de la Hunt & Kerfoot, 2008:91).    
Delays create uncertainty for migrants as they are subjected to living in a state of limbo. They are 
denied the peace of mind that a stable and predictable status provides. Not only is it difficult for them 
to plan their lives beyond the duration of their permit but it also disadvantages them in securing 
housing and jobs, for example. Even when they acquire a more stable status it is never guaranteed 
when the permit has expired and it is not clear how long it will be renewed for. Permanent residence, 
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which is the most secure status, is almost impossible to acquire for those refugees who meet the 
criteria of having lived in the country for more than five years. Delaying tactics by the DHA can be 
seen as a way of denying migrants access to the rights that come with their status or any entitlements 
that would be customarily expected after having spent a long period in a foreign country legally. These 
delays present a barrier to the integration of migrants into South African society and discourage 
migrants with short term visas from considering staying in South Africa for the long term. 
6.2.1.7 Inconsistent procedures for extension of permits  
Three issues around extension of asylum seeker and refugee permits emerged from the empirical 
research. These are the actions of DHA officials when renewing expired permits, the validity period of 
extended permits, and renewing a permit in a different RRO from where the initial permit was issued. 
Migrants with expired permits are liable to an administrative fine. The law provides that an individual 
must apply for renewal of temporary resident permits not later than 30 days prior to the date of expiry, 
and for refugees not later than 90 days prior to expiry of the permit. However, it is not clear how many 
days before expiry an asylum permit can be renewed. This has created a lot of confusion as officials 
act unreasonably and unpredictably. One migrant said that you can renew it up to two days before 
expiry. However, another migrant went two days before his permit expired and was told to come back 
on the actual date of expiry. With the way things work at the RRO there is no guarantee that the permit 
will be actually be renewed on the day of expiry. 
Another migrant (Rwandan woman, respondent 29) explained that she went to renew her permit on the 
day it was expiring and was not served. When she mentioned that her permit was expiring that day 
they still refused to give her priority and told her not to argue with them. The next day she went they 
wanted to fine her and she explained to them what happened the day before and they told her that she 
can go and explain that in court, but she stood her ground until they relented. Officials are quick to 
impose fines on those whose permits have expired by a day including those that expire on a weekend 
when the RRO is closed. Instead of appreciating the efforts of migrants to remain legal and to facilitate 
this, DHA officials resort to ‘power games’ probably to remind migrants of the power that state 
officials wield over them. Some corrupt officials have allegedly also found a way to cash in on fines. 
Instead of administering a fine of R 2,500 as stipulated in the law, they charge between R 500 and R 
1,500 to renew a permit and pocket the money (Ethiopian man, respondent 36).  
Another issue with extensions is the validity period of renewed asylum seeker and refugee permits. 
According to the Refugees Act, the initial permits are issued for a period of six months and two years 
respectively. There is no consistency or predictability after the first permit lapses and the law is silent 
in this respect. The researcher found that asylum seekers were getting their permits renewed for 
anything between 30 days and eight months and refugees for between three months and four years. 
Short extensions of asylum seeker permits have contributed to the crowds at the RRO as people have 
to keep going back almost every month. The migrants have to abandon their occupations for the better 
part of the day and incur transportation costs to make regular visits to the RRO. With some refugees 
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being eligible to access the government’s social grants as a result of a 2012 amendment to the Social 
Assistance Act 13 of 2004, the DHA has found a way to deny them access as told by one key 
informant respondent: 
The Refugees Act doesn’t specify exactly how long a refugee permit needs to be valid for. So 
now refugees are able to access the SASSA social assistance, child grants, disability grants 
and elderly grants. You must have at least three months validity on your refugee permit to 
apply and to be given a grant. So what does the Department of Home Affairs do? They start 
issuing refugee permits instead of four years, for three months. (Director at Cape Town 
Refugee Centre, respondent 41)  
This example can be viewed as the institution of an extraordinary measure to prevent migrants from 
accessing their socio-economic rights using the sovereign authority bestowed on state officials to 
decide. The practice prior to the amendment of the Social Assistance Act was to renew refugee 
permits for four years. However, because officials now want to prohibit migrants from accessing state 
welfare programmes, which the law entitles them to, they use their discretion to limit the validity of a 
refugee permit instead of outrightly violating the Social Assistance Act. This act is insensitive to the 
fact that only the indigent and needy refugees can qualify for state assistance.   
The final issue regarding extensions has to do with not being able to renew asylum and refugee 
permits in a different office from the one that issued the initial permit. For instance, someone whose 
permit was initially issued in Musina and is now in Cape Town has to go back to Musina because that 
is where their file is. As has been stated, this practice has been contested in court a number of times 
and the court ordered that the DHA should extend permits regardless of which RRO issued them. 
However, the DHA has only complied selectively.  
On the whole then, the practices of DHA officials in issues related to permit extensions make it 
difficult for migrants to retain their legal status over an extended period of time. They can be 
construed as a calculated strategy to keep migrants in a continuous state of uncertainty and to deny 
them access to basic services and other rights. 
6.2.1.8 Issuance of fraudulent permits 
The data also revealed that DHA officials are fraudulently issuing asylum seeker permits to foreigners. 
This is said to be increasingly the case since the closure of the fully fledged Cape Town RRO. The act 
of issuing asylum seeker permits itself is not illegal considering that according to the court; the DHA 
should never have stopped issuing these permits in Cape Town in the first place. The problem is that it 
is reportedly happening behind the scenes without following due process and at a cost, which makes it 
unethical. Two migrants interviewed in this study and who coincidentally had worked as interpreters 
at the RRO at different periods shed light on how officials are allegedly able to issue permits 
fraudulently (Somali man, respondent 26; Ethiopian man, respondent 36).  
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The migrants claimed that corrupt officials do not give the applicants the Eligibility Determination 
Form for Asylum Seekers to complete, which is a requirement before the permit is issued and also a 
requirement for examining their claim. They take finger prints of the applicant, enter their details into 
the computer, print out the permit on the A4 government security paper and then sign it. They omit to 
save the details entered on the computer before printing, which means that the applicant does not 
appear in the system. In other words, they capture the applicant’s details in order to issue a permit but 
this information is not stored in the system, so it is not on record. One NGO respondent claimed that 
some officials take the government security paper and print the permits in their homes. One 
Zimbabwean migrant (respondent 7) who has been undocumented since she arrived in Cape Town 
after the closure of the RRO stated that officials had offered to give her a permit if she was prepared to 
pay R 800 for it.  
While by law anyone is allowed to apply for asylum and to remain in the country until his/her claim is 
processed, DHA officials are allegedly effectively making it possible for people to get asylum papers 
without actually making a claim and enriching themselves in the process. In so doing, they open up the 
asylum system to abuse by migrants who probably do not have a legitimate claim and would not be 
able to qualify for entry into the country through the Immigration Act. Ironically though, such corrupt 
officials also provide an avenue for genuine asylum seekers who are willing to pay in order to 
circumvent the barriers to accessing the RRO and gain legal recognition. Violation of the law by 
corrupt state officials results in unintended consequences that threaten the very sovereign power of the 
state that these officials are supposed to protect. 
The fraudulent issuing of permits exposes the corruption networks in Home Affairs and is endangers 
the state’s efforts to manage immigration. Also, because of all the obstacles that make staying legal so 
difficult, migrants are incentivised to acquire fraudulent documents from corrupt officials.  
6.2.1.9 Soliciting bribes 
Another corrupt practice observed from state officials by respondents that also undermines sovereignty 
is bribery. It also violates public service ethos which bind all state officials. The extraction of bribes 
from migrants by DHA officials and agents at the DHA offices seems to be a regular practice as one 
NGO that periodically monitors the RRO claims:  
So there’s an exchange of money from one hand to the next… It’s a complicated network of 
corruption that is going on there, very complicated, but if you go there even a blind person 
would be able to tell there is corruption here. You will see middlemen scattered all over. They 
are always on their phones and they are speaking to officials inside and the security guards 
would facilitate a smooth movement and some of them would get in through gates that are 
normally reserved for officials only. (Community Liaison Officer at PASSOP, respondent 47) 
Some migrants alleged that they had paid bribes of between R 200 and R 500 just to jump the queue 
and gain access into the RRO. This money was paid to security guards or to migrants who worked in 
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cahoots with DHA officials stationed inside the offices. One migrant paid R 800 as a fine for an 
expired permit, which is lower than the R 2,500 stated in DHA Regulations, but it went into the 
official's pocket. Others paid between R 1,500 and R 4,000 for refugee permits, which together with 
asylum seeker permits are to be issued at no charge.  
The incentive for migrants to pay bribes at the RRO in particular is strong because of the inefficiencies 
and barriers that the DHA has created to prevent clients from obtaining access and staying legal. 
Those who are willing to follow legal channels unfortunately have to endure long queues, 
uncomfortable surroundings, indifferent officials, unpredictable processes and inconsistent treatment 
for the most part, all of which can be very frustrating. Officials are allegedly cashing in on the misery 
and desperation of migrants by arguably maintaining poor levels of service and creating loopholes 
through which those who are not prepared to go through the tedious process of doing things by the 
book can be served. One migrant explained it thus: 
The long queue was for them a strategy to get money from refugees because if the service is 
quick, there is no way for them to say, look, I will do this but you pay me R100. But if the 
people spend weeks to renew the papers, you go the first day they will tell you, we’re not 
ready today, come back tomorrow. The following day, no, we are not ready, come tomorrow 
again. Now in that situation, if you can pay R100 for not coming back tomorrow there is 
people who just say, ok, I’m going to pay R100 because I don’t want to come back tomorrow. 
(Angolan man, respondent 34)  
Migrants linked the bribes they paid to officials to institutional corruption, which they highlighted as a 
key institutional problem in the DHA (as quoted below) and which was also noted in Chapter 4. 
Indeed, corruption in the entire public service in South Africa is an issue of concern (Chipkin, 
2013:220).  
There has been a lot of reshuffling and firing of people but the corruption is so entrenched 
that I do not think it is going to be as easy as just firing people or replacing them, because it is 
a network really. (Rwanda woman, respondent 29) 
Corruption in the DHA has led to exploitation of vulnerable migrants and instead of advancing refugee 
protection opened up the immigration system to abuse. Corruption and the previously discussed 
fraudulent issuing of permits in the DHA are discretionary acts of exercising state authority which at 
the same time constitute abuses of power. These practices present a challenge to the state as they fall 
outside state regulation and thus undermine the state’s sovereign power. These law-breaking practices 
are presented as evidence of a state exception because alongside other practices discussed in this 
section, they fall outside state regulation and within the non-application of the law. They also occur in 
a zone where illegality and legality are hard to discern. However, they have generated networks of 
corruption, which according to Landau (2005a:17), endanger the sovereignty that the state of 
exception is intended to protect. A rival explanation is that they are symptomatic of the informalisation 
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of the state where state apparatus are exploited by state officials for their personal gain. This makes it 
easier for migrants to obtain immigration status through fraudulent and corrupt means rather than by 
following the legal route.  
Based on the above findings, this study is also concerned with “practices that have to do with the 
securing and undoing of identities” of migrants (Das & Poole, 2004:15). Specifically, these practices 
include the production of illegal migrants, barriers to accessing services and fraudulent practices 
surrounding the production and acquisition of documentation. They revolve around the application of 
residence permits and identity documents by migrants and the processing and issuing of these by the 
state. Das and Poole (2004:16) note how these state documents, which are supposed to secure 
identities, often operate in ways that undermine these same identities and assurances. 
 
6.2.2 South African Police Service officials 
Evidence of a state of exception among SAPS officials was observed in the overstepping of the 
boundaries of police powers, the exploitative use of the coercive apparatus of the state, abuse of 
discretionary powers, and unlawful practices. This was visible in the approach of the police towards 
African migrants in immigration policing; conducting raids and searches; acts of exploitation, 
extortion and extraction of bribes; and impunity when dealing with citizens who attack migrants or 
loot their possessions. These are discussed below.  
6.2.2.1 Immigration policing 
The police routinely conduct spot checks as part of crime policing and ask people to produce IDs at 
random. However, there is no legal requirement for migrants or citizens to carry their permits or IDs 
with them. Nonetheless, should a police officer request a migrant’s ID or permit and the migrant is 
unable to produce it, the police should allow the migrant time to present it.  
It is necessary to point out that most research on the role of SAPS in immigration has been conducted 
in Johannesburg which has the highest concentration of African migrants.42 The researcher’s 
interviews with the SAPS in Cape Town and with migrants and key informants, suggest that the SAPS 
in Cape Town operates differently from the police in Johannesburg. In the interview with the Western 
Cape Deputy Provincial Commissioner in charge of operations, he stated that the SAPS does not have 
a legal role in immigration enforcement and thus it is not part of their line function or core business 
(Deputy Provincial Commissioner, respondent 49). He stated that under the Aliens Control Act, which 
was repealed and replaced with the Immigration Act, a role for the police in immigration existed. 
However, under the Immigration Act, according to him, the SAPS has no legal basis for immigration 
enforcement. He was categorical that “only to the extent that if we incidentally come across a person 
that in the pursuit of other investigations is an illegal immigrant, then we would arrest that person for 
                                                     
42
 See Klaaren & Ramji, 2001; Aglotsson & Klaaren, 2002; Landau, 2005b; Landau et al., 2005; Vigneswaran & 
Duponchel, 2009; Vigneswaran, 2011; Sutton & Vigneswaran, 2011. 
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handover to the immigration officials” (Deputy Provincial Commissioner, respondent 49). Such 
person may not be detained by the police for more than 48 hours. In other words, when the police stop 
migrants and request to see their permits, it is part of crime policing and not immigration policing.  
Although the Deputy Provincial Commissioner stated that the police do not have a legal mandate to 
conduct immigration policing, there was evidence of this taking place from the field research. The 
police use racial profiling such as darker complexion and bio-cultural markers such as the inability to 
speak South African indigenous languages to detect foreigners as mentioned in Chapter 3. Such 
irrational and exclusionary practices are, as Vigneswaran (2011:151) points out, deeply embedded in 
the formal procedures, everyday routines and unwritten codes of practice.   
The migrants who had been asked for their identification felt that they were targeted because the 
police thought that they looked different while others saw it as part of the random police checks 
conducted by the police, which are part of their job description. They all had their documentation with 
them. In fact, it appears that migrants mostly carry their documentation either as a precautionary 
measure probably brought about by an awareness that they are soft targets or because they think they 
are legally required to. 
A key informant respondent reported having seen the police stopping people in the streets in Bellville, 
which has a high concentration of Somalis, asking them for their permits. She said that they were 
targeting Somalis because they look different (Director at CTRC, respondent 41). This matched the 
experiences of the migrants as it is only the Somali migrants who said that they had been asked on 
more than one occasion by the police to produce their documents whereas those of other nationalities 
had only been asked once. Other than on the streets, migrants were also stopped by the police at the 
airport and in train stations and asked to show their IDs. The evidence of immigration policing in Cape 
Town, although of a much smaller scale than Johannesburg, is an example of the existence of 
individual police officers who go beyond the bounds of their legal power to target migrants at their 
own discretion.   
Migrants explained the way immigration policing works in Johannesburg where they said that being 
stopped by the police and being asked to show one’s document is commonplace.    
Yes, I think almost every time in Joburg but not here. There are random checks whereby they 
stop you, search your bag, ask you where you’re from. I think the first thing is the language. 
The moment you speak English you are not local. That’s a dead giveaway. From there they 
need proof that you are here legally. (Zimbabwean man, respondent 3) 
Every day in Jo’burg when you are walking around you should have your ID. In April this 
year I went in Jo’burg, so just on my way out from the bus I saw the police coming to me and 
saying, ‘Hi chief, can I see your Home Affairs?’ So that means can I see your asylum papers. 
So I just take my ID and then I show them. They look, they say, ‘oh, it’s fine’. (Congolese man, 
respondent 23) 
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Only when I was in Joburg they used to ask. I came to Cape Town in 2000 and went to Joburg 
in 2002 for 8 months and I was asked more than five times for paper. (Congolese man, 
respondent 21) 
Not here, in Johannesburg. It was my first day… On my way to my auntie’s they asked. I 
showed them my passport, they said ok. (Zimbabwean woman, respondent 7) 
The experiences of migrants captured in the quotes above show that there is a higher probability of 
being asked for documentation during police spot checks in Johannesburg than in Cape Town. The 
Deputy Provincial Commissioner also explained that the SAPS does not conduct operations to find 
illegal migrants. In other words, it is not involved in immigration policing. However, it will assist any 
special operations of the DHA in this regard, for instance, by securing the building and providing 
search warrants. With regard to crime he stated that the Criminal Procedures Act 51 of 1977 is the 
primary law that governs their work where crimes are committed. According to him, when a foreigner 
is arrested for crime the police are compelled to inform the DHA and the Embassy of the foreigner in 
South Africa (Deputy Provincial Commissioner, respondent 49). 
The low incidence of immigration policing encounters could be explained by the fact that the SAPS 
does not engage in immigration enforcement as explained by the Deputy Provincial Commissioner. It 
would be interesting to explore the reasons for the differences between migrants’ experiences with 
SAPS in Johannesburg and SAPS officials in Cape Town or why the police in Johannesburg engage 
more actively in immigration policing. It is plausible that the SAPS in Johannesburg uses its 
discretionary powers to target migrants and its actions have no legal grounding or are not genuinely 
aimed at immigration enforcement. It appears that some within the police are not really interested in 
enforcing the law but in breaking it by soliciting money from migrants even when they cannot prove 
their legal status in the country. According to one migrant, the police in Johannesburg are merely 
looking to extort migrants pointing to the corruption in the SAPS. The Congolese man said “in Joburg 
it’s because they now looking after money… If you don’t have papers, you don’t worry, you must just 
have R 10, R 20, so when they ask where is your Home Affairs, you just take R 20 and give them. They 
will leave you” (Congolese man, respondent 23). 
6.2.2.2 Raiding and looting from migrants 
Respondents from organisations that work with migrants stated that the police raided the homes or 
businesses of informal traders and seized their goods or money. While the police are charged with 
crime prevention and enforcing by-laws, their methods indicate abuse of their discretionary powers 
and the arbitrary use of authority. This, together with the impunity of their actions and the 
vulnerability they expose migrants to, qualifies the raiding and looting from migrants as exceptional. It 
appears that only migrants who are engaged in businesses experienced police raids and looting, which 
means that it is tied to their occupation, in addition to their being foreign. These practices directly 
jeopardise the livelihoods of migrants. 
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One key informant respondent spoke about police operations when they visit informal businesses 
claiming to be looking for guns. The Advocacy Officer at ARESTA (respondent 45) explained that in 
the process of conducting these raids, they allegedly take money from the traders because they know 
that they mostly deal in cash. The traders cannot then go and report to the same police who raid their 
shops and expect protection.  
Another NGO respondent explained that the police use their authority to harass migrants and 
criminalise their activities even if they are legitimate: 
I’ve often seen police officers raiding foreign nationals who buy and sell TVs or those that 
repair computers – people who honestly earn a living by doing that. They have a shack where 
they do these things and yet the police would still raid them, confiscate all these things, accuse 
them of having stolen some of the equipment when in actual fact the thieves who are local are 
still wandering freely. So it’s that selective application of the justice system. (Community 
Liaison Officer at PASSOP, respondent 47) 
The police must charge or arrest migrants who they find to be violating trading laws while engaging in 
business. However, when they just raid shops and make away with goods without any arrests or 
charges, they are abusing their authority and at the same time making arbitrary decisions of when and 
when not to apply the law. They are also advancing the perception that migrants are involved in 
criminal or illegal activities. This can have a negative impact on the relationship between foreign 
nationals and the locals living within them (Community Liaison Officer at PASSOP, respondent 47). 
6.2.2.3 Exploitation, extortion and bribery 
The police allegedly abuse migrants, regardless of their legal status, in several ways which suggest 
that they are not so willing to protect and serve those who are not from South Africa. The Director of 
CTRC summed up how the police take advantage of foreigners: 
There is corruption and there’s sometimes taking advantage or using your badge and your 
weapon and your outfit as an excuse to pick up bribes, steal cigarettes, solicit all sorts of 
things. I mean I have a lot of smaller contacts who have been harassed by the police and all of 
their stuff taken away by the police even though they have legitimate operating permits. 
Informal traders who have had everything cleared out and then they only get a third of it back 
after they’ve proved that they were a legitimate business. (Director at CTRC, respondent 41)   
Another migrant explained how the police use threats to get them to give in to their demands: 
A guy come to me and he said to me that I must give him a cool drink. He said to me that if I 
don’t want to give him he will investigate the stuff that I’m selling, whether I have a licence to 
make a business or not... I said to him, just do whatever you are going to do but I’m not going 
to give you. Then he ordered me to open the gate. I said no. Then he said that he’s going to 
shoot me. I said, then shoot me. Then my wife come out, then the other guy said (they were 
two). The other guy come out and he talk to him in his language then he get in the car. And 
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this guy talk to my wife and he said they are thirsty, they need something to drink... Then my 
wife gave them 1.5 litre coke and they take it. If police ask you and they realise that you are a 
Somali and you’re foreign, then you should have to pay. Otherwise you know there is a 
problem. (Somali man, respondent 26) 
A Ugandan migrant (respondent 30) who was arrested for being in possession of a fraudulent work 
permit narrated how she was taken advantage of in the police cells. She said that she would ask the 
police to buy her food from outside as she did not like the food they were providing in the police 
station.  She claimed that the police would go out and bring the food but not give her back her change. 
Also when she run out of airtime and wanted to send the police to buy her some they only agreed on 
condition that she also bought airtime for them leaving her with no choice. A Zimbabwean migrant 
(respondent 3) claimed that he had paid bribes to the police at a police station and roadblock in 
Gauteng and at the border in Limpopo. Finally, another migrant explained how migrants get swindled 
by the police (Ethiopian man, respondent 36). The police had allegedly told a migrant that if he paid 
them R 5,000 they would find the person who had killed his brother. The migrant should have refused 
to pay the police to do their job but he paid them and nothing happened.  
Continued illegal harassment and abuse of migrants by the police through exploitation, extortion and 
bribery, creates a category of people who live in a realm that is beyond the law (Landau, 2005a:6). 
There was also evidence of DHA officials engaging in similar practices, which indicates that they are 
not limited to one state institution.  
6.2.2.4 Impunity in dealing with citizens who attack or steal from migrants 
Research respondents accused the police of not intervening when migrants fell victim to crime 
perpetrated by South Africans or for acting with impunity when they knew the perpetrators. The police 
were said to be indifferent because the victims were foreign or because they were working in cahoots 
with criminals to target foreigners. Some examples are cited below:   
If you look into the incident last year in Bishop Lavis, Somali shops have been looted and 
petrol bombed. I think there was one media which took some pictures and they were showing 
that the police were just standing while the people were looting the shops. (Kenyan man, 
respondent 39)  
They are together with those people, the skollies, ja. (Ugandan woman, respondent 30) 
Being a foreigner gives them a feeling to just rob… Even if police came and arrest… Then 
they just release them. (Ethiopian man, respondent 36) 
The above experiences are indicative of migrants having less worth than citizens in the eyes of the 
police. They also illustrate how state officials exercise their power to decide, in this instance through 
inaction and reneging on their duty to protect. These experiences of migrants reflect a culture of 
impunity with regard to official law-breaking behaviour towards African migrants. It indicates that 
that there is tacit endorsement by the state for citizens to deal with migrants by whatever means they 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
152 
 
deem appropriate. According to Mosselson (2010:653), a culture of impunity emphasises migrants’ 
lives as bare. In this way, it has been recognised as enabling xenophobia in South Africa with regard to 
ordinary citizens who perpetrate xenophobic violence (Misago, 2011). But this study finds that 
impunity also exists when it comes to general crimes committed against foreigners who escape 
punishment for their actions. Underlying this treatment is the stigmatisation of African migrants.   
 
6.2.3 City of Cape Town officials 
Only one indicator of a state of exception was observed in CoCT officials – extortion. It was specific 
to Metro Police officials and is similar to the behaviour of SAPS officials described in section 6.2.2.3 
above. Both these examples illustrate how officials exploit their mandate to target migrants. Migrants 
who had operated or were still operating businesses were specifically targeted, which negatively 
impacts on their source of livelihood. The migrants were ethnic Somalis from Somali and Kenya, and 
a Nigerian. When viewed in isolation, extortion, which sometimes goes hand in hand with bribery 
could merely indicate that there are corrupt individuals in the Metro Police/law enforcement. Also 
since all the migrants who experienced this were informal traders it could be that it is an issue that cuts 
across informal traders and not just the foreign ones. However, a Kenyan ethnic Somali respondent 
who also happened to be an official of a Somali migrants association stated that several Somalis often 
complained to him about being searched by City officials when they were looking for counterfeit 
goods (Kenyan man, respondent 40). This could imply that Somalis feel that they are particular targets 
of the Metro Police given that most of them run shops, which sell the kind of goods that the police are 
suspicious of. 
Migrants mentioned having been targeted during raids and searches conducted by the Metro Police 
and other law enforcement officials in their shops. They stated that while claiming to be searching for 
counterfeit cigarettes and contraband goods they would extort money and/or goods from foreign 
traders. While this took place mostly at the business premises, it was also happening at roadside stops 
as one migrant narrated:  
We were driving to my shop and I got stuff in a bakkie then the metro police stopped me. He 
looked the car then he checked me and he said in Xhosa,‘bring your ID out’. Then when I 
speak English he realised that I can’t speak Xhosa; I must be foreign then. He asked me my 
permit or my passport then I showed him. Then by that time he bring out paper, something like 
that, and he say that you are this and this. Then he said to me make a plan. Then I said I do 
not have the cash. He asked me what I have. I had some items that I was taking to the shop. 
Then he took two R 29 Vodacom vouchers. Then he released me. (Somali man, respondent 26)  
The fact that there was only one indicator for practices that constitute a state of exception with local 
government officials and that it has to do only with local government officials involved in law 
enforcement is an interesting finding. This is because firstly it may suggest that the less direct 
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encounters migrants have with state officials, the less vulnerable they are to abuses by state officials. 
In this study migrants had the most encounters with DHA officials and the least with the CoCT. 
Secondly, state officials with an everyday law enforcement responsibility that entails street interaction 
with people are more likely to harass and abuse migrants. Related to this is that foreigners who are 
entrepreneurs are particularly vulnerable to arbitrary and unbridled state power from law enforcement 
officials. Thirdly, it suggests that not all state institutions are complicit in enacting a state of exception 
but rather those which have more direct and day-to-day interaction with migrants.   
To sum up the response to the third research question, there was evidence of a state of exception in the 
practices of state officials in all three institutions with varying intensity (see Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). 
It appears that alongside conventional law, the paradigm according to which African migrants are 
dealt with by the South African state also includes a realm of practices that fall outside state regulation 
and within the non-application of the law. Thus, state officials operating at the frontier of state power 
create and maintain a threshold zone of exception in line with Agamben’s argument. This was evident 
in everyday practices where the law is violated and extraordinary measures are employed by officials 
to constrain some migrants and not others. Such practices were more common in relation to the DHA 
compared to the SAPS and the CoCT, which means that such practices are mostly related to the 
documentation of migrants, which is critical to their stay in South Africa. Furthermore, the measures 
that constitute a state of exception were more apparent in the RRO than in other DHA offices.  
Another way of stating these findings is in terms of the agents, targets and spaces of the exception 
presented in Figure 3.1 to show the state of exception in operation. The agents of the state of exception 
are officials from all three state institutions but particularly the DHA and SAPS. The targets of the 
exception among African migrants are predominantly asylum seekers, refugees and illegal foreigners 
as the evidence of a state of exception emerged mostly from these categories of migrants in 
comparison to temporary and permanent residents. Asylum seekers, refugees and illegal foreigners are 
therefore more vulnerable than temporary and permanent residents to the DHA’s sovereign power. In 
the case of the SAPS and CoCT, the targets are African migrants with different immigration status but 
particularly those who operate small businesses. This illustrates how distinctions between legal 
migrants and illegal foreigners are blurred in the state of exception. 
In terms of the spaces of the exception, the Cape Town RRO is the most discernible space but the 
DHA head office in Pretoria is also implicated as a space of exception. This is not only because it has 
a hand in the operations of the RRO, but also because most permit applications are sent to Pretoria for 
processing. A more general space of exception observed is the site where migrants collide with law 
enforcement agents either from the SAPS or CoCT. Indeed, in the case of the CoCT there was no 
evidence from other municipal officials of practices that are indicative of a state of exception except 
for the Metro Police. Consequently, while the exception occurs in a few particular places more than 
others, migrants are generally at risk of being taken outside the law at any moment where the practice 
of sovereign power occurs and not only in spatially defined zones in the territory as recognised in 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
154 
 
some of the literature. This symbolises the ever-present potential for being reduced to bare life that 
Agamben theorises about. Moreover, because migrants in South Africa live side by side with citizens 
as opposed to in isolated camps, the state of exception pervades the territory of the state. In other 
words, the topological structure of the exception can be observed in the entire territory as it is 
potentially a zone of indistinction between those who are included by virtue of their exclusion and 
those who are excluded through their inclusion.     
Finally, although the findings were determined by the level of interaction migrants had with the three 
different institutions, they suggest that the state of exception is not legitimised in the entire polity but it 
is a mechanism that is applied by those state institutions that have more face-to-face interaction with 
migrants. In this case, the agents of the state of exception are more likely to be from the DHA and the 
SAPS than the CoCT. Some state institutions by virtue of their mandate and level of direct interaction 
with migrants are able to exert more power over the lives of migrants than others. Stated differently, 
the sovereign power that the state has over migrants’ lives is more visible in state institutions that 
interact with them on an everyday basis than in those which do not. This demonstrates how within the 
state its officials can blur the lines between lawfulness and lawlessness through “everyday practices of 
avoiding, bending or performing the law” (Hagmann & Korf, 2012:210).  
In answering the research question about the evidence of a state of exception, this study demonstrates 
that although South Africa has firmly committed itself to the rule of law and human rights in its legal 
system, the practices of some of its state officials depart from this. This highlights the gap between 
migrants’ rights on paper and in practice by demonstrating both the rule of law and at the same time 
the absence of law in the everyday practices of the state. Obstacles to obtaining immigration status 
created by DHA officials in particular undermine the liberal character of the South African 
constitution, which grants migrants the same rights as citizens save for two provisions. Instead of 
blurring the lines between citizens and non-citizens, these obstacles delineate them in practice. The 
basis for this delineation is the construction of migrants as a threat. In addition, corruption and 
fraudulent practices point to informal economies within the state. 
South Africa is also regarded as one of only a few comparatively strong states in Africa by Rotberg 
(2013) and others. However, as recognised in section 4.3, it faces a number of capacity and resource 
constraints. In addition, this chapter shows that there are those segments of the population (African 
migrants) who cannot rely on the government for legal protection. It appears that this has less to do 
with the constraints facing state institutions but it is arguably because of deliberate and strategic 
measures which allow some officials to step outside of the law in the name of protecting South Africa 
from the danger of migrants and to deny them their rights and existence in South Africa.  
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Figure 6.1: Indicators of a state of exception in the practices of DHA officials 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Indicators of a state of exception in the practices of SAPS officials 
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Figure 6.3: Indicators of a state of exception in the practices of CoCT officials 
 
6.3 The state of exception and xenophobia in South Africa 
To what extent has a state of exception in dealing with African migrants shaped xenophobia in South 
Africa? This research question seeks to explore the relationship between the state of exception and 
xenophobia based on the evidence presented so far and the primary data generally. Given that the 
previous section dealt with evidence of a state of exception in terms of the exercise of sovereign 
power, this section revisits the concept from the perspective of bare life. Agamben (1998) 
conceptualises the state of exception in terms of sovereign power and bare life. For him these are 
paradoxically two sides of the same coin. The evidence presented in the previous section is slanted 
towards the sovereign power side of the state of exception with bare life being implicit. Inseparable as 
these two elements are, this section will give more attention to the bare life aspect of the state of 
exception.  
It is worth recalling that migrants are reduced to bare life because of their exclusion from national 
citizenship by the state (Agamben, 2000). Although Agamben uses the refugee’s exclusion from the 
state to make this point, it can also include other categories of migrants. In terms of xenophobia, the 
findings on this thus far are reviewed in terms of the operationalisation of the term in Chapter 2 and in 
terms of the broader South African social context in which migrants live. This approach aims to tie up 
the two main concepts used in the study, due to their common exclusionary character, and make final 
conclusions that address the research question. In terms of the application of Atlas.ti, this section 
analyses the results related to the codes and categories that operationalised bare life and xenophobia. 
 
6.3.1 Bare life 
Das and Poole (2004:13) observe that Agamben conceptualises bare life in two ways; one is by 
assigning it to specific spaces and figures, such as the concentration camp and the refugee 
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respectively, and the other is by conceptualising it as a potential threat and condition into which 
anyone could fall. The concern here is with the latter conceptualisation. However, according to the 
author’s reading of Agamben, he uses the term both philosophically and literally while remaining 
ambiguous about how it is concretely observed. For Agamben, those reduced to bare life are 
biologically alive but “lacking almost all the rights and expectations that we customarily attribute to 
human existence” (Agamben, 1998:159). Therefore, this study borrows from the interpretations of 
other scholars for the operationalization of bare life. According to Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 
(2004:50), bare life includes the dependence on the whims of state officials “for full enjoyment of life, 
livelihood, and personal security and dignity”.  Kearns (2007:7) interprets bare life as a condition in 
which some lives are treated as if they were either not worth living or not worth protecting. 
Bare life, as a corollary of sovereign power, can be viewed as an outcome of the measures that 
constitute a state of exception summarised in Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, which were found to vary in 
intensity. The vulnerability that many migrants are condemned to has been alluded to in section 6.2. 
Using the term ‘bare life’ underscores the potential that the practices of state officials have to threaten 
the humanity of migrants. To this extent, migrants are at the mercy of state officials in terms of how 
they interpret and apply their power to decide.  
In Chapter 5, the researcher concluded that the poor treatment migrants experienced from officials 
infringed their dignity and showed the low value attached to migrants lives because they are non-
citizens. This was based on the choice of words they used to describe their treatment such as 
‘dehumanise’, ‘slave’ and ‘criminal’, among others; the physical abuse they were subjected to by 
DHA officials; and the inferior environment of the RRO where some migrants are served. In the first 
part of Chapter 6, the details of the poor treatment were analysed in terms of exceptional bureaucratic 
practices and showed that these practices, which are outside the law, have serious consequences for 
the lives of migrants in terms.    
Examples of the state of exception pointed out earlier show that bare life may not be immediate or 
clearly visible from one encounter with a state official but rather that some practices have a longer 
lasting impact on the lives of migrants and their existence in South Africa, which could relegate them 
to bare life. These practices apply to DHA officials and relate to documentation, which for migrants is 
absolutely critical. For example, the generation of illegal migrants through delays in processing 
permits and loss of files, or reducing the validity of refugee permits to prevent them from accessing 
social grants deny migrants any legal status in the country and/or access to social services. Other 
permit-related processes and the barriers to accessing services at the DHA also mean that the status of 
many migrants in South Africa is unstable. Such practices expose segments of the migrant population 
to bare life as they struggle to earn sustainable livelihoods and integrate into the community while in 
the country, which is likely to push them to the periphery. They also have the potential to push many 
migrants to menial jobs and the informal sector. This includes those with a tertiary education and/or 
entrepreneurial skills, which would otherwise be expected to give them an advantage in life. Instead, 
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some find themselves engaging in survivalist occupations even after having spent many years in the 
country as refugees, for example, and have been unable to acquire permanent residence even when 
they are eligible for it.  
With regard to police practices, examples of bare life were evident in those situations where migrants 
felt like the underdogs of society who can be trampled upon by the police and citizens, and that their 
lives were undervalued. In these instances, the police failed to exercise their duty to protect in relation 
to migrants who were victims of crime even when the police knew who the perpetrators were or when 
they simply ignored calls for help from migrants. The police also failed to act when foreigners had 
been killed in alleged hate crimes and did not arrest the perpetrators. Migrants suggested that they 
probably would have been treated differently if they were South Africans in such circumstances.  
State officials seem to disassociate the inalienable human rights that all humans have by virtue of their 
humanness from migrants thus devaluing their lives. This resonates with Agamben’s assertion that in 
reality human beings are not equal because of their humanness despite the whole notion of human 
rights (Agamben, 2000). From the quotes below, one of which bears repeating from an earlier section 
but is used in a different context here, it seems that migrants need more than just their humanity to be 
taken seriously by state officials.  
Some police are very helpful but others are very negative. When it comes to helping the 
foreigners they have got the very negative perception. Unless if they see you that you are a bit, 
maybe sometimes educated, or maybe you are going with someone who is a citizen, that time 
maybe they might help you, but if you go alone in many cases they usually do not, they don’t 
treat you very nicely. (Kenyan man, respondent 39) 
I delayed to go and renew my permit by almost a week cause I was sick. I even showed them 
the doctor’s certificate. They told me I had to pay R 2,500 but I told them I don’t have money 
and I am not working. I came to PASSOP and they gave me a white guy to help me who went 
with me to Home Affairs. When they saw a white guy they were asking what is happening. He 
questioned them then they started denying and told me to go the next day... I went back again 
they gave me a letter I took to UCT then I went the next day and they gave me a paper. I don’t 
think they helped me cause of who I am. They helped me cause they assumed that there is a 
pressure. Other people were telling me, we’ll show you someone who you can pay R 1,000 or 
we’ll show you someone you can pay R 500. (Rwandan man, respondent 28) 
The above quotes based on experiences with the police and immigration officials show that if a 
migrant is perceived to be educated, has a South African contact, or has access to an NGO or legal aid 
they add some kind of worth to their lives which makes state officials pay attention to their issues. The 
latter excerpt also has additional significance. Firstly, it implies that state officials, who are 
presumably black in this instance, associate whiteness with power and blackness with powerlessness. 
African migrants could therefore be exposed to a double exclusion based not only their foreignness but 
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also based on their race. Secondly, it shows that they are possibly targeted for extortion and 
exploitation in order to sustain corrupt officials. State officials could be giving them a hard time 
deliberately in an effort to frustrate them and get them to contemplate parting with money in order to 
get service.  
In line with Kearns (2007:7), the above describes an environment in which some lives are treated as if 
they were either not worth living or not worth protecting. However, the findings also suggest that the 
state of exception may not always result in bare life and even when it does; it varies in intensity 
showing that not all of Agamben’s theoretical subtleties apply for three reasons. Firstly, is the 
acknowledgement in Chapter 5 that not all migrants are treated poorly by state officials and this could 
be because of what Agamben refers to as the civility and ethical sense of the sovereign official.  
Secondly, it is because of the individual’s own ability to assert themselves based on an awareness of 
their rights and the law. Migrants who are acquainted with the law are empowered to demand certain 
treatment from the police, whereas those who are ignorant of the law can be taken advantage of as 
revealed in Chapter 5. Thirdly, it is due to the ability of migrants to gain access to human rights or 
migrant organisations that champion their cause. Earlier examples include the willingness of NGOs to 
assist migrants with police cases that they may have, the assistance they provided to migrants to get 
their documentation from DHA and the litigation against the DHA mentioned by NGOs in an effort to 
protect the rights of asylum seekers and refugees. These open up possibilities to mitigate bare life 
which is characteristic of the state of exception. However, despite the revelation of these possibilities, 
their success was not always evident and it was not clear under what conditions migrants or NGOs 
chose to utilise them as they were only mentioned in particular instances and not in others. The 
findings pertaining to bare life suggest varying degrees of bare life with some examples being more or 
less harsh than others, which Agamben does not seem to acknowledge in his work. Based on this, the 
author supports the criticism that Agamben has received for his dualistic theorisation of homo sacer or 
bare life which should instead be regarded as being “less solid and stable” than Agamben submits 
(Long, in Ek, 2006:371). In Agamben’s conceptualisation, one is either homo sacer or potentially 
homo sacer with no in-between.  
 
6.3.2 Xenophobia 
Examples of migrants describing their poor treatment by state officials as a manifestation of 
xenophobia were provided in Chapter 5.  These examples were in line with the operational definition 
adopted by the researcher in Chapter 3. Xenophobia was defined and measured in terms of a set of 
negative attitudes or dispositions towards non-South Africans. Xenophobia includes discriminatory 
attitudes, hostility and intolerance towards foreigners by citizens and the state. Indeed, all of these are 
reflected in the findings in sections 5.2 and section 5.3 relating to the first two research questions with. 
Migrants recognised that the negative treatment they received from state officials stems from the fact 
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that they are non-South Africans. The research therefore confirmed the existence of institutional and 
public xenophobia, which other researchers have also observed.  
Two issues related to state-level xenophobia can be distilled from the data. Firstly, that asylum seekers 
and refugees seem to encounter state-level xenophobia more than temporary and permanent residents. 
This seems to follow naturally in the case of DHA officials given that it was noted in section 5.3.1 that 
these categories of migrants tend to have more negative experiences with DHA officials due to their 
legal status, which is perceived as inferior. However, when it comes to SAPS and CoCT officials who 
do not distinguish based on migrant category, the researcher can only speculate from the data since 
this was not a research question. It is possible that these categories of migrants operate as informal 
traders and hence are likely to come into contact with law enforcement officials. Alternatively, they 
are more likely than so-called economic migrants to live in impoverished areas where violent 
xenophobia is rife, such as in black townships, and the state officials they encounter there also display 
similar attitudes to those of the community. It is therefore plausible that the same applies in the context 
of public xenophobia, whereby asylum seekers and refugees experience more public xenophobia, at 
least the violent manifestation of it, than temporary and permanent migrants. Even so, temporary and 
permanent residents who reside in townships seem to be vulnerable to violent xenophobia because of 
their socio-economic status as opposed to their legal status. To summarise, institutional xenophobia is 
manifested in discriminatory attitudes, hostility and intolerance towards migrants based on their 
immigration status, socio-economic status and geographical location.   
Secondly, xenophobia at the state-level can be more accurately described as institutional rather than 
institutionalised. Although the data revealed mostly negative experiences of migrants with state 
officials, which includes xenophobia, the fact that there were positive experiences suggests that 
xenophobia exists at the state-level but it is not necessarily part of the institutional culture. In the case 
of Home Affairs, exclusion could be institutionalised by virtue of its immigration mandate which 
distinguishes between citizens and foreigners. How this exclusion is expressed, however, is not always 
anchored in law but rather in a belief that certain categories of non-citizens threaten the security of the 
state more than others, which can be construed as xenophobic. Different degrees of institutional 
xenophobia in the DHA, SAPS and CoCT also show that institutional xenophobia has not permeated 
the entire state.  
Beyond state-level xenophobia, migrants also revealed how they had experienced xenophobia as part 
of life in South Africa fostered by citizens. Their examples spanned violent xenophobic attacks, verbal 
abuse and threats as portrayed below: 
It was 2009 here in Imizamo Yethu. They were just torturing us, stealing our stuff and so on. 
(Zimbabwean woman, respondent 6) 
They were screaming – no beat her, those foreigner they must go back to their countries, what 
are they doing here, in Xhosa, and another guy joined in. They kicked me, they beat me like a 
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thief… yoh! They tore my jacket.  I had a golden chain from home. They pulled it. They cut it. 
They took it. They pulled the earrings so I was screaming until another train came it’s when 
they leave me and they run away. (Burundian woman, respondent 37) 
They are saying if Mandela pass away they will loot your shop or take everything that you 
got…you must go back to your country. (Somali man, respondent 26) 
6.3.3 Discussion 
In terms of linking the two concepts in this section together, the results of the study indicate that the 
state of exception and xenophobia produce similar outcomes in their targets; who they view as posing 
a real or imagined threat to the national order of things. Indeed, the experiences of migrants with state 
officials show that there is a thin line between a state of exception and xenophobia at the level of the 
state. The state of exception is defined in this study as a structural condition, which is an attribute of 
the political system and of the institutional character of the state, and which allows for state officials to 
discriminate against migrants, regardless of their motivations and to get away with it. Xenophobia is 
defined as a set of attitudes.  
Both concepts possess an exclusionary power that marginalises migrants as it delineates them from 
citizens by marking them as the ‘enemy’ within. This is the exclusionary inclusion that structures the 
state of exception where what is excluded from the juridical order is also included by virtue of its 
exclusion (Agamben, 2005:35) The manner in which frontline officials, particularly those from the 
DHA and SAPS, exercise their power results in the exclusion of migrants in the same way that 
xenophobia results in the social exclusion of migrants. This exclusion as a result of both the state of 
exception and xenophobia further exposes them to bare life. This is reflected in the challenges that 
migrants face in the course of trying to make a living in South Africa. For instance, respondents 
narrated how migrants are excluded from social services and banking services, and how they face 
discrimination in higher education institutions, private housing and jobs. Examples of the latter two 
are quoted below from a key informant and migrant: 
They have some more struggles with housing than I would say South Africans in terms of 
gaining access because people are xenophobic and don’t want to rent to them. Or they cluster 
and then they end up 15 people in a one-bedroom apartment. (Director at CTRC, respondent 
41) 
Even on that permit they wrote you’re entitled to study or to work. But when you go on the 
work place with all the criteria and… you have the experience, you have the knowledge but 
they said green I.D. So you are stuck. (Burundi woman, respondent 37)  
So, while South African immigration policy promotes self-sufficiency and integration into society, the 
poor perception and treatment of migrants leads to their social exclusion. This means that many of 
them are prevented from enjoying their rights. It also illustrates the everyday effects of the entrenched 
negative discourse on migrants. 
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The final quote from an attorney at the LRC captures the vulnerability that migrants are exposed to 
when the state of exception and xenophobia combine. 
The enormous number of refugees who are desperate to be resettled in other countries and 
even the number of Somalis… They would rather go back to Mogadishu than to continue to 
live here being looted and robbed around every turn. But it is really extraordinary the number 
of people who have been here for some years who are desperately insecure. They cannot rely 
on the protection of the state and they are very vulnerable, not only in the ordinary sense, but 
even when they have managed to get their assailants or robbers arrested. They then become 
even more frightened because there is no system here worth talking about of witness 
protection and all that happens is the robber or the rapist’s friends and family threaten the 
complainant’s family and people come in here crying wanting to be relocated to Australia or 
Canada or the United States or wherever, and I am forced to tell them that very few people 
succeed and even if they do it takes forever for the UNHCR to persuade another country to 
accept refugees from South Africa. (Attorney at LRC, respondent 46) 
It is on the basis of the above excerpt and an overall analysis of the data that the researcher asserts that 
the state of exception and xenophobia both identify migrants as an excludable group and thus makes 
them vulnerable. However, it is difficult to say with certainty whether a state of exception shapes 
xenophobia or whether xenophobia contributes to the state of exception. Agamben (1998) argues that 
various forms of abuse directed at migrants are enabled by an originary distinction between citizen and 
non-citizen. From the data, it appears that the state of exception creates the space for xenophobia to 
flourish or exacerbates xenophobia through its differential treatment of migrants from citizens. 
Therefore, rather than counter xenophobia, the practices of frontline state officials, which are evidence 
of a state of exception, make them vulnerable to xenophobia. On the other hand, pre-existing 
xenophobia in state officials could be behind the state of exception to the same effect of marginalising 
migrants. The data suggest that xenophobic attitudes of state officials lead to practices that constitute a 
state of exception. Xenophobia gives rise to the idea of the ‘migrant threat’ and at the same time the 
political discourse on migrants posing a threat is in itself a xenophobic discourse. In the final analysis, 
there seems to be a complex relationship between the state of exception and xenophobia. It is not a 
linear relationship but rather a multi-directional cycle as shown in Figure 6.4. The state of exception 
and xenophobia therefore seem to reinforce each other. 
Mosselson (2010:643) argues that exclusionary practices directed at migrants are a defining feature of 
the South African state and one of the foundations of citizenship. They have created boundaries 
between ‘us and them’. African migrants caught in the state of exception threaten the oneness of the 
nation embodied in the sovereign state. Therefore, the state of exception is undertaken with the intent 
of protecting this order and migrants are marked as dangerous bodies in the context of Agamben’s 
conceptualisation of bare life, which he uses both metaphorically and literally. As migrants become 
the focus of the state’s fears, the exception becomes a day-to-day mechanism of governing expressed 
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in the practices of state officials presented in this chapter rather than an extraordinary measure during 
a period of emergency. This is summarised in Figure 6.4. Violations of the Constitution, Refugees Act 
and Immigration Act are thought to be routine, widespread and systematic rather than idiosyncratic 
and anecdotal (Human Rights Watch, 2006:3; Landau et al., 2005).   
 
 
Figure 6.4: Migrants, the state of exception and xenophobia 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the results of the latter two secondary research questions of the qualitative 
study using Atlas.ti and interpreted them. The key findings are summarised below. 
The key finding in the third research question is that there is evidence of a state of exception in the 
practices of state officials in all three institutions. However, the extent of this evidence varies in each 
institution. In other words, the agents of the state of exception are officials from all three state 
institutions but particularly the DHA and SAPS. The targets of the exception among African migrants 
are predominantly asylum seekers, refugees and illegal foreigners as the evidence emerged mostly 
from these categories of migrants in comparison to temporary and permanent residents. This applies to 
the migrants targeted by DHA officials. When it comes to the SAPS and CoCT, migrants who are 
informal traders are targeted more than those in other occupations. In terms of the spaces of the 
exception, the Cape Town RRO is the most discernible space but the DHA head office in Pretoria is 
also implicated as a space of exception. A more general space of exception observed is the site at 
which migrants collide with law enforcement agents either from the SAPS or CoCT. SAPS officials in 
Johannesburg are notably much more involved in immigration policing than their counterparts in Cape 
Town. This suggests that the state of exception is not only confined to anomalous spaces as some of 
the literature suggests but also encompasses other spatiotemporal contexts where the state and 
migrants interact. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
164 
 
The findings also show that there is no uniformity in the exclusionary bureaucratic practices of the 
three institutions although they are all part of the state. In fact, the less direct encounters migrants have 
with state officials, the less vulnerable they are to abuses by state officials. Migrants had the most 
encounters with DHA officials and the least with the CoCT. Also, state officials with an everyday law 
enforcement responsibility that brings them into the daily spaces in which migrants operate are more 
likely to harass and abuse migrants. Related to this is that foreigners who are entrepreneurs are 
particularly vulnerable to arbitrary and unbridled state power from law enforcement officials, which is 
potentially damaging to their source of livelihood. Therefore, from the examination of three state 
institutions, the researcher infers that some state institutions by virtue of their mandate and level of 
direct interaction with migrants are able to exert more power over the lives of migrants than others.  
So, not all state institutions are complicit in declaring a state of exception but rather those which have 
more direct and day-to-day interaction with migrants.   
With respect to the fourth research question, the key finding is that the link between the state of 
exception and xenophobia probably lies in bare life as both concepts identify migrants as an 
excludable group. The findings pertaining to bare life are in line with those of the state of exception 
which show varying degrees of intensity. Unlike Agamben’s dualisitic formulation of bare life, the 
findings reveal various manifestations of bare life, which Agamben does not seem to acknowledge in 
his theory. Both the state of exception and xenophobia are intertwined and dialectical resulting in a 
complex relationship. The state of exception enables xenophobia while at the same time xenophobia 
leads to a state of exception. In this way, the state of exception and xenophobia reinforce each other. 
This makes it difficult for the same state officials who use the state of exception mechanism to 
constrain migrants to counter xenophobia at the same time. However, state officials, key informants 
and even migrants recognise the potential power of agency to mitigate the state of exception and 
xenophobia in certain instances. This agency seeks to be used to access the provisions of the same law 
that is suspended or violated by state officials, a sign that the rule of law still has its place, if only one 
has the resources to access it and the justice system functions optimally.  
Taken together, the findings from Chapters 5 and 6 indicate an affirmative response to the central 
research question. The practices of state officials towards African migrants reinforce state-level 
xenophobia in particular and general xenophobia in South Africa. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents the end product of the research endeavour. It begins with a brief discussion of 
the salient points from each chapter as the building blocks of the dissertation. It then summarises the 
main findings obtained from the primary research in relation to the research questions presented at the 
start of the study. This is followed by a summary of the overall conclusions of the study linking them 
to the literature and the theory, as well as the objectives of the research. It also states the contribution 
of the dissertation before proposing areas for further research.  
  
7.1 Dissertation overview 
Chapter 1 explained the rationale of the study, the problem statement and the methodological approach 
adopted to address the problem. Proceeding from the assumption that xenophobia holds negative 
consequences for South Africa’s democracy, the study set out to investigate how state power is 
exercised by frontline officials of selected state institutions when dealing with African migrants and 
how this relates to widespread xenophobia in South Africa. The study examined the practices of junior 
bureaucrats from three selected institutions in relation to African migrants. These institutions are the 
Department of Home Affairs (DHA), the South African Police Service (SAPS) and local government 
– the City of Cape Town (CoCT). These institutions were selected because their responsibilities lead 
them to interact directly with migrants compared to other state institutions. 
The study was undertaken in Cape Town as an ethnographic field study that drew upon in-depth 
interviews with a diverse sample of African migrants, key informant organisations and state officials, 
as well as observation of selected DHA offices. Primary data were gathered from a sample of 40 
African migrants, seven key informant organisations and two state officials between July and October 
2013. Semi-structured interviews and observations were the data-collection instruments used. 
Interview transcripts and field notes were analysed using Atlas.ti, a computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis software. 
The study was guided by the following primary research question: Do the practices of state officials 
(from the DHA, SAPS and CoCT), as experienced by African migrants, reinforce xenophobia in South 
Africa? This question was addressed by way of four secondary questions:  
a) How are the practices of South African state officials experienced by African migrants? 
b) To what extent are African migrants treated differently by South African state officials in 
terms of their legal status or nationality? 
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c) Is the approach of South African state officials towards African migrants evidence of a state of 
exception?  
d) If so, to what extent has a state of exception in dealing with African migrants shaped 
xenophobia in South Africa? 
Chapter 2 contextualised international migration to South Africa, which has a long history. The 
chapter began by acknowledging that, by definition, non-citizens are excluded from the state and that 
international migration is an issue that involves state sovereignty. Structurally, the state is 
characterised by a bias towards its citizens and an implicit alienation of the non-national (Monson, 
2012:463). International migrants, therefore, challenge the triad of state-territory-citizen and are thus 
constructed as a threat to the national order of things. It was recognised that state immigration policies 
serve to mark the individual as external to the nation-state in order to facilitate identification and 
control, thus performing the gate-keeping function of enforcing territorial sovereignty (Dauvergne, 
2004:86; Tuitt, 2004:48). 
The chapter then identified African migrants as forming the bulk of international migrants in post-
apartheid South Africa, with most of them originating from neighbouring southern African countries. 
The chapter also noted the complex nature of African migration to South Africa, which is the 
consequence of a range of economic, political, socio-cultural and personal factors. It observed that the 
presence of African migrants in South Africa is largely viewed in negative terms in the country. This 
is reflected by state responses which have centred on overstating the scale of international migration to 
suggest an overwhelming problem for the country which threatens citizens’ livelihoods. Public 
discourse has also linked migration to the high crime rate and perceives migrants as takers who plan to 
settle in South Africa permanently. Migrants are therefore regarded as a danger to the nation. 
Chapter 3 critically reviewed the literature on xenophobia and the state of exception. It first defined 
the terms ‘migrant’, ‘the state’, ‘xenophobia’, ‘state of exception’ and ‘bare life’ which are key 
concepts used in the study. In line with the United Nations (UN) definition a migrant was defined as 
“an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, 
voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate” (International 
Organization for Migration, 2011:62). This definition was applied to those of African nationality in 
South Africa, since the focus was on African migrants as they bear the brunt of xenophobia. The state 
was defined in terms of its territorial, institutional and central nature in line with dominant scholarly 
definitions as well as its core function of providing political goods to those living within its borders. 
Xenophobia was defined and operationalised as discriminatory attitudes, hostility and intolerance 
towards foreigners by citizens and the state emanating from the construction of African migrants as a 
threat to the human security of South Africans. The state of exception was defined as the implicit 
authorisation of state officials to operate outside the law in order to protect the state from the migrant 
threat. The African migrant is marked as a threat to the national identity, security and well-being of the 
South African state. This declaration of the state of exception endorses practices in which the law 
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itself is either suspended or regarded as an instrument that state officials may enact as a strategy for 
constraining and monitoring the African migrant population. The state of exception impacts negatively 
on the lives of migrants. It subjugates people to a state of bare life where they are abandoned by the 
law, stripped of their rights and their lives are treated as not worth living or protecting.  
The chapter then presented evidence from the literature of xenophobia as a longstanding and 
widespread phenomenon which makes for a hostile reception for many foreign nationals in South 
Africa. It showed that xenophobia ranges from the expression of general attitudes of intolerance to 
outright violence, and it emanates from the public, the media and the state. In addition, it examined the 
body of knowledge that seeks to explain why xenophobia exists in the first instance. It juxtaposed 11 
explanations showing the complexity of xenophobia as a phenomenon, but also the multiple 
disciplinary perspectives from which it can be approached. It then highlighted which of the materialist, 
sociological, socio-cultural and political theories were relevant for the study and why.   
The chapter then anchored the study at hand within the state of exception theory of Giorgio Agamben 
(1998, 2005) by linking xenophobia to legal discrimination as well as withdrawal and non-application 
of the law when it comes to migrants in the second part of the chapter. Underlying the detailed 
discussion of Agamben’s biopolitical theory of sovereignty is the state’s power over life. It also 
reviewed the literature on Agamben’s theory, which has informed research in various country settings 
on topics such as the condition of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, and the security situation 
since the global ‘war on terror’.   
The state of exception was operationalised in Chapter 3 by taking into account existing research and 
the researcher’s own interpretation of Agamben. In order to find evidence of Agamben’s state of 
exception in South Africa, agents, targets, spaces and indicators of a state of exception were identified. 
State officials from the DHA, SAPS and CoCT were identified as possible agents, while African 
migrants were identified as the targets. The spaces where the state of exception would be observed 
were defined as the locations in which migrants come into contact with the possible agents of the 
exception. These include government offices, police stations and the streets, among others.  
For the purposes of the empirical research, the following 13 practices by state officials were 
established as indicators of a state of exception: flouting the laws relating to migrants; overstepping 
the bounds of their authority; abuse of official and discretionary powers; irregular policing of 
foreigners; perpetration of human rights violations; institution of extraordinary measures to exclude 
migrants from accessing basic social services; impunity of perpetrators of xenophobic violence; 
barriers to accessing documentation from Home Affairs; fraudulent practices surrounding the 
production and acquisition of documentation; production or generation of migrants who are extra-legal 
by denying them documentation; exploitation and extortion; irregular arrest and detention of migrants; 
illegal raids and looting of migrants’ property; and corrupt behaviour in service provision, for example 
bribery. Bare life was operationlised by way of a definition that includes the dependence on the whims 
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of state officials for full enjoyment of migrant rights and the condition in which some lives are treated 
as if they were either not worth living or not worth protecting. 
From the review of the literature, two gaps were identified which this study has attempted to address. 
The first is that the studies on the prevalence of xenophobia shed insufficient light on what variables 
determine how migrants experience xenophobia, whether from the state or the general public. 
Secondly, the reviewed political explanations of xenophobia do not sufficiently go beyond describing 
certain state practices and discourses as xenophobic to provide supporting empirical evidence of how 
the state engenders xenophobia on an everyday basis through its practices. This study sought to 
empirically provide a nuanced understanding of how migrants experience xenophobia based on 
variables such their legal status and nationality. It also attempted to expand existing statist 
explanations of xenophobia by bringing in the element of state power to an investigation of the 
relationship between the state and African migrants.  
Chapter 4 provided a contextual background to the regulatory environment within which state officials 
from the DHA, SAPS and CoCT (as representatives of the state) interact with migrants and vice versa. 
The chapter began by outlining the legal framework that regulates the rights and obligations of 
migrants; this includes the Constitution (1996), the Refugees Act (1998) and the Immigration Act 
(2002) and the Regulations of the last two Acts. With regard to the Constitution, the focus was on the 
Bill of Rights and the provisions that establish the different tiers of government. The discussion on the 
Refugees Act and Immigration Act highlighted the legal categories of migrants covered under the 
respective Acts, i.e. asylum seekers and refugees in the former, and temporary residents, permanent 
residents and illegal foreigners in the latter. It also underlined the rights and obligations of migrants. 
This section concluded that the letter of the law, specifically the Constitution and the Refugees Act, 
grants migrants of different legal status a broad range of rights and protections. As a result, these two 
pieces of legislation are regarded as among the best in the world.   
The chapter also described the legislated functions of the DHA, SAPS and local government both in 
broad terms and also in relation to the services they need to provide to migrants. It sketched a picture 
of the context within which these institutions operate and how they are perceived in terms of service 
delivery. It was pointed out that they all face challenges related to capacity, skills, resources and 
delivery. In addition, this chapter described the different settings in which state officials from each of 
the institutions come into contact with migrants. Stated differently, this chapter provided a background 
to the possible agents, targets and spaces of the state of exception. It laid the basis for an empirical 
analysis of the experiences of African migrants with state officials and an analysis of instances in 
which these experiences are evidence of the disjuncture between law and practice.   
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 contain the presentation and analysis of the empirical qualitative data in 
relation to the research questions, which was done using Atlas.ti. The findings are summarised below 
according to the research questions.  
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7.2 Summary of findings 
This section summarises the key findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 in relation to the research 
questions of the study. 
The first research question asked how the practices of state officials from the DHA, SAPS and CoCT 
are experienced by African migrants. It was found that, firstly, migrants did not encounter all the three 
state institutions uniformly. While all 40 of them, by virtue of being foreigners, had encountered the 
DHA, only 28 had experienced the SAPS and 11 the CoCT. Secondly, migrants’ experiences with 
these officials were mixed. Some experienced being treated positively and some negatively. Migrants 
did not generalise their experiences as they recognised that the individual attributes of the state 
officials played a part in how they experienced them. However, on the whole, the majority 
experienced being treated poorly, especially by DHA officials, followed by SAPS officials and, to a 
lesser degree, CoCT officials. It was therefore inferred that migrants generally experience being 
treated poorly by state officials. Migrants’ experiences with DHA officials at the Refugee Reception 
Office (RRO) stood out as being particularly appalling.  
The second research question sought to establish the extent to which African migrants are treated 
differently by state officials based on their legal status or nationality. The data reveal that the basis for 
migrants’ mostly negative experiences with state officials is simply their status as non-South Africans. 
No patterns based on the legal category of migrants or their nationalities were observed in the way that 
migrants experienced SAPS and CoCT officials. However, when it came to DHA officials, there is an 
apparent difference in how foreigners are treated. Differential treatment was experienced based on 
legal category, implying a hierarchy of migrants in the eyes of DHA officials. Migrants who are 
served at the RRO – asylum seekers and refugees – experienced worse treatment than temporary and 
permanent residents who are served in DHA offices. Although the research question limited itself to 
differential treatment on the basis of legal status and nationality, the data suggest that there might be 
other variables that determine how migrants experience state officials. These include residential area, 
socio-economic status, level of education and knowledge of the law or access to some form of legal 
aid or civil society organisation. To some extent this shows that some officials take the categories of 
migrants for granted seeing them simply as foreigners or amakwerekwere and not as legal beings.   
The third research question examined whether the approach of state officials towards African migrants 
was evidence of a state of exception in South Africa. The data indicate an affirmative response to the 
research question, as the key finding was that there is evidence of a state of exception in the practices 
of state officials in all three institutions albeit in varying degrees. In other words, the agents of the 
state of exception are officials from all three state institutions, but more so the DHA and SAPS. The 
targets of the exception by the DHA among African migrants are predominantly asylum seekers, 
refugees and illegal foreigners, as the evidence emerged mostly from these categories of migrants in 
comparison to temporary and permanent residents. Among African migrants targeted by the SAPS and 
CoCT, those who are informal traders are soft targets compared to those in other occupations. 
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In terms of the spaces of the exception, the Cape Town RRO is the most discernible space, but the 
DHA head office in Pretoria is also implicated as a space of exception. A more general space of 
exception observed is the public space in which migrants collide with law enforcement agents either 
from the SAPS or CoCT. SAPS officials in Cape Town engage in immigration enforcement to a lesser 
extent than those in Johannesburg indicating that the practices of SAPS officials differ spatially. Some 
examples of the state of exception include lack of administrative justice in status determination, 
inconsistent procedures for permit extensions, and the generation of illegal migrants in the case of 
DHA officials by denying applicants documentation. Other examples with regard to the SAPS and the 
CoCT, include exploitation and extortion, and impunity from any form of sanction for those who 
commit crimes against migrants. 
The less direct encounters migrants have with state officials, the less vulnerable they seem to be to 
abuses by state officials. Migrants had the most encounters with DHA officials owing to its critical 
role of legalising migrants, and the least with the CoCT. Also, state officials with an everyday law 
enforcement responsibility that brings them into the daily spaces in which migrants operate are more 
likely to harass and abuse migrants. Related to this is that foreigners who are entrepreneurs are 
particularly vulnerable to arbitrary and unbridled state power from law enforcement officials, which is 
potentially damaging to their source of livelihood.  
The fourth research question focused on the extent to which a state of exception has shaped 
xenophobia in South Africa. It was found that both the state of exception and xenophobia have an 
exclusionary power which produces similar outcomes in their victims, in this case migrants. In the 
context of the exception, exclusion is embodied in bare life, which was found in the study to manifest 
itself in different ways. After having established that there is a link between the two concepts of the 
state of exception and xenophobia, it is difficult to say with certainty whether a state of exception 
shapes xenophobia or whether xenophobic tendencies contribute to the state of exception. The data 
suggest that they have a complex and intertwined relationship with both being a cause and effect of 
each other. There was evidence of migrants being relegated to a condition of bare life, in which they 
reside in South Africa with unstable legal status and little legal protection as a result of xenophobia. In 
addition, there was also evidence suggesting the idea that xenophobia at the institutional level and 
public xenophobia towards African migrants is conducive to the state of exception.  
As the identified agents of exception exercise their sovereign authority, they have their own 
preconceptions of the relative power of different segments of society vis-à-vis their sovereign power. 
Individual migrants are generally seen as powerless when faced with the sovereign power of the state. 
However, these same officials seem to recognise, or not underestimate, the power of agency in 
challenging state power to realise justice. The data revealed instances of vulnerable migrants turning 
to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that promote the rights and interests of migrants to 
mitigate the state of exception and xenophobia.  
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Taken together, the findings in response to the four research questions summarised above lead to the 
overall conclusion that the practices of state officials towards African migrants and xenophobia in 
South Africa are mutually reinforcing.  
 
7.3 Conclusions 
In line with the stated objectives of the study, this research was able to gain an understanding of the 
way that African migrants experience the sovereign power of the state through their interactions with 
frontline DHA, SAPS and CoCT bureaucrats. Migrants’ individual experiences were both positive and 
negative. The fact that on the whole they were mostly negative is consistent with the literature that 
associates state officials with poor treatment of migrants. The findings on bare life show different 
degrees or experiences of bare life with some interpretations being more or less harsh than others. In 
terms of state-level xenophobia, the finding that not all migrants experienced the state negatively 
could be interpreted to mean that xenophobia at the state level is not institutionalised in the three 
institutions, although there are elements of it. The migrants stating that their experiences of state 
officials depended in part on the individual official could mean that xenophobia at the level of the state 
is expressed more by individuals rather than being an expression of organisational culture.  
The study also sought to establish differences and patterns in the differential treatment of Africans 
based on migrant category and nationality. To this end, it established that the primary basis for 
differential treatment of African migrants by state officials is their foreignness, regardless of which 
African country they come from. Beyond that, subtle differences or patterns in how African migrants 
experience state officials based on their legal status and personal attributes were observed. With 
regard to legal status, differences were observed in the experiences of African migrants with 
immigration officials. Temporary and permanent residents seem to have less harsh experiences of 
state-level xenophobia, while asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants experienced being 
treated particularly poorly.  
South Africa’s Immigration Act favours foreigners that it believes can make an economic contribution 
through their skills and who are able to meet the battery of conditions to gain entry into the country. 
Such migrants who are in the country possess different types of temporary resident permits and 
permanent resident permits. This preference seems to be apparent in the practices of state officials, as 
those migrants who are accepted into the country on the basis of international law obligations, that is 
asylum seekers and refugees, seem to be perceived to be low-skilled or of little worth to the country 
and only reluctantly accepted on humanitarian grounds. This reluctance is also evident in the job 
market where although refugees, for instance, have rights to work without the need for a work permit, 
they face difficulties in getting employment merely because of their legal status, even when they 
possess skills that would enable them to enter the formal job market and contribute towards alleviating 
the skills shortage in South Africa. Thus, both unskilled and skilled migrants in these categories find 
themselves confined to the unskilled labour market, which is very competitive in South Africa. This is 
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because of an oversupply of low-level skills which is a legacy of apartheid and high unemployment 
rates in post-apartheid South Africa. The differential treatment based on a codified hierarchy of 
international migrants could explain why some would experience subtle forms of, or no, xenophobia 
and bare life in South Africa, while others would experience more stark forms. The findings on 
differential treatment highlight the tension raised by Weiner (1996:176) between migration serving the 
interests of the host state and migration serving the interests of migrants. 
In addition, the poor treatment experienced by refugees confirms Agamben’s assertion that the 
refugee, who stands on the threshold of the nation-state, reveals how sovereign power and the state of 
exception operate to define the life of the state’s citizens as apart from that of others (Agamben, 
1998:134). Refugees defy conventional and formal notions of citizenship as their belonging in the host 
countries is thrown into question. They unhinge the state-territory-citizen triad that defines citizenship 
in their home and host states (Agamben, 2000:22).  
While it has been noted that no differential treatment in terms of nationality was observed from the 
perspective of migrants, it is recognised that perhaps a different methodology would have yielded a 
different finding – for instance, if South African respondents were asked for their views of African 
migrants from particular countries. However, the study did discover that personal attributes, such as 
the ability to assert one’s rights (directly or indirectly), one’s occupation, level of education, socio-
economic status and residential area play a role in how one is treated by state officials, something the 
study had not explicitly set out to investigate. These socio-economic factors are no different from 
those that tend to determine the quality of services South African citizens receive from the 
government.  
This research also aimed to locate the practices of state officials towards African migrants within 
political theory. It drew upon political theory on sovereignty and localised this to everyday 
expressions of state power displayed in the interactions of frontline officials of the state with African 
migrants. It adopted Agamben’s theory of the state of exception and used it to investigate how the law 
is applied, or not, to African migrants by state officials and how this impacts on the lives of the 
migrants.  
While it is a fact that the legal status of a foreigner inherently means having inferior claims on the 
state in contrast to citizens (Amisi & Ballard, 2006:321), the legal framework governing migrants in 
South Africa grants them a generous range of rights and protections. Despite this, state officials, 
particularly immigration officials, seem to actively operate from the notion that the state exists only 
for its citizens irrespective of the progressive ideals reflected in the Constitution and the Refugees Act. 
The study infers that this thinking appears to have permeated the approach of the state in dealing with 
migrants. A clear demonstration of this thinking was reflected in the delaying tactics employed by 
DHA officials to deny refugees who are eligible to acquire permanent resident status from doing so. It 
was also demonstrated by the act of issuing of refugee status for a period of only three months in order 
to prevent eligible refugees from accessing social grants. The study also found that while the law and 
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enabling institutions place limits on state power, these can be transgressed with tacit acceptance that 
they are an effort to contain the threat posed by foreigners. This implies that the everyday decisions of 
state officials are not always based on the law as such, but rather on what Agamben (2000:42) refers 
to as the civility and the ethical sense of the official.  
Furthermore, the data show that the state of exception is best observed as a set of collective practices 
in a particular context rather than a single practice in isolation. A number of these practices were 
observed from DHA and SAPS officials, resulting in clear evidence of a state of exception. However, 
the researcher is hesitant to identify the actions observed in the CoCT as constituting a state of 
exception per se, because only one indicator – extortion of migrants – was present and applied to the 
unique experiences of African migrants who were informal traders. On its own this could simply be 
viewed as an example of corrupt state officials or something else. However, the presence of this 
indicator suggests that the site in which African migrants interact with law enforcement agents of the 
CoCT is potentially a space of exception compared to the other spaces in which migrants interact with 
state officials without a law enforcement mandate. While such measures are declared in order to 
protect the state from the ‘migrant threat’ to the body politic, they are not legitimised across the polity 
and seem to be prevalent in state institutions that have regular face-to-face interaction with migrants. 
Some state institutions by virtue of their mandate and level of direct interaction with migrants are able 
to exert more power over the lives of migrants than others.  
Another possible interpretation touched on in Chapter 3 is that the state is simply incapable of 
fulfilling its functions and this is reflected in the practices of state officials towards migrants. The state 
therefore falls short of the classic ideal of sovereignty, or as Jackson (1990) puts it, the state has not 
achieved empirical statehood. His analysis of sovereignty, which is different from Agamben’s is 
shaped around the ideas of negative and positive sovereignty. His analysis of African states is that 
while they possess negative sovereignty, which refers to their juridical recognition as states, they do 
not possess positive sovereignty; positive sovereignty is what gives substance to negative sovereignty 
and includes the state’s ability to deliver political goods to its citizens (Jackson, 1990:29). Jackson 
associates empirical statehood with positive sovereignty and challenges the capabilities of post-
colonial states, which in his view lack both empirical statehood and positive sovereignty.  
A final objective of the study was to define the relationship between the state of exception, and 
xenophobia in South Africa. It was found that the common denominator between the state of exception 
and xenophobia is their ability to exclude and therefore threaten the humanity of migrants. In the state 
of exception, the state is able to act without restraint towards African migrants, under certain 
conditions, and their capacity to resist is minimised, except if they are able to successfully challenge 
the abuse of state power or the extra-legal practices of state officials.  
In addition, while state-level xenophobia may not be institutionalised, exclusion could be 
institutionalised in the bureaucracy to the extent that it allows for differential treatment of migrants 
both in relation to citizens and in relation to other migrants. This exclusion is most entrenched in the 
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DHA, which is responsible for dealing with immigration, and is used as a way to constrain migrants. 
However, migrants can protect themselves from unbridled state power by seeking help from NGOs 
that seek to advance migrants rights. This suggests that the rule of law still applies, if only migrants 
were able to access it through these NGOs or through their own ability to assert their rights. Indeed, an 
educated migrant living in the suburbs and empowered about their rights seems to be able to mitigate 
the state of exception and xenophobia through the resources they possess.  
The state of exception and xenophobia reinforce each other in a complex and non-linear relationship. 
Both the state of exception and xenophobia contribute to the social exclusion of migrants. Xenophobia 
is likely to flourish in an environment where there is a state of exception, which is supported by 
research findings that point to more instances of xenophobia from DHA and SAPS officials. The state 
of exception creates a conducive environment for xenophobia to flourish beyond the state and extend 
into the public arena, thus the state of exception shapes the broader socio-political environment in 
which xenophobia takes place. On the other hand, xenophobic attitudes towards migrants are a 
breeding ground for measures that constitute a state of exception. 
 
7.4 Summary of this study’s contributions 
The first contribution of this research is to the body of theory, particularly in advancing a political 
understanding of xenophobia by examining state responses to international migration and the 
consequences thereof. It systematically applies Agamben’s twin concepts of the state of exception and 
bare life to understanding xenophobia in South Africa, which is directed at black African migrants. In 
so doing, it moves away from mainstream analyses which attempt to explain the poor treatment of 
African migrants in South Africa on the basis of a legacy of apartheid, citizens’ disillusionment with 
the socio-economic performance of the ANC led post-apartheid administration and strained relations 
between African migrants and their host communities due to the contestation of resources. Instead, it 
deploys Agamben’s theory to argue that having construed the unprecedented arrival of African 
migrants as a national human security threat, the South African state has resorted to extra-legal 
measures to control and discourage immigration, with serious consequences on the dignity and welfare 
of African migrants. This has important implications for law and rights in South Africa. 
While evidence of Agamben’s (1998, 2005) state of exception was observed in this research, it is not a 
pervasive or permanent state of exception, or ‘camp’, to use Agamben’s term. The camp is Agamben’s 
metaphor for the space that is created when the state of exception starts to become the rule (Agamben, 
2000:39). The disjuncture between the letter of the law and its practice is not unique to migration 
matters or to South Africa. Boone (2003:4) and others have already recognised the gap between the 
formal rules that define institutional structure and functions, and the real politics of how government 
agencies work. It is worth recalling that one of the things that sets Agamben’s theory apart from other 
theories that acknowledge the suspension of the law is that he argues that over time the state of 
exception has ceased to be a provisional measure and has become a working paradigm of governments 
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or a fact of everyday life in contemporary politics that is difficult to reverse. It is also worth noting that 
while evidence of bare life was presented in the study, it did not fall into the dualism that Agamben 
has developed of the concept but instead manifested itself in multiple ways. So, what does this mean 
for the application of Agamben’s theory in the context of this study?  
It means that Agamben’s theory is not without its limitations as far as the empirical study is 
concerned. Although there was evidence of the suspension of law this occurs alongside the rule of law. 
This claim is made on the basis of three research findings. One is that despite there being a state of 
exception, it did not affect all migrants, with some reporting positive experiences with state officials. 
Secondly, there was evidence that although the rule of law is suspended or used to constrain African 
migrants, it can be challenged, thus minimising the production of bare life. Two examples of this from 
the research are NGOs’ litigation against the DHA following the closure of the Cape Town RRO, and 
the help provided by NGOs to individual migrants to get services from state institutions. Thirdly, not 
all migrants were reduced to bare life, the form of subjectivity produced by and captured in sovereign 
power.  
The theoretical significance of the study is that its findings did not entirely resonate with Agamben’s 
theoretical subtleties. Stated differently, it is consistent with Agamben’s theory of the state of 
exception, but only up to a point, after which its conclusions differ. The evidence of a state of 
exception from the practices of DHA and SAPS officials especially, and the revelation that the legal 
categories of the asylum seeker, refugee and illegal foreigner are the most vulnerable categories 
compared to others, is consistent with Agamben’s theory. The point of divergence from this theory is 
that the exception has not become the rule or the nomos of modern sovereignty and the rule of law still 
has its place, if one has the resources to access it. However, it still calls into question South Africa’s 
liberal and constitutional democracy when a segment of the population is socially excluded.  
While Agamben’s claim about ‘the camp’ precludes the emancipatory possibilities that the state of 
exception can open up and thus create a check on state power, this research found evidence to suggest 
that NGOs that work on migrants’ issues provide migrants with a way to challenge the state of 
exception, although the extent to which such NGO efforts are successful has yet to be explored. 
Indeed, other scholars have criticised Agamben for presenting the state of exception as the nomos of 
modern sovereignty as mentioned in Chapter 3. Laclau (2007:17) argues that countertendencies to the 
state of exception, such as social movements, point to a more optimistic future while Ong (2006:23) 
contends that the shifting legal and moral terrain of humanity has become more complex. 
While the state by its very nature draws distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, it may also 
have embraced sovereignty that is rule-based or democratic, which is the case in South Africa. This is 
expressed in the laws of the state. Relating this to the Constitution and the Refugees Act, which have 
been identified as relevant to this research, it can be said that these laws counter the effects of the 
underlying exclusionary character of the state along citizenship lines by guaranteeing migrants who 
manage to gain entry into South Africa a broad range of rights. It is the mere existence of these laws 
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that opens up the possibility for migrants to avoid marginalisation, despite the fact that the chances of 
their accessing social justice appear slim or that these laws are not always upheld. 
Furthermore, the findings on bare life suggest varying degrees of it with some interpretations being 
more or less harsh than others, which Agamben does not seem to acknowledge in his work. Based on 
this, the author supports the criticism that Agamben has received for his dualistic theorisation of homo 
sacer or bare life where someone is either homo sacer or potentially homo sacer with no in-between. 
Instead, homo sacer, according to Long (in Ek, 2006:371), should be regarded as being “less solid and 
stable” than Agamben proposes.  
The second contribution of this study is empirical in that it provides a nuanced understanding of 
xenophobia, thus augmenting the findings of existing studies. In terms of state-level xenophobia from 
DHA officials, migrants experienced either more subtle or harsh forms of it, depending on their legal 
status in the country. Immigration status of the migrant matters more than the country of origin in 
determining their treatment by state institutions. Asylum seekers, refugees and illegal foreigners are 
the migrant categories most vulnerable to xenophobia from immigration officials. With regard to 
institutional xenophobia from the SAPS and the CoCT, it seems that legal category is not a 
distinguishing factor. Rather it is the officials’ own perceptions of the migrants either as powerless and 
rightless individuals, or as powerful as a result of their perceived social standing. The generalisation 
that can be made from this, to the extent that the data allow, is that migrants are able to minimise the 
possibility of xenophobic treatment from these officials when they encounter them if they are 
relatively well off economically, educated, live in a suburb and have recourse to the law or access to 
migrants’ organisations.  
Empirically, this study also showed the lack of uniformity in the exclusionary bureaucratic practices of 
the three institutions although they are all part of the state. The conclusion that can be drawn from this 
is that not all state institutions are complicit in declaring a state of exception but rather those which 
have more direct and day-to-day interaction with migrants. Furthermore, the less direct encounters 
migrants have with state officials, the less vulnerable they are to arbitrary and unbridled state power.  
This reveals the ambivalent position within which migrants find themselves. On one hand, the state 
defines them as a threat to national belonging and security and on the other hand, they are portrayed as 
human beings with constitutionally guaranteed rights (Zembylas, 2010:31).  
The practical implications of the study lie in the existing approaches that have been embraced by the 
state to address institutional xenophobia. In so far as the empirical data can be generalised, state-led 
approaches, which are widely advocated, are unlikely to counter xenophobia. This is not simply due to 
the state’s stance of denial discussed in earlier chapters but because, firstly, the very configuration of 
the state distinguishes between citizen and non-citizen. Secondly, the general prevailing attitude of 
state officials, particularly among immigration officials, is that African migrants are a threat that needs 
to be contained, even if it is through violation and/or non-application of the law. It is therefore difficult 
to expect that the same state institution which regards the exclusion of African migrants as a way of 
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protecting state sovereignty would successfully counter xenophobia. This may explain why the DHA 
has been unable to successfully fulfil its pledge in the preamble of the Immigration Act to prevent and 
counter xenophobia within government and society (Republic of South Africa, 2002). The state of 
exception and state-level xenophobia – though not institutionalised – combine to form a powerful tool 
of territorial control. Instead, a strategy to counter xenophobia that challenges the state of exception in 
government institutions and the attitudes of state officials is more likely to have an impact. 
 
7.5 Suggestions for further research 
This study was limited in scope to addressing the research questions. It was delimited to address the 
issue in a particular geographical location and to selected state officials and research respondents. 
However, from the findings, some which revealed issues beyond the scope of study, two possible areas 
for further research have been identified. This study has established that the state of exception is not 
becoming the rule. However, given the delimitation of the study to African migrants it has not 
exlpored whether citizens are biopolitical subjects who are also exposed to bare life as Agamben 
asserts. It would therefore be interesting to test Agamben’s hypothesis that for the marginalised and 
poor, the exception has almost always been the rule by investigating the state of exception in other 
spheres with respect to such groups in South Africa. Such an investigation could also consider the 
ramifications of the state of exception to the broader functioning of the South African state and its 
implications for the rule of law. 
Another way of extending this scholarship is to undertake research into how the state of exception can 
be challenged to prevent it from becoming the norm or from producing bare life. It was noted that 
power dynamics exist between the sovereign state and the subject with respect to state officials and 
African migrants in the state of exception. There was evidence from the study that NGOs which 
champion migrants’ rights can challenge the state of exception on behalf of individual migrants. Such 
research could therefore explore how agency can be developed and used to emancipate migrants from 
the biopolitical aspect of sovereign power and the conditions under which such agency is likely or 
unlikely to succeed. 
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Appendix A: Interview themes and questions for respondents 
 
I. Migrant respondents 
General 
1. How long have you been in South Africa? 
2. What is your country of origin? 
3. What was your reason for coming to South Africa? 
4. What is your legal status? 
5. How much longer do you intend to stay in SA? Do you want to become a permanent 
resident/citizen? 
6. What South African languages do you speak? 
7. Where do you live? 
8. What do you do for a living? 
9. How do you think people identify you as a foreigner?  
10. Have you ever experienced any form of discrimination and/or hostility in South Africa? If yes, 
please give details. 
11. Do you feel that you have ever been treated differently from a South African citizen by a state 
official? If yes, how? 
12. Have you ever been a victim of crime? If yes, please describe. 
13. Have you ever been a victim of public violence? If yes, please describe. 
Department of Home Affairs 
14. What have been your reasons for visiting the DHA?  
15. How were you treated at DHA offices or by immigration officials at your port of entry or? 
16. Have you ever had to renew your permit or change your legal status? If yes, please describe 
the process and your encounter with the DHA. 
17. Have you ever had to unlawfully give money to a DHA official? If yes, for what reason(s) and 
how much? 
18. Have you ever been harassed or threatened by a DHA official? If yes, please give details. 
South African Police Service 
19. Have you ever been in a situation where you required assistance from the police? If yes, 
please give details of the situation, the assistance provided and how you were treated. 
20. Have you ever been asked by the police to produce your permit/ evidence of your legal 
status? 
21. Have you ever been detained or arrested by the police? If yes, please describe the alleged 
offence.  
22. Have you ever had to unlawfully give money to the police? If yes, for what reason(s) and how 
much? 
23. Have you ever been harassed or threatened by the police? If yes, please give details. 
24. Have you ever been verbally or physically abused by the police? If yes, please give details. 
Local municipality 
25. What services do you receive from your local municipality? 
26. Have you had any personal encounter with municipal officials regarding the above services? I 
yes, please give details of how you were treated and the assistance provided. 
27. Are there any services that you are not entitled to from your municipality because you are not 
a South African? 
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II. NGO respondents 
1. What is the mandate of your organisation? 
2. What types of migrants do you work with? 
3. What issues do they come to you with relating to DHA, SAPS and local government officials? 
4. How are they treated by DHA, SAPS and local government officials? 
5. Does the way they are treated have anything to do with their nationality or legal status in 
South Africa? 
6. Do you know of instances of extra-legal practices by the above state officials towards African 
migrants? 
7. Have any migrants been unfairly targeted by the above state officials? 
 
 
III. State respondents 
Department of Home Affairs 
1. How would you describe South Africa’s immigration policy? 
2. How many foreigners are living in South Africa (both legally and illegally)? Please provide the 
statistics of African migrants living in South Africa. 
3. What challenges does your department face in implementing the Immigration Act and 
Refugees Act? 
4. How many permit applications has the department received and processed in 2012 and 2013 
nationally/from the Western Cape? 
5. How many appeals have you received for rejected applications in 2012 and 2013 and what is 
the result of these appeals? 
6. What is the current backlog in processing the various types of permits and what do you 
attribute the delay to? 
7. Please provide statistics of immigration offenses committed by African migrants? 
8. How are any discretionary powers given to DHA officials by the above legislation exercised?  
9. What is the role of the SAPS in immigration enforcement and what is its legal basis? 
10. Are there instances in which staff have contravened the Immigration Act and the Refugees 
Act? How has this been dealt with? 
11. Do you receive complaints from migrants about how they are treated by your staff? Please 
give examples. 
12. To what extent is xenophobia an issue within the department? 
South African Police Service 
1. What is the role of the SAPS in immigration enforcement? 
2. What is the legal basis for SAPS involvement in immigration enforcement? 
3. How does the SAPS go about identifying foreigners? 
4. What challenges does your department face in policing that have to do with foreigners? 
5. How many migrants have been arrested for immigration offences in the Western Cape in 2012 
and 2013? 
6. What procedure is followed once an illegal foreigner is apprehended? 
7. How many migrants have been arrested for crime in the Western Cape in 2012 and 2013? 
8. How many African migrants have reported cases where they have been victims of crime? 
9. To what extent is xenophobia an issue within the department? 
City of Cape Town 
1. What is the population of non-South Africans living in your municipality? 
2. What is their profile in terms of nationality, legal status, gender, occupation etc? 
3. What is the role of local government in providing services to non-South Africans living in your 
municipality? 
4. What challenges do you face in providing these services? 
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5. What public services are migrants living in South Africa entitled to? 
6. What municipal services are free of charge to migrants and which ones are charged? 
7. Does your municipality provide targeted services to vulnerable migrants? 
8. What is your relationship with the DHA & SAPS? 
9. To what extent is xenophobia an issue in your municipality? 
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Appendix B: Cases of xenophobic violence recorded in 2011 and 2012 
 
Month Year Province Place Description 
Dec 2012 Western 
Cape 
 The Somali Board of South Africa reports that at 
least a total of 45 Somali nationals were murdered 
following robberies and xenophobic attacks. 
Nov 2011 Western 
Cape 
 The Somali Board of South Africa reports that over 
60 Somali nationals were killed in 2011. 
Oct 2012 North 
West 
Rustenburg In three days, five foreign- owned shops and 10 cars 
are destroyed by a gang.  
Aug 2012 Gauteng Mayfair A group calling themselves the South African Blacks 
Association terrorises foreign nationals. The group 
threatens foreign national business owners and 
residents, organises raids against foreign nationals 
and spreads hate speech. 
Aug 2012 Limpopo Northern 
Limpopo 
Province 
Police shut down hundreds of shops run by refugees 
and asylum seekers during an operation to enforce 
trading laws that observers said were “selectively 
enforced” to target foreign nationals. 
Jul 2012 Western 
Cape 
Beacon Valley 
(Cape Town) 
Four Spaza shops are petrol- bombed within minutes 
of each other. 
Jul 2012 Western 
cape 
Bishop Lavis Four spaza shops owned by foreign nationals are 
petrol- bombed. 
Jul/ 
Jun  
2012 Free 
State 
Botshabelo More than 500 foreign nationals are displaced after 
attacks against their businesses. 
Jun 2012 Gauteng Johannesburg 
Lindela 
Repatriation 
Centre  
Riot by various NGO and foreign nationals against 
the inhuman conditions at the Johannesburg Lindela 
Repatriation Centre. 
May 2012 Eastern 
Cape 
   Khayelisha Fifteen Somali owned shops are closed after 
Zanokhanyo Retailers Association threaten to burn 
down and destroy foreign owned tuck- shops. 
Residents in Khayelisha come to the defence of the 
Somali traders. 
May 2012 Limpopo Modimole One hundred and six protesters are arrested with 23 
being minors for vandalising and looting foreign 
owned shops in the area. They are all later released 
on warnings and the case is postponed to 31 August 
for further investigations. 
Feb 2012 Gauteng Orange Farm, 
Johannesburg 
Thirteen nationals are attacked, beaten and left in 
critical conditions in the shacks of Orange Farm. 
Feb 2012 Free 
State 
Thabong, 
Welkom, 
Odendaalsrus 
A number of shops owned by foreigners are broke 
into, set alight, and looted. 43 residents are arrested 
for public violence and looting. 
Feb 2012 Free 
State 
Thabong More than 250 Bangladeshi’s are left displaced after 
unemployed youth vandalise and loot shops owned 
by foreign nationals in the township. 
Feb 2012 Gauteng Diepsloot Two Zimbabwean men, Nkululeko Mathwasa and 
Blessing Tshuma are murdered by a mob after 
allegations that they committed theft in the 
community.  
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Feb 2012 Gauteng Doornhill Eight foreign nationals from Zimbabwe and Malawi 
are beaten by men at night in their shacks. All are 
critically wounded and are taken by ambulance to 
Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital. 
Jan 2012 Western 
Cape 
Maitland 
Refugee 
Reception 
Office 
Maitland police refuse to help a Zimbabwean man 
who was beaten by security guards at a refugee 
reception office (Maitland Refugee Reception Office). 
They refuse him the right to open a case because his 
identification document has expired. 
Jan 2012 Gauteng Thokoza (East 
Rand) 
A shop co- owned by two Bangladeshi men is petrol- 
bombed after a few locals demand that foreign shop 
owners close down. The two shop co-owners surfer 
severe burns and later die in hospital. Two cases of 
murder are opened. 
Nov 2011 Gauteng    Ekurhuleni,   
Johannesburg 
Hundreds of Ekurhuleni residents take to the streets 
of Johannesburg demanding that the Gauteng 
government shut down shops owned by foreign 
nationals in their area. They march to the Gauteng 
Premier Nomvula Mokonyane’s office to hand over a 
memorandum demanding that local government 
support businesses owned by local citizens, stop 
rezoning processes, halt malls from operating in 
townships and evict foreigners staying in RDP 
houses. 
Nov 2011 Gauteng Ekurhuleni, 
Johannesburg 
Small business owners from Ekurhuleni warn of 
xenophobic violence if the Gauteng government 
does not act to its call following their march to their 
Gauteng Premier. 
Oct 2011 Gauteng Alexandra 
Township 
Increased xenophobic tension. Residents of the 
township of warn of an uprising over foreigners living 
in RDP houses.   
Oct 2011 Gauteng Alexandra Foreign residents of the Alexandra township (north of 
Johannesburg) are intimidated by the Alexandra 
Bonafides Movement (ABM) — a resident’s group 
accusing foreigners of taking part in corrupt practices 
to secure Reconstruction Development Programme 
(RDP) housing. 
Oct 2011 Gauteng Itereleng 
informal 
settlement 
near Laudium 
Foreign nationals were evicted from their houses and 
businesses by locals. More than 60 foreign nationals 
were displaced. 
Oct 2011 Gauteng Atteridgeville Several businesses owned by foreign nationals are 
broken into and looted. 
Aug 2011 Eastern 
Cape 
East London Armed gang shoots and kills a prominent Somali 
cleric, who is also a businessman. Major manhunt to 
arrest those behind the killing. 
Aug 2011 Limpopo Dennilton,         
Polokwane 
A Bangladeshi shop owner is robbed and set on fire. 
The 35-year-old was robbed of his money, groceries 
and cellphone and was then doused with paraffin 
and set alight. The man sustains serious burn 
injuries and is hospitalized. 
Aug 2011 Limpopo Musina Two armed men and another with an axe entered a 
couple's house at 02:00. The Zimbabwean couple is 
robbed and two of the men rape the woman raped. 
They chopped off the man's right. They also take the 
couple's passports and money. 
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Aug 2011 Gauteng Lenesia Two men rape and stone a Zimbabwean to death. 
Another victim (also Zimbabwean) is also raped and 
stoned but survives. The men are found two days 
later and are arrested and appear in the Vereeniging 
Magistrate’s Court.  
Jul 2011 KwaZulu-
Natal 
Durban A Somali businessman dies and another is seriously 
injured after armed gangsters raided their shop. 
Jun 2011 Western 
Cape 
Cape Town Two Somali shop owners are murdered. 
Jun 2011 Limpopo Seshego, 
Limpopo 
A Zimbabwean man is stoned and beaten to death. 
Twelve men are arrested, including a ward 
councillor. 
   Jun 2011 Limpopo Seshego, 
Limpopo 
Twenty eight Zimbabwean xenophobia victims are 
sheltered at Seshego police station outside 
Polokwane after losing their homes and belongings 
in xenophobic attacks in Seshego. 
Jun 2011 Limpopo Polokwane  More than 3000 Zimbabweans fled to hide in bushes 
after they were attacked by residents of Extensions 
71, 72, 75 and 76 near Polokwane last week. Six 
houses belonging to the Zimbabweans have been 
torched during the attacks. 
Jun 2011 Gauteng Diepsloot Community members are angry and blame foreign 
nationals in the community for the increasing 
housebreaking in their area. One person though to 
be a foreigner is beaten to death. It is later found out 
that the murdered man was from Limpopo. 
Jun 2011 Gauteng Diepsloot Two Zimbabweans are kicked and beaten to death 
after being accused of robbery. 
Jun 2011 Gauteng Diepsloot A suspected thief narrowly escapes with his life 
when police arrive just in time to prevent a mob from 
killing him. 
Jun 2011 Gauteng Diepsloot 26 year old Farai Kujirichita is brutally murdered by a 
mob. This is video tapped and months later receives 
international coverage. Kujirichita's "crime" was that 
he was a Zimbabwean in the wrong place at the 
wrong time. 
Jun 2011 Gauteng Germiston Police hold back a crowd of more than 100 – 
including members of the Greater Gauteng Business 
Forum (GGBF) – in Ramaphosa informal settlement 
near Germiston, east of Johannesburg, as they 
attempt to forcibly close foreign-owned businesses 
there. 
Jun 2011 Gauteng  Ramaphosa A crowd march through an informal settlement in 
Johannesburg chanting: "We want the Somalis to 
stay." The march is intended to counter a protest by 
local businessmen demanding the closure of foreign-
owned shops. 
 
May 2011   Eastern 
    Cape 
Motherwell, 
Port Elizabeth 
More than 50 Somali-owned shops are attacked and 
looted. About twenty Somali shop owners find shelter 
at the Motherwell shelter. 
May 2011 Eastern 
Cape 
Kwadwesi, 
Port Elizabeth 
Three shops are looted and one is burnt down in 
Kwadwesi. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
202 
 
May  2011 Limpopo Leppelle- 
Nkumpi 
A number of Pakistanis are attacked. This follows 
after a young girl is allegedly raped by a Pakistani in 
his house. About three shops are set alight and more 
than 15 Pakistanis are temporarily housed at a police 
station in Lebowakgomo, Polokwane. 
Mar 2011 Gauteng Katlehong Seventy-one people are arrested for sending 
intimidating letters to foreign-owned businesses. The 
letters from "Greater Gauteng Business Forum" 
threatened drastic action against business owners 
who did not comply. 
Mar 2011 Gauteng Pretoria Woman mocked and denied access to a Putco bus 
by the bus driver because of her foreign nationality 
an inability to speak South African ethnic languages. 
Feb 2011 Western 
Cape 
Delft A shopkeeper is killed and another injured in a 
botched robbery at their shop. 
Feb 2011 Mpumala
nga 
Ermelo Somali shop owners fall victim to the violent service 
delivery protests outside Ermelo. Shops are looted 
and goods are taken and destroyed. 
Feb 2011 Gauteng Ramaphosa Renewed threats from locals against foreign shop 
owners. Shop owners were threatened by locals 
demanding that they immediately shut down their 
businesses and leave the area. 
Jan 2011 Gauteng Randfontein, 
Johannesburg 
71 foreign nationals face eviction from a temporary 
refugee shelter in Randfontein. The occupiers are all 
people displaced from their communities during the 
xenophobic attacks of May 2008. They were taken to 
the Reit Shelter and promised they would receive 
assistance to re-integrate into South African society 
or to resettle outside South Africa. The shelter failed 
to provide the assistance promised. 
Jan 2011  Gauteng Freedom Park 56 shops belonging to foreign nationals are closed 
while police investigations continue after local 
residents attack business owners in the area. 
Jan 2011 North 
West 
Madibogo An attack on a 23-year-old resident in the area has 
outraged residents, who are targeting Chinese 
people in the area they believe are responsible for 
the assault. A Chinese group allegedly targeted the 
individual for shoplifting from one of their tuck shops 
in the area. The attack lives the injured person in 
hospital. 
Residents demand that police arrest those 
responsible for the attack. They also threaten 
Chinese people operating businesses in the area, 
who have since abandoned their premises. 
 Source: Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (2014) 
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Appendix C: List of interview respondents 
 
I. Migrants 
Respondent 
ID 
Nationality and gender Legal status Date of interview 
1 Zimbabwean man Work permit 16 August 2013 
2 Zimbabwean woman Study permit 10 October 2013 
3 Zimbabwean man  Permanent resident permit 19 October 2013 
4 Zimbabwean man Work permit 27 July 2013 
5 Zimbabwean man Illegal foreigner 27 July 2013 
6 Zimbabwean woman Work permit 27 July 2013 
7 Zimbabwean woman Illegal foreigner 8 August 2013 
8 Zimbabwean woman Asylum seeker permit 7 September 2013 
9 Malawian man Asylum seeker permit 6 September 2013 
10 Malawian woman Illegal foreigner 7 September 2013 
11 Malawian woman Illegal foreigner 7 September 2013 
12 Mozambican man Study permit 8 October 2013 
13 Mozambican man Study permit 8 October 2013 
14 Mozambican man Study permit 8 October 2013 
15 Mozambican man Visitor’s visa43 8 October 2013 
16 Nigerian man Study permit 8 August 2013 
17 Nigerian man Asylum seeker permit 8 August 2013 
18 Congolese44 woman Refugee permit 17 August 2013 
19 Congolese man Asylum seeker permit 17 August 2013 
20 Congolese woman Asylum seeker permit 29 August 2013 
21 Congolese man Refugee permit 29 August 2013 
22 Congolese man Illegal foreigner 2 August 2013 
                                                     
43
 This migrant has been in South Africa since 2001 mostly on a study permit. His study permit expired but he 
had applied for permanent residence before it expired and he is using a visitor’s visa while his permanent 
residence application is being processed.   
44
 Note that Congolese refers to both migrants originally from the DRC and Congo. Respondents 18 to 24 are 
from the DRC and respondents 32 and 33 are from Congo. 
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23 Congolese man Refugee permit 16 August 2013 
24 Congolese man Refugee permit 17 August 2013 
25 Somali woman Refugee permit 7 August 2013 
26 Somali man Refugee permit 27 August 2013 
27 Somali woman Refugee permit 30 August 2013 
28 Rwandan man Asylum seeker permit 13 September 2013 
29 Rwandan woman Refugee permit 25 September 2013 
30 Ugandan woman Asylum seeker permit 2 August 2013 
31 Ugandan woman Refugee permit 5 September 2013 
32 Congolese man Work permit 14 August 2013 
33 Congolese man Asylum seeker permit 7 September 2013 
34 Angolan man Refugee permit 17 August 2013 
35 Ethiopian man Refugee permit 6 September 2013 
36 Ethiopian man Refugee permit 9 September 2013 
37 Burundi woman Refugee permit 31 July 2013 
38 Burundi man Asylum seeker permit 16 September 2013 
39 Kenyan man Refugee permit 26 July 2013 
40 Kenyan man Refugee permit 30 September 2013 
 
II. Key informants and state institutions 
Respondent 
ID 
Designation Institution Date of interview 
41 Director Cape Town Refugee Centre 
(CTRC) 
19 July 2013 
42 Researcher African Centre for Migration and 
Society (ACMS) 
29 October 2013 
43 Head of Field Office United Nations Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR) 
9 September 2013 
44 Advocacy Officer Scalabrini Centre 16 July 2013 
45 Advocacy Officer Agency for Refugee Education, 
Skills Training and Advocacy 
(ARESTA) 
18 July 2013 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
205 
 
46 Attorney Legal Resources Centre (LRC) 20 September 2013 
47 Community Liaison Officer People Against Suffering 
Oppression and Poverty 
(PASSOP) 
19 July 2013 
48 City Manager City of Cape Town 23 July 2013 
49 Deputy Provincial 
Commissioner  
South African Police Service 6 August 2013 
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Appendix D: Code list 
Abuse of asylum system 
ACCESS TO OTHER SERVICES 
access_Banking services 
access_Other 
access_Social services 
Asylum seeker numbers 
Certification process for refugees 
BARE LIFE 
CRIME VICTIM 
crime_Assault 
crime_Business burglary 
crime_House burglary 
crime_Mugging 
crime_Public violence 
crime_Shooting 
crime_Unknown 
crime_Xenophobic 
D_DISCRIMINATION 
d_Higher education 
d_Homophobia 
d_Housing 
d_In customer service 
d_Inability to speak local language 
d_Job 
d_Racism 
DHA_+TREATMENT 
DHA_ACCESS 
dha_access_Chaotic environment 
dha_access_Long queues 
dha_access_Multiple visits before being served 
dha_access_Sleeping outside 
dha_access_Stressful 
DHA_ASYLUM SEEKER TRANSIT PERMIT 
DHA_BRIBE (agent) 
DHA_CONTRIBUTION TO UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS 
dha_contribution_Delay in processing permit 
dha_contribution_Lost files 
dha_contribution_Not accepting newcomers 
dha_contribution_Not accepting those who lodged their claims in other RROs 
dha_contribution_Unprocedural 
DHA_COURT ORDERS 
DHA_DELAYS IN PROCESSING PERMITS 
dha_delays_Adjudicating asylum claim 
dha_delays_Appeal hearings 
dha_delays_Certification 
dha_delays_PR permits 
dha_delays_Refugee IDs 
dha_delays_Refugee travel documents 
dha_delays_Study permits 
dha_delays_Verification of permits 
dha_delays_Volunteer permit 
dha_delays_Work permits 
DHA_DIFFS BASED ON STATUS & NATIONALITY 
dha_diffs_Nationality & race 
dha_diffs_Status 
DHA_EXP GETTING PERMIT NEG 
DHA_EXP GETTING PERMIT POS 
dha_exp_pos_Asylum permit 
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dha_exp_pos_Refugee status 
dha_exp_pos_Study permit 
dha_exp_pos_Work permit 
DHA_EXTENSIONS 
dha_extn_Expired permits 
dha_extn_Length 
dha_extn_Procedures 
dha_extn_Renewing in a diff RRO from where first permit was issued 
DHA_IMMIGRATION 
dha_immigration enforcement 
dha_immigration raids 
DHA_INTERNAL ISSUES 
dha_internal_Changes from 1 day to the next 
dha_internal_Corruption 
dha_internal_Facilities 
dha_internal_Fraudulent asylum seeker permits 
dha_internal_High absenteeism 
dha_internal_Huge backlogs 
dha_internal_Lack of capacity 
dha_internal_Lack of political will 
dha_internal_No admin justice 
dha_internal_Non-responsiveness to researchers 
dha_internal_Poor mgmt 
dha_internal_Poor staff supervision 
dha_internal_Poor working conditions 
dha_internal_Reasons for shortlived recent imprvmnts & good ol' days 
DHA_INTERVIEW PROCESS 
DHA_LINDELA 
DHA_NEWCOMERS 
DHA_OTHER SERVICES 
dha_other_Corrections 
dha_other_Family reunification 
DHA_PERMIT ISSUED OUTSIDE SA 
DHA_RRO CLOSURE & RELOC 
DHA_RRO CLOSURE COURT CASE 
DHA_STAFF 
dha_Staff homophobic 
dha_Staff unhelpful 
dha_Staff unproductive 
dha_Staff unqualified 
DHA_-TREATMENT 
DHA_TREATMENT INCONSISTENT 
dha_-trmt_Bad 
dha_-trmt_Don't believe u 
dha_-trmt_Don't care 
dha_-trmt_Harassment 
dha_-trmt_Inhuman/slave 
dha_-trmt_Insulting 
dha_-trmt_Physically abusive/violent 
dha_-trmt_Rude 
dha_-trmt_Throw their weight around 
dha_-trmt_Unfair 
dha_-trmt_Xenophobic 
DHA_UNLAWFUL ARREST 
DHA_ZIM-SA BORDER IMMIGRATION PROCEDURE 
Experience of exploitation & extortion 
EXPERIENCES WITH CITIZENS BY RACE 
F_FUTURE PLANS 
fp_Go back to home country 
fp_Go back to home country or other country 
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fp_Go back to home country or stay depending 
fp_Go to another country 
fp_Stay in SA 
fp_Stay in SA or go to another country 
Fraudulent work permit & arrested 
HOSTILITY 
HR violated 
Identified as a foreigner 
Identified as a foreigner sometimes & as a local sometimes 
Illegal foreigners 
LG_+VE EXPERIENCE 
LG_Better services in SA than home country 
LG_CT rezoning 
LG_No experience 
LG_Not promoting integration 
LG_Promotes coexistence btwn foreigners & citizens 
LG_Protests & xenophobia 
LG_Reason for no interaction 
LG_-VE EXPERIENCE 
lg_-xp_Business licence 
lg_-xp_Clinic_Discrimination 
lg_-xp_Clinic_No translator 
lg_-xp_Clinic_Poor services 
lg_-xp_Clinic_Waited the whole day to be served 
lg_-xp_MP_Business raids/searches 
lg_-xp_MP_Extortion 
lg_-xp_MP_Xenophobia 
Life in SA 
Migrant producing countries 
Migrants as soft targets 
Nice SAns 
Organisational mandate 
Perceptions of migration in SA 
PERSONAL INFO 
pi_Change of status 
pi_Migrant category 
pi_Nationality 
pi_Occupation 
pi_Reason for coming to SA 
pi_Residential area 
pi_SA languages spoken 
pi_Time in SA 
Premeditated nature of xenophobic attacks 
Reason for govt denial of xenophobia 
Reason for not applying for PR 
Reason for state officials actions towards migrants 
Reasons why SA is a refugee destination 
Refugee applied for certification 
SA immigration policy 
SAPS_+VE EXPERIENCE 
SAPS_ASKED TO SHOW PERMIT 
saps_Asked to show permit in CT 
saps_Asked to show permit in East London 
saps_Asked to show permit in Joburg 
saps_Asked to show permit in Rustenburg 
SAPS_EXPLANATION FOR VARIATIONS 
SAPS_IMMIGRATION POLICING 
saps_IP diffs btwn CT & Joburg 
saps_IP in CT 
saps_IP in Joburg 
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SAPS_Reluctance to get involved in migrants against migrants conflicts 
SAPS_-VE EXPERIENCE 
saps_-ve experience_Because of being a foreigner 
saps_-ve experience_Nothing to do with being a foreigner 
saps_-xp_Bad treatment 
saps_-xp_Bribe 
saps_-xp_Came when it was too late 
saps_-xp_Exploitation & extortion 
saps_-xp_Let locals get away with stealing from/attacking migrants 
saps_-xp_Let locals loot migrant's business 
saps_-xp_Looted/Raided migrant's business 
saps_-xp_Never came when I called them 
saps_-xp_Nothing happens after reporting/opening a case 
saps_-xp_Raided migrant's hse 
saps_-xp_Refused to do affidavits 
saps_-xp_Threatened migrant 
Section 22 rights 
STEREOTYPING 
Time it took to get permit 
Undocumented but using paper from lawyer 
Undocumented but using proof of permit application 
Unfounded & manifestly unfounded 
XENOPHOBIA 
xic_Attitudes 
xic_Services inaccessible 
xic_Threats 
xic_Verbal 
xic_Violence/crime 
XTRA INFO 
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